











This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
• This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
• A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
• This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
• The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
• When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 







INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES & INSTANCE BASED DECISION MAKING: 













MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY IN PSYCHOLOGY 
THE UNIVERSITY of EDINBURGH 
 SCHOOL of PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY  













LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………v 
LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………………..vii 
LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………………………...viii 
ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………ix 



















I would like to thank my academic supervisor Dr. Elizabeth Austin for helping to set 
up and supervising the studies I present in this thesis, Professor Nick Chater from 
UCL for providing information regarding the development of the risk-taking task in 
study 1-A and suggesting instance based decision making literature review 
references, Dr. Benjamin Hilbig for providing a thorough description of the 
methodology regarding the calculation and experimental application of the (DI) in 
study 2, Professor Neil Stewart from Warwick University for providing helpful 
comments on the development of binary choice decision making tasks and offering 
examples based on one of his datasets that he kindly shared with me, the internal 
examiner of this thesis Professor Lars Penke from Edinburgh University for helpful 
comments and suggestions throughout this manuscript, and finally the external 
examiner of this thesis Professor Thomas Chamorro-Premuzic from UCL for helpful 
comments and suggestions throughout this manuscript. Any errors and or omissions 
in this thesis remain my own. 
On another level I would like to thank Kostas, Ali, and Robert for being good 
"mentors" on the inside workings of the psychology department at Edinburgh 
University, also for being good company and serving as postgraduate role model 
students balancing out their time wisely between the odd departmental chat and 
meaningful research. I certainly looked up to each one of them for inspiration and 
consultation on a number of things ranging from where to find the best kebab shop in 
town to how one ought to spend a Saturday night in Edinburgh while being a 
postgraduate student. 
I would also like to thank Katie Keltie from the postgraduate office for tirelessly 
responding in zero time to all of my queries, she surely was the single most kind staff 

















I dedicate my work to my mother Eleni and my family Giada and Alexandros for 
they have changed and enlightened my life in numerous beautiful ways. Without 






























LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
ANCOVA: Analysis of Covariance 
ANOVA: Analysis of Variance 
CA: Cognitive Abilities 
EI: Emotional Intelligence 
TEI: Trait Emotional Intelligence 
EMRE: Emotional Regulation 
MAO: Monoamine Oxidase 
FC: Frontal Cortex 
PFC: Prefrontal Cortex 
VMPFC: Ventr Medial Prefrontal Cortex 
JSH: Joint Systems Hypothesis 
MRA: Multiple Regression Analysis 
SRA: Sequential Regression Analysis 
DM: Decision Making 
IBDM: Instance Based Decision Making 
RT: Risk Taking 
ID: Individual Differences 
PA: Positive Affect 
NA: Negative Affect 
FI: Functional Impulsivity 
DI: Dysfunctional Impulsivity 
BAS: Behavioural Activation Scale 
BIS: Behavioural Inhibition Scale 
 vi
RST: Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory 
PT: Prospect Theory 
CPT: Cumulative Prospect Theory 
EUT: Expected Utility Theory 
RDUT: Rank Dependent Utility Theory 
ER: Ecological Rationality 
IQ: Intelligence Quotient 
CRT: Cognitive Reflection Test 
SAT: Scholastic Assessment Test 
ACT: American College Testing 
BCT: Binary Choice Task 
pApB: Double Gamble Task 
IGT: Iowa Gambling Task 
NFC: Need for Cognition scale 
WPT: Wonderlic Personnel Test 
RH: Recognition Heuristic 
DI: Discrimination Index 
TBH: Take the Best Heuristic 
PH: Priority Heuristic 
TEIQue: Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionaire 
DII: Dickman’s Impulsivity Inventory 
PANAS: Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule 
DST: Dual System Theories 



































LIST OF FIGURES 
 






























Instance based risk taking behaviour allows relatively little time for information 
processing and may be responsible for unconsciously driven erratic behaviour in 
judgment and decision making. Previous theories that have explored the factors involved 
in risk taking behaviour include dispositional, decision-making, and neurocognitive 
functioning based theories. The present studies examine the contributions of age and 
gender, emotional intelligence, dispositional traits and affective states, involved in 
instance based decision-making. Participants were assessed using a binary choice task 
(study 1-A) and a double gamble risk taking task (study 1-B) which involved choices 
between financial gains with different pay-offs and risk levels, and an ignorance based 
task (study 2) which involved ignorance based judgments in the classic city size task. 
Participants were also administered the Trait Emotional Intelligence questionnaire, the 
Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule, a self-report measure based on Gray’s 
behavioural activation and behavioural inhibition systems theory (BIS/BAS scale), and 
Dickman’s Impulsivity Inventory which distinguishes in functional and dysfunctional 
impulsivity. The purpose of these studies was to investigate whether individual 
differences in personality, emotional intelligence (EI) and affect predicted instance 
based risk taking behaviour. The participants were 64 (study 1-A), 68 (study 1-B), and 
73 (study 2) university students; In study 1-A there were significant correlations between 
positive affect (PA), BAS Drive, BAS Fun-Seeking (FS), and total BAS and the number 
of risky choices in the binary choice task (r = .28, .25, .26, .31; p= .02, .04, .04, .01). In 
study 1-B there were significant correlations between PA, FS and total BAS and the 
number of risky choices in the binary choice double gamble task (r = .24, .25, .32; p = 
.04, .04, .01). There were no significant associations of trait EI or (functional or 
dysfunctional) impulsivity with the number of risky choices. These results indicate that 
individuals who are high in PA, BAS Drive and BAS Fun-Seeking tend to be riskier in 
decision making involving monetary incentives on an instance based decision making 
task. In study 2 there were significant correlations between functional impulsivity and 
negative affect and absolute scores of the Discrimination Index (r = .26, 33; p = .02, 
.01). These results indicate that individuals who are high in FI and NA tend to base their 
judgments and decision making on recognition heuristic use. The findings of the three 
studies indicate that dispositional variables and affective states may play a very 
important role in instance based risk taking behaviour. Also they indicate that affect is 
an important factor in instance based decision making, but the role of impulsivity is less 
clear. The findings in general imply a connection between personality and affective 
states and performance in professional risk laden domains such as the security, finances, 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Rationale for the Research Project 
The study of decision making is a multidisciplinary effort to understand and 
explain human rationality. A great contributor to this effort is behavioural decision 
theory, a consistent and systematic approach that seeks to explain a large number of 
systematic and cognitive reproducible errors committed by human decision agents 
attempting to solve decision problems and choice dilemmas ranging from simple to 
more complex ones. The behavioural decision theory provides psychological insight to 
axiomatic utilitarian models laid down by mathematicians, statisticians, and economists 
in their quest to systematize, understand and model human rationality. The major 
concept that still escapes a through understand by social scientists is that of decision 
making under risk and uncertainty. Although behavioural scientists have attempted to 
explain human rationality by reverse engineering human judgement and decision 
making processes have yet to conceptualize in a concrete system of thought how human 
rationality functions both at the aggregate and individual levels. As our modern habitat 
becomes more complex by the day, due to rapid technological advancements in all a 
cognitive “struggle” having to cope in rapidly changing environment with an 
information fronts, we face a world whose defining core is a single element—a constant 
barrage of information. Thus it becomes obvious more than ever that copping becomes 
“processor”, i.e. the human brain, of limited computational capacity which is subject to 
err in a modern environment by employing cognitive tools that were possibly designed 
for simpler habitats. 
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The cognitive reproducible errors include, among others, limits of rationality, 
assessing and understanding probability, willpower and self-interest (Thaler 1980, 
Kahneman & Tversky 1981, Rabin, 1998; Mullainathan and Thaler, 2000), and every 
other decision making behaviour that is the direct result of a complex computing system 
with limited capacity—i.e. the human brain. Behavioural economists, i.e. social 
scientists that seek to provide psychological insights into the study of decision making 
in general and economic decision making in particular, have repeatedly challenged over 
the past 50 years the traditional economic view of man as a rational decision-making 
agent and have offered an empirical understanding of economic behaviour and decision-
making. The study of individual differences (e.g. affective responses to impending 
reward and punishment, impulsivity, neuroticism, emotional and affective states, etc.) in 
decision making may offer significant explanatory power for the understanding of 
human rationality. The approach of incorporating individual differences in the study of 
human rationality and decision making processes can also assist in the assessment of 
current decision theoretic frameworks, including both normative and descriptive 
models, which bear significant limitations with regards to minimizing effects of 
irrational economic behaviour while at the same time would guarantee consistency and 
tractability. Individual differences are fundamental differences in personality (e.g. 
known as personality traits such as impulsivity and neuroticism), attitudes, physiology 
(e.g. handedness, genetic endowment, volumetric differences in brain areas), learning or 
perceptual processes, emotional states, etc., that account for variation in performance or 
behaviour. However, in several attempts from economic theorists, behavioural 
economists, and psychologists to explain and model economic behaviour the field of 
individual differences has been rather neglected in the past.  
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Although behavioural economists and psychologists have exerted great 
influence in shaping the decision making field, there has been relatively little 
contribution from the field of individual differences. This is primarily due to the fact 
that behavioural economists have largely focused on the fundamental principles that 
drive aggregate economic behaviour, with only a significantly low number of studies 
taking off during the past years regarding individual differences and risk-taking 
behaviour and decision making in social and experimental economic contexts; thus 
leaving very little room for a contribution from the differential psychology standpoint 
of view regarding the understanding of risk taking behaviour. However, it has been 
suggested that individual differences  is a top candidate to help explain the apparent 
inconsistency in results of aggregate economic behaviour, offering support to the 
argument that economists should consider a multi-domain approach to measuring 
people’s attitudes to risk and financial decision making. This project’s rationale is a 
substantial contribution towards the line of research concerned with individual 
differences in instance based experimental and real world risk taking behaviour. More 
specifically, the research project’s scope is to investigate the relationship between 
emotional intelligence, affective states, personality traits and decision making processes 
in risky and uncertain domains. 
 
Statement of the Research Topic 
The aims of this research project are as follows:  A) to provide experimental 
evidence regarding the influence of affect and personality traits on shifts of preference 
concerned with the consistency of risk taking behaviour in instance based monetary 
decision making tasks, B) to identify personality correlates of financial decision making 
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under risk and uncertainty, and C) to identify personality correlates of cognitive 
heuristics that equip decision agents for advantageous decision making in the long run 
on controlled decision making tasks. The identity of the project’s particular research 
line requires that knowledge from at least three independent research fields—namely a) 
behavioural economics, b) cognitive psychology, and c) individual differences—is 
combined successfully in order to achieve meaningful results throughout the course of 
the project. 
The study of human decision making has emerged as a unique field of study and 
meeting point where other “older” fields such as economics and psychology merge and 
exchange knowledge regarding how decision making agents arrive at decisions when 
faced with alternative or multiple choices. Validated empirical research has showed that 
observed human decision making behaviour departs rather dramatically and in several 
ways from the axiomatic assumptions of the prescriptive paradigm in economic theory 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 1986; 1991; 1992; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In 
principle, if such departures were inconsistent and of a small scale “they would on 
average cancel out” and economic theory would thus not be widely off the focus point 
in its attempts to predict decision making behaviour and outcomes for large aggregates 
of human decision making agents (Kahneman, 2003). However, we do know that 
human decision making systematically deviates from the standard prescriptive model of 
classical economics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and 
is subject to systematic cognitive reproducible errors (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; 
Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). 
The disciplines of economics and cognitive psychology have been relatively 
long collaborators in the quest of explaining how human agents arrive at decisions. 
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Economic theory postulates that the human behaviour behind market efficiency is 
primarily influenced by material incentives and as a result financial decision making 
behaviour is driven mainly by rationality. Therefore, it is said that extrinsic (material, 
usually based on personal profit) incentives are thought to shape decision making 
behaviour. Economic theory basically assumes that human decision agents are rational 
actors motivated exclusively by self-interest and their only goal is to maximize their 
utility regardless the context when called upon to arrive at a decision. From the 
economic theory point of view, all human decision agents are rational maximizing 
actors that assumedly use all available cognitive resources and available information in 
a coherent and consistent way in order to arrive at the most optimal decisions having 
taken into account the alternative choices and the objectives to be reached for maximal 
profit and wealth. Economic theory also assumes that every rational decision agent 
arrives at a decision having taken into account future consequences of decisions taken 
at present time thus implying that every decision is made in a forward-looking way and 
clearly serves as a utility maximizing medium (Camerer, 2005). 
In cognitive psychological and cognitive neuroscientific research in recent 
years, the human decision agent is regarded as a cognitive information processing 
system, which codes and processes available information in conscious, i.e. rational, and 
unconscious ways. However, as research shows the largest impact on human decision 
making is exerted by less conscious factors that nonetheless have been recorded, 
studied and well documented (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer & Todd, 
1999). The unconscious factors that have been guiding human decision making 
throughout human evolutionary history are simple and fast, known as simple or 
cognitive heuristics, and have been developed as concrete mechanisms of a more 
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general evolutionary adaptive toolbox that has enabled the humans to evolve, survive, 
and adapt in their environments. The unconscious cognitive factors have been 
responsible for naturally driving human decision making behaviour in a rapid-response 
fast and systematic way. This more complex view of human decision making, where 
intrinsic cognitive mechanisms drive human decision making behaviour has come in 
recent years to penetrate and influence recent developments in economic decision 
making theory helping to the rise of cognitive heuristics research field for the study of 
human decision making processes. 
In a forward-looking approach, according to economic theory, and while taking 
into account real market conditions—which define the decision making context 
parameters and materialize the choice sets available to the rational actors—the decision 
making process is reduced to a predicament of outcome, i.e. expectation, and utility 
maximization. In this way the rational decision making agent is thus assumed to operate 
in a self maximizing way correctly assigning occurrence probabilities to the relevant 
choice sets and subsequently arriving at a decision where the given choice will 
numerically maximize the expected value of the choice’s utility. On the other hand, a 
more interactive process is considered in cognitive and neuroscientific research where 
several cognitive factors and decision making context parameters may potentially 
influence the actual decision making process and as a result affect the final choice of 
the decision agent in a predictable fashion. 
In recent years, however, the research field of individual differences has started 
emerging as a dynamic contributor to the study of human decision making providing a 
concrete account of promising dispositional traits such as impulsivity and extraversion, 
affective states naturally occurring or being induced for experimental reasons, proxies 
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of cognitive ability, and a number of heuristics and biases that affect the decision 
making process (Stanovich & West, 1998b; 1998c; 2000, 2008). Thus the goals of this 
research project is to follow in a parallel line this particular research approach 
incorporating diverse measures of risk taking behaviour in order to explore the role and 
influence of individual differences variables in decision making under risk and 
uncertainty. More specifically the aims of the project are the investigation of the 
relationship between emotional intelligence, affect, and personality traits as potential 
predictors of risk-taking behaviour in instance based decision making under risk and 
uncertainty. 
 
General Objective of the Research Project 
Behavioural economists have challenged the traditional economic view of man 
as a rational decision agent and have offered an empirical understanding of economic 
behaviour on aggregate levels. However, there are still significant discrepancies in 
explaining economic behaviour primarily because behavioural economists focus on 
aggregate economic behaviour without really paying attention on the potential 
contribution of individual differences with regards to understanding risky decision 
making. In recent risk taking studies a number of researchers have pointed out that 
decision agents on the individual level largely differ in risk taking behaviour while 
others have showed that human decision agents, depending on the decision making task, 
largely exhibit consistent risk taking behaviour (Lauriola et. al. 2005; Levin et. al. 2007; 
Zuckerman, 1994). 
Contrary to the established utilitarian decision making theory approach to the 
study of risk taking behaviour that has been focused on the characteristics of the 
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situations, ignoring interpersonal differences and studying aggregate  behaviour 
Nicholson and colleagues claim that risk propensity, i.e. a risk loving tendency, is 
rooted within personality (2005). Therefore, in up to date literature concerning risk 
taking behaviour decision making agents appear as consistent risk takers (risk loving) 
but at the same time exhibiting significant individual differences in risk propensity 
(Nicholson et. al. 2005). Although it would be quite practical to have a validated 
measure for measuring risk propensity it seems an idea that is not feasible. Any 
individual may be risk loving in an extreme sports context but risk averse regarding 
financial decisions. Attempting to classify risk propensity as a construct rooted in 
personality does not explain why one would be less or more risky depending the risk 
specific domain (e.g. an extrovert is an extrovert in family context, working 
environment and peer interaction, if we were to measure levels of risk propensity would 
not help explain why an individual maybe risk loving and at the same time risk averse 
depending the context). Furthermore, replicated research findings show that an 
individual’s attitude regarding risk and financial decision making is not stable across 
elicitation methods of economic behaviour (Camerer, 2005; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 
2001; Rabin, 1998; Mullainathan and Thaler, 2000; Rabin & Thaler, 2002). 
Although not all research is directed at a common goal, it is becoming evident 
that individual differences have the potential for explaining the apparent inconsistencies 
that derive from the study of aggregate decision making behaviour, offering support to a 
well-received argument which postulates that economists should consider a multi-
domain approach to measuring people’s risk taking behaviour. The research project’s 
scope is to investigate the influence of affect, emotional intelligence, and personality on 
risk taking behaviour and more specifically instance based decision making in 
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laboratory based experiments. Therefore, the general objective of this research project is 
to contribute and strengthen the role of individual differences in the study and 
understanding of human decision making processes. The research project is based on 
previous experimental work and has been built on strong hypotheses deriving from 
existing literature in accord with recent academic standards. 
 
Specific Objectives of the Research Project 
This research project is based in the emerging integration of behavioural 
economics, cognitive decision sciences and individual differences. This 
multidisciplinary integration builds on established theories and paradigms in the areas 
of economic theory, cognitive psychology, and individual differences respectively. The 
specific objectives of this research project is to contribute a minor yet systematic part of 
knowledge regarding human decision making that can potentially help us understand the 
contextual and individual factors that influence financial decision-making and risk 
taking behaviour. This may form the foundation for a more intensive study of individual 
differences, i.e. dispositional traits, affective states, and genetic endowment, could 
contribute in the debate regarding human rationality, learning, and efficient decision 
making. Additionally the contribution of individual differences in the study of human 
rationality may also prove to be a very important approach in order to identify and study 
variables that act as predictors or mediators of optimal and suboptimal decision making, 
something that cannot be achieved by studying decision making based on aggregate 
models. 
Camerer has argued that we may be in a position of “understanding whether 
social interaction and economic aggregation minimizes effects of rationality limits” 
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(2005). This has direct implications for the role individual differences could play in the 
study of decision agent’s irrational behaviour, i.e. behaviour that is not predicted by 
standard decision theoretic models, under risk and uncertainty. However, understanding 
the contextual, i.e. levels of risk, global, i.e. environment within which decisions are 
taken, and individual factors, i.e. dispositional traits, affective states, genetic 
endowment, etc., that may influence the decision-making process is clearly a key 
concern in the current economic climate and, more generally, a concern that could foster 
multidisciplinary research that could have potential economic and social impact at the 
individual level. 
Every human decision agent is faced with numerous daily problems and choice 
dilemmas that involve multi outcome prospects, risky and highly uncertain outcomes. 
The inclination to follow a particular course of action and take a decision or steps of 
sequential decisions in order to minimize and/or avoid risks incorporates very diverse 
decision domains. These decision domains range from friendships, family, social and 
recreational activities to career prospects, development, and/or longer term plans for 
financial investment and personal growth as an individual. Some daily decisions may 
range from catching a bus or walking to go from home to work, attending a lecture 
theatre or skipping it altogether to go for an ice cream, to more complicated aspects of 
decision making that involve harder choice dilemmas that could potentially affect more 
important facets of life such as one’s investment agenda in the short or longer term, the 
development of a new portfolio and the risks this bears by exposing one’s self in 
markets; other tough calls may include diverse asset development and real estate 
purchases, and even career development plans. Therefore, establishing a 
multidisciplinary research context in the study of human judgement and decision 
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making could possibly help us understand the role of human psychology in general and 
individual differences in particular in the study of human rationality. 
Therefore the objectives of this thesis are to establish some first links for the role 
of individual differences as predictors of rationality departures. More specifically, the 
aims were to examine the predictive validity of specific individual differences such as 
emotional intelligence, affect, and personality traits in instance based decision making 
under risk and uncertainty. In order to achieve these objectives we designed three 
exploratory studies that aimed to examine the predictive validity of emotional 
intelligence, affect, and personality traits in A) an instance based decision making task 
that was offering the participant a choice between a sure win option and an prospect 
whose outcome would depend on probability controlling for different levels of risk and 
different probabilities (study 1-A); B) an instance based decision making task that was 
offering the participant a choice between two risky options where both involved 
probabilistic outcomes controlling for different levels of risk and different probabilities 
(study 1-B); C) an ignorance based performance task where the participant was 
presented with two options and subsequently had to decide which option had the greater 
value, for this study we employed the classical city size task where the participant is 
presented with a set of cities and has to decide which city had the greater population at 
the time the study was conducted (study 2). 
The data obtained were analyzed and the results were presented and discussed 
particularly taking into account potential contributions from the individual differences 
point of view with regards to current debates in the field of decision theory and analysis. 
Despite having been overlooked while the field of behavioural decision theory was 
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expanding and maturing, contributions from the field of individual differences hold 





Studies 1/A & 1/B 
The present research will examine the extent to which affective states, 
impulsivity, and emotional intelligence may predict risky decision making in a binary 
choice decision making task and its alternative, a binary choice double gamble task. 
Affective states were assessed using the positive affect negative affect scale (PANAS), 
impulsivity was assessed by Dickman’s impulsivity inventory (DII) which measures 
functional and dysfunctional impulsivity, and emotional intelligence was assessed by 
the trait emotional intelligence questionnaire (TEIQue). The BIS/BAS scales were also 
incorporated in the present study in order to assess whether a) the fun seeking BAS 
subscale could predict risk loving behaviour and b) BIS could predict risk aversive 
behaviour in the two decision making tasks. 
The Studies 1/A and 1/B differed only in the measure of decision making 
behaviour. More specifically, study 1/A incorporated an instance based monetary binary 
choice task which presented one shot gambles in the form “choose between A.) £70 OR 
B.) a 50% chance of winning £150” for a total of 64 gambles whereas study 1/B 
incorporated an instance based monetary binary double gamble task which presented 
one shot gambles in the form “choose between A.) 95% chance of winning £100 OR B.) 
20% chance of winning £600” for a total of 64 gambles. As we may see the study 1/A 
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decision making task provides a “sure thing” option and an alternative option with a 
probabilistic outcome, i.e. uncertain payoff, whereas the study 1/B provides two 
gambles to choose from. In the study 1/A an individual is considered to be risky when 
he/she is opting for the probabilistic option, whereas in the study 1/B an individual is 
considered to be risky when he/she is opting for the option that has less chances to 
appear (e.g. option B in the example given above). The decision making tasks employed 
in studies 1/A and 1/B are adopted from Moore and Chater (2003) for study the 1/A and 
Rogers et. al. (1999) for the study 1/B. 
Laboratory based research (Isen,  Nygren,  &  Ashby,  1988; Kahn &  Isen, 
1993; Isen, 2001) shows that there is a complex interaction in play between  affect and 
risk taking behaviour. Although Isen and colleagues report conflicting results they argue 
that positive affect is an accurate determinant of seeking risk in specific contexts, while 
at the same time research findings by Isen and colleagues highlight a contradicting 
dimension of affective states on risk-taking which shows that positive affect is 
associated with an increased risk aversion. Moore and Chater departed from the 
methodological model of Isen and showed that “the relationship between natural 
variations in affective state and risky behaviour found relatively happier participants 
selected risky options more often than relatively less happy participants” (2003). In light 
of these findings we proposed that “positive affect will be positively correlated with 
risky behaviour on the decision making tasks”. 
 
A personality trait that has been studied in decision making is impulsivity. 
Impulsivity is best understood nowadays, despite earlier methodological shortcomings 
towards its understanding as a human trait, as a multidimensional rather than as a one 
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dimensional dispositional trait. There have been developed a number of personality 
measures that actually account for the multidimensional aspect of impulsivity. Buss and 
Plomin developed a comprehensive measure of impulsivity that differentiates between 
two major dimensions of impulsivity, the first one is defined as “resisting vs giving in to 
urges, impulses, or motivational states” and the second one is defined as “responding 
immediately and impetuously to a stimulus vs lying back and planning before making a 
move” (p. 8, 1975 Op. Cit. in Parker et. al. 1993). Another popular theoretical 
differentiation that has been well received came from Eysenck and colleagues when 
they offered distinct definitions for “impulsiveness” and “venturesomeness” (Eysenck 
et. al. 1985). According to Eysenck impulsive is an individual that is acting on impulse 
without any forethought involved and without taking into consideration potential threats 
and future outcomes that the particular behaviour in question may elicit, while 
venturesome is an individual that acts consciously and has undergone a cognitive 
evaluation of potential threats and risks associated with the behaviour in question but 
eventually gives in on his/her impulses anyway (Parker et. al. 1993). 
Barratt (1985) and Gerbing et al. (1987) took it a step further and proposed 
three-dimensional models for the study of impulsivity that distinguish among “motor 
impulsiveness”, “cognitive impulsiveness”, and “non-planning impulsiveness” (Parker 
et. al. 1993). Gerbing and colleague’s study also added “confirmatory weight to Barrat’s 
conception that impulsivity was multifactorial” but differentiated from Barrat’s 
proposition by introducing cognitive impulsiveness (Patton & Stanford, p. 269, 2012). 
Dickman’s impulsivity measure accounts for two distinct aspects of impulsive 
behaviour a) functional impulsivity and b) dysfunctional impulsivity (1990). Dickman’s 
functional impulsivity is the giving in to a particular behaviour without any sort of 
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thinking in advance but only when the behaviour in question will benefit the individual. 
Dickman’s dysfunctional impulsivity is the giving in to a particular behaviour without 
any sort of thinking in advance irrespective of the behaviour in question being a source 
of problems and distress. Impulsive behaviour and decision making behaviour are 
related at least on theoretical grounds in that impaired, uncalculated and/or illogical 
planning is a crucial component in both (Kjome et. al. 2010). In addition, impulsive 
behaviour, i.e. acting without evaluating the situation and without weighing potential 
advantages and disadvantages, and impaired decision making, i.e. when decisions are 
deriving from flawed reasoning or biased estimations, are both key elements of many 
psychopathological disorders (Franken et. al. 2008). However, the literature is rather 
dichotomized between supporters of the notion that impulsivity may predict risky 
decision making and those that advocate that impulsivity does not predict risky decision 
making and as a result does not contribute in understanding impaired decision making. 
Vigil-Collet (2007) showed that Dickman’s functional impulsivity is associated with an 
“impulsive decision making style”. Glicksohn et. al. (2007) Franken and Muris (2005) 
and Petry (2001) all ruled out impulsivity as a contributing factor in several decision 
making tasks. On the other end Demaree et. al (2008) discuss empirical findings which 
confirm that impulsivity predicts risk taking in real world decision making tasks (See 
also Clarke 2006, Fuentes et. al. 2006). We predicted that “functional impulsivity will 
predict advantageous risky decision making, i.e. an attempt to achieve or maximize 
personal gain depending on the choice set situation” whereas “dysfunctional 
impulsivity would predict risk aversive decision making that involves no “real” 
gain, i.e. in a risky choice set situation with a negative payoff”. In the absence of no 
“real” gain, i.e. with a negative payoff, options in a risky choice set we would expect the 
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decision maker to opt for either low value risks, i.e. risks that could be classified as risks 
not worth taking.  
Gray, upon reviewing evidence from psychopharmacological experiments, 
established the behavioural inhibition system (BIS) theory, suggesting that BIS is a 
construct that mediates anxiety and individual differences in trait anxiety (1982). 
According to Gray’s theory BIS is stimulated by signs of impending punishment or an 
absence of reward and its major output is “the inhibition of motor behaviour, increased 
arousal and increased attention” (Barros Loscertales, 2006). In recent reviews of the 
BAS/BIS model, the region of amygdale, as it is shown in voxel-based morphometry 
studies, has emerged as a key player in the formation of “anxiety due to its participation 
both in the processing of punishment and in promoting the arousal reaction of the BIS” 
(Barros Loscertales, 2006). In addition, the brain region of amygdala also appears to 
mediate loss aversive behaviour affecting the individual’s response in risk laden 
domains and leading to an avoidance of risks involving losses (Benedetto De Martino 
et. al. 2010). There is also evidence showing that risk-taking behaviour is mediated by 
anxiety (Mikle South et. al. 2010) and that Amygdala volume mediates BIS activity 
(Barrós-Loscertales et. al. 2006) and hippocampal volume (Cherbuin et. al. 2008) is 
associated with BIS sensitivity. The brain area of Amygdala appears to mediate BIS 
activity, anxiety, and risk aversion, processing signs of impending punishment or the 
absence of reward and promoting a behavioural response to them. Although there are 
enough evidence available to suggest a complex interaction, and possibly a non linear 
relationship, between BIS, anxiety, and risk taking behaviour, we would nonetheless 
expect a risk aversive individual to be aware of the fact that there are losses involved in 
these particular probability valuation games and respond to them opting for the (more) 
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secure alternative in the binary choice decision making tasks. So we hypothesize that 
“an overactive BIS, i.e. higher BIS scores, will be positively correlated with risk 
aversive behaviour in the decision making tasks”. 
Risky choice framing tasks have been designed to capture consistent 
reproducible errors regarding the requirements that would satisfy the axiomatic 
expectations of rational choice (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The framing effects gave 
rise to well defined models of “decision frames” which are in use for describing an 
individual’s reaction when the decision making problem undergoes a linguistic switch, 
i.e. being “framed” in a different manner, which usually differentiates between positive 
and negative. According to the “decision frames” theory a decision agent opts for a 
particular frame that satisfies a number of requirements, i.e. it is characterized by the 
decision making style of a an individual decision agent, and will significantly be 
influenced from the formulation, i.e. wording, of the decision dilemma and the way 
options will be presented to him. Previous exploratory studies have showed that higher 
BAS scores have been positively correlated with risk taking behaviour in a risky choice 
framing task (Lauriola et. al. 2005). 
Framing effects are mediated by cognitive and affective perspective taking 
(Fagley et. al. 2010). In addition, research on arousal and risk taking behaviour has 
showed that individuals that score high in sensation seeking tend to be risk takers in 
financial and legal domains besides the traditional physical and social risk taking 
behaviour that has been attributed to high sensation seekers (Zuckerman, 1994). 
Zuckerman and Kuhlman also showed in previous research that high sensation seekers 
tend to express higher risk taking behaviour in controlled decision making tasks (1978). 
Based on these findings we expected higher BAS scores to predict risk taking behaviour 
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and more specifically we hypothesized that “individuals scoring high in the fun 
seeking subscale of BAS would exhibit significantly higher risk taking behaviour in 
the decision making tasks than low scoring fun seeking individuals”. Fun seeking 
has also been positively associated with socially risk taking behaviour such as smoking 
and drinking and negatively associated with compulsive gambling (O’Connor et. al. 
2009). However, to our knowledge, no study so far has explored the relationship 




Different approaches to adaptive strategy selection, strategic management, 
judgment and decision making have highlighted the effort-reducing characteristics of 
cognitive heuristics. Cognitive heuristics have evolved as an integral mechanism of an 
evolutionary adoptive toolbox that has been designed to optimize in a fast and frugal 
way the decision making process. A well-known and well-studied example for effort-
reduction in the decision making process is the recognition heuristic (RH) which 
postulates that decisions are made by relying on one single cue—recognition, ignoring 
other information. According to Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002), the RH golden, i.e. 
operational, rule is that “if one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, then 
infer that the recognized object has the higher value with respect to the criterion.”A hot 
debate has started with regards to whether the decision maker actually ignores other 
relevant information besides recognition during the decision making process but several 
studies point to the direction that when the RH is examined in controlled laboratory 
experiments decision makers tend to rely heavily on the single cue of recognition. Like 
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other established decision making research lines, the influence of dispositional traits and 
affective states in fast and frugal decision making has received relatively little, or not at 
all, attention. 
 
A recent study by Hillbig (2008) showed that RH use was positively correlated 
with neuroticism. More specifically Hillbig showed that neuroticism predicted 
individual decision makers' deliberate use of the recognition heuristic “while the other 
Big 5 factors and intelligence yielded no additional explanatory power” (2008). In 
further analysis it was also demonstrated that the influence and predictive ability of the 
neuroticism trait on the use of the RH “was not mediated” by the availability of 
knowledge and recognition “thus lending preliminary support for the notion that this 
effect may, in fact, be genuinely motivational in nature” (Hillbig, 2008). For the 
purposes of our study we hypothesized that “use of the RH would be negatively 




Thesis Organization and Overview of Chapters 
The study of individual differences (e.g. affective responses to impending 
reward and punishment, impulsivity, neuroticism, emotional and affective states, etc.) 
and its influence on human decision making processes is crucial to determine whether 
the interplay of cognitive abilities, complex social skills, and a thorough assessment of 
decision making principles may balance out the negative effects of quasi irrational 
decision making and repetitive risk taking behaviour. The aim of the thesis is to 
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contribute towards an understanding of individual differences in the decision making 
process. Furthermore, the thesis presents and discusses findings from 3 exploratory 
studies conducted at the department of psychology at the University of Edinburgh. 
Studies 1/A and 1/B sought to explore the relationship between emotional intelligence, 
affect, impulsivity, personality and two measures of risk taking behaviour in the form of 
instance based monetary decision making gambles. Study 2 sought to explore the 
relationship among the variables mentioned above and adherence to the recognition 
heuristic. 
The thesis has been divided into eight chapters. Chapter one serves as the 
introduction to the present project, presents the rationale behind the present project, 
explains the general and specific objectives of the studies conducted, and outlines the 
research hypotheses of the present project. Chapter two is a concrete, yet not exhaustive, 
literature review discussing the contextual background of behavioural economic theory 
regarding the study of risk taking behaviour, the evolution of behavioural economics 
which merged findings from economics and psychology for a better understanding of 
human decision making processes. Chapter three discusses the evolutionary perspective 
of cognitive heuristics, the ecological rationality principle, and adaptive decision 
making from the adoptive toolbox point of view and the modularity of the human mind. 
Chapter four discusses dispositional theories of personality with regards to risk-taking 
behaviour and offers some insights regarding the influence of individual differences in 
risk-taking behaviour and financial decision making. Chapter five discusses research 
design, materials and method procedures that were used for the purposes of this project 
and also presents the specific measures (DVs and IVs) that were used in all three 
exploratory studies. Chapter six is a presentation of the results and a discussion of the 
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studies 1-A and 1-B, we also discuss the impact on the literature regarding the 
relationship of individual differences, risk-taking behaviour and instance based decision 
making. Chapter seven is a presentation of the results and a discussion of the study 2, 
we also discuss individual differences’ determinants in adaptive decision making 
models. Chapter eight provides a summary of the main points of this thesis, draws some 
conclusions and discusses strengths and limitations of the studies conducted, offers 




















CHAPTER 2: BEHAVIOURAL DECISION MAKING 
 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide a review of behavioural and cognitive decision 
making. The literature review will familiarize the reader with key concepts for the study 
of decision making and provide the necessary links for understanding the importance of 
merging individual differences, economic theory, and cognitive psychology insights in a 
single project for better understanding human decision making processes in general and 
instance based risk taking behaviour in particular. 
 
Decision Making 
In everyday life we are facing a world that constantly bombards us with a vast 
amount of information (news, life and career choices, leisure options, other stimuli, 
etc.); therefore, we are required to perform a vast number of cognitive processes and 
mental calculations, yet on a very limited time, on a daily basis in order to be able to 
cope within our artificial habitat. People are required to make decisions and choices 
about virtually everything, from the least important such as choosing a news magazine, 
to the most important of things such as choosing a health insurance policy, a pension 
scheme option, a career route, etc. Therefore, in order to account for some of the 
challenges that human reason is faced with, the notion of decision making that will be 
broadly used throughout this chapter will include preferences, inferences, priorities, 
judgements and classifications regardless of being conscious or unconscious. 
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The framework for arriving at a decision may sound familiar with regards to 
choosing between a set of options or a subset of a pool of options, needs, and/or 
preferences, an actual definition for decision making is rather an elusive concept 
because it involves multi level processing on a multi level framework, i.e. there are 
conscious and unconscious decisions, shaped by parameters that often go unnoticed 
instead of following a pre-planned execution and can also be influenced from 
interpersonal, social, and environmental factors. What really is decision making and 
how can we account for the decision making process? A decision could be an instinctual 
split moment choice (e.g. to run away in the view of a wild barking dog) stemming from 
the innate “fight or flight” mechanism or a time consuming cognitively taxing 
calculation of whether it would be better to invest a small sum of your money buying a 
house insurance that would protect you from a flood while you know that chances of a 
flood (based on the past) are rather slim in the area you live. Therefore we could 
broadly say that decision making is the process of arriving at a final choice (whether or 
not to buy the house insurance) or a plan of action (whether to stay and put up with the 
dog or run away from it) by evaluating desirable alternatives and selecting the most 
appealing or promising course of action. 
In order to choose optimally or to devise an optimal plan of action—a strategy—
individuals must assess alternative choices and diverse action plans and in addition they 
must weigh the probability that each of them will lead to an optimal choice or an 
effective action plan taking at the same time into account possible consequences of their 
choice. However, the process of decision making usually takes place under a cloud of 
uncertainty—due to a lack of relevant information—about whether an individual’s 
choices or action plan may lead to a “positive or negative payoff, a gain or a loss, to an 
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advantage or disadvantage, to benefit or harm” (Naqvi et. al. 2006). Decisions, 
judgments, choices, and plans of actions made throughout the course of our everyday 
life differ with regards to their possible positive and negative outcomes, others differ 
with regards to gaining or losing relative to the status quo, i.e. that for a decision agent 
is usually his own reference point, while others differ with regards to their probabilistic 
nature—odds of an event happening (e.g. you have two options as a final destination for 
your summer vacations, 50% for island A and 50% for island B, with equal probabilities 
for both events until you arrive at your final decision). This is mentally taxing for many 
people particularly accounting for decisions, judgments and choices that are linked with 
financial rewards and punishments (e.g. deciding to take the bus home on a Friday 
evening after work may prove to be a great waste of time; deciding to invest in a 
particular stock or in a new house may bear significant financial cost to the individual). 
Decision making is an essential aspect of everyday life. How good are we, humans, in 
deciding effectively, i.e. taking optimal decisions in the array of decision “problems” 
we are called to face daily? Is there anything that influences or affects human processes 
of judgment, reasoning and decision making? If so, are we aware of our human 
limitations to arrive at optimal final decisions? These are but a few among major 
general questions that researchers are called to answer while promoting the study of 
decision making and something that we will explore briefly in the next sections. 
 
Homo Economicus or more like Homer Simpson 
Neoclassical economists generally assume that every individual is a rational 
decision agent because it is for his/her best interest to be so. They believe that people’s 
choices, risks and preferences, judgments of preferability, and decision making studies 
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should be based on the assumption that human decision agents are inherently rational 
and act rationally because it is for their own benefit to act so—it is mathematically 
optimal to act rationally. Utility theorists, that have exerted great influence in economic 
and management research, are “interested in people’s preferences or values and with 
assumptions about a person’s preferences that enable them to be represented in 
numerically useful ways”
1
 (Fishburn, 1968). Based on such and similar a priori 
arguments of normative analysis the entire discipline of economics was founded on the 
back of the mythical species Homo Economicus. Homo Economicus is the decision 
agent who acts rationally, completely selfish, is self aware in promoting exclusively his 
own self-interest at the expense of other agents, bears an utmost and incessant desire for 
personal profit and wealth maximization, all in all an omnipotent utility maximizer. 
This view regarding decision behaviour has been all too familiar in economic models, 
and the nature of economic theory has been greatly influenced by these particular 
assumptions (Sen, 1977). 
Economists consent that the assumptions concerned with the rational view of 
humans and the utilitarian paradigm has served economic research and the development 
of the economic discipline rather well, “providing a coherent framework for modelling 
human behaviour”
2
 (Levitt & List, 2008). Although there are several objections to this 
particular model of human behaviour and the unrealistic portrayal of decision making 
agents as fully rational, the most striking one is that this model is not based on empirical 
evidence but on a set of principles, axioms of rational choice (Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s axiomatic utility hypothesis, 1944), derived from expected utility theory 
and subjective probability (Selten, 2002, p.13). This utility maximization model of 
                                                           
1
 Emphasis mine 
2
 Emphasis mine  
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decision making also extends in financial economics and investment models—
particularly forms the microeconomic basis (Samuelson, 1938) for “efficient market 
theory” and “consumer theory” (Smith, 1982) that fail to take into account observed 
human behaviour assuming that people are rational utility maximizing agents and would 
function as such in order to maximize their personal profit and wealth (Sen, 1977)—and 
has been shown to be the direct cause of systematic and recurrent strategic and 
investment decision making erratic behaviour. (Schneider 2010). 
Social scientists have repeatedly tested and showed that people around us better 
fit to a Homer Simpson model, acting more human overall and behaving in complex, 
contradictory, imperfect and predictably irrational ways rather than the homo 
economicus model which is characterized by flawless logic in judgment and unbounded 
rationality in decision making (Ariely, 2008; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Camerer, 
2000; Thaler, 1980). Human decision making is essentially guided by emotions (Slovic 
et. al. 2004; Kahneman & Frederick 2002; LeDoux, 2000; Bechara et. al. 2000; 
Damasio et. al. 1996; Damasio,1994), not rational action and logic, and emotions most 
of the time do not serve humans well in taking self serving and rational decisions. 
Nevertheless, the Homo Economicus, rational agent model of human decision 
behaviour is still a dominant model in economic theory and has laid the microeconomic 
foundations for market efficiency assuming a whole range of rational expectations from 
its agents—humans. Although, in principle a few rational people may be able to 
influence a large number of people or even an entire market, however, in reality how 
rational and selfish is the average human being? Humans are not completely selfish, as 
research shows they often engage in altruistic acts like charity, volunteerism, offering a 
helping hand to relatives, friends, neighbours, complete strangers, while they selflessly 
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invest half a lifetime in parenting (Kolm, 2006; Collins et. al. 2000; Ijzendoorn et. al 
1991, 1992; Ijzedoorn, 1995; Becker, 1962, 1965, 1974). Obviously, all of the above are 
clear violations of the initial “rational expectation” assumptions of utility theory and the 
development of rational decision making model. The Homo Economicus model of 
human decision behaviour, although never empirically verified, has formed the basis of 
the microeconomic groundwork for “market efficiency”
3
. 
Research shows time and again that individual decision agents are not strict 
utility maximizers as they often engage in self-destructive behaviour like substance 
abuse and addiction (Weinberg et. al. 1998; Hawkins et. al. 1992), negative risk-taking 
(Koniak-Griffin et. al. 2003; DiClemente et. al. 1996, 2002) and impaired decision 
making (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), procrastination 
and suicide to name just a few of the most often observed disadvantageous decision 
patterns of human behaviour. In addition people are prone in a set of cognitive 
reproducible errors in decision making (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1974)
4
 and their 
cognitive abilities do not serve them well to perform complicated calculations since 
they have usually limited and computational capacity. Also we should add that 
individual decision agents do not prioritize according to utility functions and utility 
value but rather according to their own reference point which is essentially linked to 
their own human needs (e.g., it would be mathematically optimal for one’s own benefit 
and wealth maximization to work 22 hours a day but it is humanely impossible). It is 
obvious that observed human behaviour dictates that humans systematically fail to make 
rational decisions based on established choices, preferences and complete information 
                                                           
3
 See efficient market theory 
4
 Even experts in statistics and probability are vulnerable to these very same inherent human cognitive 
errors (Kahneman & Frederick 2002). 
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for a number of reasons that we will explore in the following sections (for a review see 
Stefan Schneider, 2010). 
It has been argued that individuals do not like taking risks because over the 
course of their long evolution those who were risking too much had a greater 
probability to exit the gene pool (Slovic et. al. 2004). People also “hate” to lose, they do 
not like losing even things that have no significant value anymore or things whose 
current value is way under their purchasing value because a) “loses loom larger than 
gains” in decision making (Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005; Ariely, et. al. 2005) and b) 
because the value of possession and ownership comes into the equation of bargaining 
(Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005; Ariely et. al 2005; Strahilevitz & Lowenstein, 1998; 
Thaler, 1992, p. 62 ). This human behaviour, the observed and “loss aversive” human 
behaviour, does not fit in any way the model of Homo Economicus, i.e. the rational 
actor. The mythical utility maximizer species characterized by flawless logic and 
unbounded rationality in decision making most likely has gone extinct, if he ever 
existed, as evidence shows that he was invented. It is clear that economists are very 
interested in people’s choices, judgments, risks, preferences and decisions (i.e. the 
behaviour of decision making agents) but selectively fail to take into account the all too 
human processes leading to the impaired choices judgments, preferences and decisions 
in everyday life. The reasons why neoclassical economists and utility theorists 
systematically use such, a flawed, assumed not observed, model of human behaviour 
based on axioms and a priori arguments, as Homo economicus is most likely because it 
makes the economic analysis simpler enabling people’s choices, judgments, risk, 
preferences and decisions “to be represented in numerically useful ways” (Fishburn 
1968)—However, Fishburn was not aware, as many other economists are not aware or 
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simply selectively ignore that “the tendency to simplify problems” is a human limitation 
in human choice, judgment, and decision making situations (Rubinstein, 1998, p. 14). 
Economists at large consent that this approach—taking into account the decision 
instead of the decision making processes—is sufficient for the purpose of economic 
research and modelling. However, this model of research allows economists to generate 
results from past histories—i.e. with very limited predictive power—that ignore 
fundamental internal reproducible cognitive errors that are heavily dependent on the 
decision problem and unavoidably come in conflict with the economists’ assumption of 
human rationality (Rubinstein, 1998, p. 15). These all too human internal and 
reproducible cognitive errors repeatedly occur in investment decisions arising primarily 
due to information availability (availability heuristic), representative information 
(representativeness heuristic), loss aversion (affect heuristic), “the search for 
confirmation” (confirmation bias), “isolation and endowment effects, status quo bias” 
and—specifically with regards to economic market trading operations—“the 
misinterpretation of patterns” (Schneider, 2010).
5
 Economic theory that is based on 
observation of past histories of  market behavior can be confirmed ex post facto, 
retrospectively, or even allow plenty of space for speculative theoretical explanations as 
to how things should turn out—when in fact they don’t, as initially predicted by formal 
economic modelling e.g. LTCM
6
—regarding economic behaviour without taking into 
account the inherent limitations and error inducing mechanisms of humans that account 
for impaired decision making (e.g. the tendency for misunderstanding probability is all 
too common among probability specialists in Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Such 
                                                           
5
 Parentheses are mine; I have added heuristics to match the investment decision making errors illustrated 
by Stefan Schneider (2010). 
6
 Long-Term Capital Management L.P. case study 
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normative and prescriptive methodology for the study of human judgement and decision 
making processes with regards to the modelling of human economic behaviour, 
however, leads to distorted perceptions, flawed models and inaccurate conclusions 
because it fails to offer a realistic understanding of observed decision behaviour 
(Kahneman, 2002; Camerer, 2000; Rabin, 2000a,b; Rabin & Thaler, 2001; Thaler, 
1980; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
 
The Study of Decision Making 
The study of decision making as a distinct yet multidisciplinary field of study 
that draws interest from a number of disciplines such as psychology, neuroscience, 
philosophy, economics, could be summarized as an attempt to systematically put under 
scientific scrutiny cognitive agents’ choices, judgments, preferences in order to better 
understand their involvement in reasoning and decision making processes. The question 
“how good are we, humans, in deciding effectively, i.e. taking optimal decisions in the 
array of decision ‘problems’ we are called to face daily?” is a dilemma present in all 
domains of decision making research. A significant body of research (from 
mathematical and statistical psychology, to cognitive neuroscience, neuropsychology, 
and behavioural economics) has created an emerging and ever expanding field of 
research on decision making research where the diverse levels of description (neuronal, 
computational modeling, cognitive, economic modeling, behavioral, evolutionary, 
management and organizational behavior) intersect. Behavioural decision research 
points to a number of findings that outline a collection of universal limitations and 
reproducible cognitive errors in human judgment and decision making. These 
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limitations and errors manifest and/or influence and affect the process of decision 
making unintentionally and unconsciously while an individual is performing a decision 
making task and most of the times it is difficult to avoid them even when human 
participants have been warned beforehand of these possible errors in their problem 
solving capacity, judgment and decision making performance. 
Over the years the major reproducible cognitive errors, i.e. signs of irrationality, 
in human judgment, problem solving and decision making processes have been grouped 
in distinct theoretical frameworks that nonetheless overlap. Cognitive psychological 
models, following Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1981, 1991), have postulated 
significant judgment errors in human reasoning, whereas evolutionary psychologists 
(Barkow et al., 1992; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer et. al 1999; 
Gigerenzer, 2000) following a slightly different paradigm underline the adaptive origin 
of these cognitive reproducible errors in human decision making processes. Here we 
will present the most important groups of these human universal decision making error 
inducing mechanisms, always with an eye on the fundamental differences that underlie 
the a) normative prescriptive and b) descriptive modelling paradigms that account for 
decision behaviour incorporating their theoretical frameworks. We will also briefly 
discuss the influence of emotions on decision making and the “dual process theories” 
field of research on decision making—the two systems of human cognitive architecture 







Herbert Simon was among the first that realized that human rationality was not 
perfect, as economists deliberately assumed, laying the foundations for the empirical 
investigation of human reasoning and cognitive decision making strategies pointing a 
finger to the limited descriptive validity of utility maximization (Simon, 1955). He 
based his assumptions of imperfect rationality on the well known critical physiological 
limits of human cognition. Humans, Simon suggested, intend to be fully rational but 
they are ultimately “boundedly rational” due to information processing limitations (Qin 
& Simon, 1990; Simon, 1990; 1957). Simon introduced the concept of “bounded 
rationality”, a cognitive model of dynamic adaptation to account for the information 
processing limitations, which represented the first attempt to incorporate cognitive 
limitations into normative models of human reasoning and decision making (Simon, 
1957). He pioneered in the field of normative modelling of human judgement and 
decision behaviour an understanding of the human mind’s limited computational 
capacities. His pioneering analysis of bounded rationality introduced an information 
processing and problem solving approach to human decision making (Simon, 1957). 
Simon’s bounded rationality was based upon the hypothesis that while humans intend to 
take optimal decisions, they do not necessarily act as they would if they had access to 
unlimited information, possessed unlimited computational power and were completely 
rational (Williamson, 1981). 
The theoretical framework of “bounded rationality” relevant to choice theory 
intended to place rationality in context (Simon, 1986) and fill the theoretical gap of 
reduced descriptive validity of expected utility models. Therefore, Simon attempted to 
enhance the descriptive power of the normative models of decision behaviour when 
fundamental principles of utility maximization were not able to fully account for 
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rationality shortcomings of observed human behaviour (Simon, 1986, 1979, 1978, 
1955). Although, Simon initiated an attempt to fill the gap in understanding decision 
behaviour and improve the descriptive validity of normative models he merely reduced 
the problem of rationality to the human brain’s computational power stating that 
“boundedly rational agents experience limits in formulating and solving complex 
problems and in processing (receiving, storing, retrieving, transmitting) information” 
(op. cit. in Williamson, 1981). 
Satisficing
7
 (1987, p. 243-245) was Simon’s tome to decision making research 
within the bounded rationality framework, replacing the utility maximization 
assumption that had started showing signs of limited descriptive validity (Simon, 1986, 
1979, 1955), as an alternative to rational decision behaviour optimization. Simon’s 
model of Satisficing proposed that decision making agents stop information processing 
and problem solving when they arrive at a near satisfactory solution which meets a 
number of pre specified criteria with regards to their goals. According to the Satisficing 
optimization model, Simon viewed decision making agents as boundedly rational 
decision optimizing cognitive machines, performing exhaustive optimizing searches for 
the best possible decision available to a given problem and whenever the decision 
optimization process was not plausible or resource costly then a simpler, approximate 
optimization sub problem was solved (Conlisk, 1996). The Satisficing decision 
optimization model, that is the essence in Simon’s theoretical framework, accounts for 
the brain’s limited analytical and computational power and although it has replaced 
normative prescriptive utility maximization models, it reassures economists and utility 
                                                           
7
 A term he created from the melding together of the words satisfy and suffice and has been incorporated 
in economic dictionaries first appearing in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 1987, 
London: MacMillan publishers, p. 243-245 
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theorists at the same time that humans are rational decision agents—i.e. they are able to 
reason and exercise good judgment. The only difference in Simon’s model that human 
decision agents are “boundedly rational” due to the limited computational power of the 
human information processing machine—the brain. Simon’s bounded rationality 
framework maintains the position that human brains are, at large, highly complex 
Satisficing optimization machines that can nonetheless carry only a limited data-
processing apparatus and as a result have developed some very concrete built in rules of 
operation—brains can exploit a number of cognitive shortcuts that ensure performance 
optimization at every computational step. 
 
Maps of Bounded Rationality
8
 
The ‘as if’ argument, which is attributed to Milton Friedman (1953) as presented 
by Conlisk (1996) in his paper “why bounded rationality?” 
“The question is” as Milton Friedman put it “not whether people are 
unboundedly rational; of course they are not. The question is whether they act 
approximately as if unboundedly rational; they do.” 
We shall see throughout the discussion of empirically validated findings that a 
plausible answer in Friedman’s conditional argument is not quite “they do”. Not only 
people are boundedly rational, as Simon had suggested (1957), with limited information 
processing capacity but, according to undisputed evidence (Tversky & Kahneman, 
                                                           
8
 I borrow the title from Daniel Kahneman’s lecture delivered in Stockholm, Sweden, on December 8, 
2002, when he received the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel. 
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1974; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; 1981; Kahneman et. 
al. 1991; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman, 2002), people’s decision making 
ability is not impaired but rather inherently sub-optimal. This is primarily due to 
peoples’ heavy reliance on a wide range of cognitive reproducible errors that lead them 
in systematically impaired decision making. People are not simply imperfect, i.e. 
boundedly rational decision optimizing agents, they are in a consistent manner 
predictably irrational decision makers. 
A large and essential part of Kahneman and Tversky’s empirical studies on 
bounded rationality successfully showed that normative theoretical frameworks of 
choice under uncertainty and risk had a very poor descriptive validity and thus could not 
be combined with realistic models of human decision making processes as had been 
suggested earlier by Neumann and Morgenstern’s axiomatic subjective expected utility 
hypothesis (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman, 2002; Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1947; 1944; Fishburn, 1970; 1968). By refuting the axiomatic subjective 
expected utility model, Kahneman and Tversky’ empirical findings suggest that 
normative models need to be abandoned altogether because they systematically fail to 
provide a coherent empirical framework for the analysis of human judgment and 
decision making processes and as a consequence they fail to offer realistic explanations 
of observed economic behaviour and real life decision making tendencies. 
During a long collaboration Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky “explored the 
psychology of intuitive beliefs and choices and examined their bounded rationality” 
exerting great influence on economic thinking and shaping major areas of decision 
making research covering key topics such as i) the heuristics and biases research 
program outlining human cognitive reproducible errors of decision making and 
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limitations of judgement under uncertainty; ii) prospect theory, models of choice under 
risk, and individuals’ experience of loss aversion in choices bearing no risk; and iii) a 
set of “framing effects” and their consequences for the debate regarding human 
rationality and how “framing effects” affects rational decision making models 
(Kahneman, 2002). Their work (Kahneman et. al. 1982; Kahneman & Tversky 1979; 
1974) and other researchers work showed how boundedly rational decision making 
agents employ a rather wide range of heuristics such as risk-aversion, availability, 
representativeness, confirmation, anchoring and adjustment to make judgments under 
uncertainty and how humans use simplified strategies such as “elimination by aspects” 
to make decisions (Tversky, 1972). Here we briefly present and discuss some key 
findings from these decision making research areas. 
 
Heuristics and Biases 
Heuristics and Biases is a line of research in the field of decision making that 
illustrates a wide range of cognitive shortcuts that people employ when they are called 
to make decisions under uncertainty—that is when they do not posses complete 
information relevant to the given problem. The central mission of the heuristics and 
biases line of research in the early days of its development was to understand intuitive 
judgments and decision making under uncertainty mapping bounded rationality. 
Attempting to draw a map of bounded rationality, Tversky and Kahneman (1974), 
followed a completely different route of thinking than Simon developing their own 
perspectives on bounded rationality and employed empirical research methods that 
enabled them to successfully show that people did not employ cognitive shortcuts for 
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computational optimization as Simon had suggested earlier introducing “bounded 
rationality” (Simon, 1957). 
Tversky and Kahneman demonstrated that decision making processes of 
“judgment under uncertainty often rest on a limited number of simplifying heuristics 
rather than extensive algorithmic processing” while copping with real world decision 
dilemmas (Gilovich et. al. 2002, p. 1) to obtain maximum optimal output while facing a 
given problem. Human “bounded rationality, Tversky and Kahneman showed, is a 
flawed rather than an imperfect rational model prone to a set of reproducible and 
systematic errors that lead to impaired decision making. Tversky and Kahneman’s 
cognitive model of “boundedly rational” judgment suggested that people behave 
irrationally in their decision making and heavily rely on a set of “heuristic principles” in 
order to process and evaluate particular subjective information such as beliefs (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974). The heuristic principles, although simple, fast, and efficient lead 
to biases—“departures from the normative rational theory that served as markers or 
signatures of the underlying heuristics” (Gilovich et. al. 2002, p. 3)—and trigger a set of 
systematic cognitive errors and violations of internal consistency such as rules of 
transitivity and basic laws of probability. The heuristics are employed automatically and 
most of the times unconsciously when people have to use abstract reasoning, that is to 
assess “abstract beliefs concerning the likelihood of uncertain events” (Kahneman et. al. 
1982, p. 3), in order to arrive at a final decision to a particular problem. The heuristic 
principles “have evolved” to solve simple problems and while relying on them people 
tend to “reduce the complex task of assessing probabilities and predicting values to 
simpler judgmental operations” (Kahneman et. al. 1982, p. 3). Tversky & Kahneman 
also showed that relying on the heuristic principles translates into automatic and rapid 
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simplification of complex assessments in the light of absent, reduced, or weak 
information—uncertainty—such as the assessment of subjective probabilities (1974). 
In a series of gambling experiments Tversky and Kahneman presented and 
explained three general purpose heuristics: “availability”, “representativeness”, and 
“anchoring and adjustment” which act as cognitive short-cuts thus illustrating how 
people perceive and evaluate probabilities (1974). Based on these general purpose 
heuristics Tversky and Kahneman proposed that “the subjective assessment of 
probabilities resembles the subjective assessment of physical quantities such as distance 
or size” (1974). Tversky and Kahneman drew these analogies from decades’ worth of 
research in human perception and vision (Thaler, 2000). These judgments, according to 
Tversky and Kahneman, are “based on data of limited validity, which are processed 
according to heuristic rules” but also come together with a number of biases, invisible 
to introspection, that lead to systematic errors in judgment (1974). 
These heuristic principles may be quite useful shortcuts for judgment and 
decision making in domain/generic environments but they also may lead to fallacious 
conclusions—the biases reliance effects—thus leading to “severe and systematic errors” 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The Heuristics and Biases research topic sparked by 
Tversky and Kahneman has turned into a distinct program of research whose main goal 
has been to empirically verify, record, and catalogue heuristic principles and biases to 
which human decision making behaviour leads along with the applied and theoretical 
implications of other important observations in the field of decision making 
(Kahneman, 2002). Later work on intuitive heuristics had list them “as a collection of 
disparate cognitive procedures that are bound together by their common function” in 
specific decision making contexts (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Contrary to this, 
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Kahneman and Frederick argue that intuitive heuristics not only “share a common 
process of attribute substitution and are not limited to questions about uncertain events” 
but also influence and regulate a wide range of complex judgments and decision making 
procedures that people and specialists alike may face on their daily lives including for 
example “retrospective evaluations of colonoscopies and decisions about saving birds 
from drowning in oil” (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). That is to say, heuristics and 
biases operate as domain-generic algorithms that aim to optimize the decision making 
process by cutting down the time and effort invested in the decision making process. 
 
Prospect Theory 
Expected utility theory (EUT) has been the dominant model for the study and 
description of choice under uncertainty and risk and “generally accepted as a normative 
model of rational choice” when in fact can easily be shown that is an incorrect approach 
for the study of human decision making behavior (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Expected value was one of the first theoretical formulations to explain decision making 
processes under conditions of risk. This framework postulates that under uncertain 
conditions the expected value of an outcome is equal to its return sum multiplied by the 
probability of this outcome coming true (Ross, p. 38, 2007). The successor of the 
expected value model was expected utility theory that was based on a series of axioms 
(Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s axiomatic utility hypothesis, 1944) assuming that 
people would always try to maximize their utility advancing the notion of “revealed 
preferences” (Varian, 2005; Samuelson, 1938). According to Samuelson’s “revealed 
preferences” theory any rational decision agent’s utility maximization can be measured 
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through calculations of subjective expected utility since individual preferences may 
differ across decision agents for the same payoff outcomes. Samuelson attempted to 
explain differences in decision making that could not be described by the rational choice 
theory model of subjective expected utility. EUT postulates that the utilities of uncertain 
outcomes derive from their probabilities but utility itself is perceived as independent to 
probability (Varian, 2005). However, observations of economic behavior have 
systematically proven this axiomatic assumptions to be fundamentally incorrect in 
several experimental findings (Kahneman, 2002; Rabin & Thaler, 2001; Rabin, 2000 a 
& b). 
A number of critical observations in vision and perception research illustrated 
that human “intuitive evaluations” of future prospects are “reference-dependent” 
(Kahneman, 2002) and further studies in risk-taking behavior led to significant 
formulations that helped propel the development of prospect theory (PT) (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). PT is a descriptive decision making framework that explains decision 
behavior when between alternative choices under conditions of risk, that is of known 
probabilities but of unknown outcome, and was developed primarily as a “critique” and 
a realistic alternative to the EUT model (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). EUT up to this 
point was the only model for the explanation of risk aversion but proved to have very 
poor descriptive validity regarding risk aversion in controlled financial experiments. 
EUT as a model of explaining risk aversion has been fiercely attacked by a number of 
researchers and has been systematically proven of poor descriptive validity. Rabin 
(2000b) in his calibration theorem showed that EUT is not a reliable model to explain 
risk aversion, namely “an utterly implausible explanation” of risk aversion (2000a), and 
gives a number of inconsistent results under a series of experimental conditions that 
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have been established to test the model giving further support to alternative empirically 
validated models of explaining risk aversion such as PT (Rabin, 2000a, 202-203; 2000b; 
Rabin & Thaler 2001). 
Kahneman and Tversky’s single most significant contribution in the field was 
“prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk” (1979) where they conducted a 
series of seminal experiments showing how “choices among risky prospects exhibit 
several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the basic tenets of utility theory” and 
that individual’s choices and preferences systematically violate the axiomatic principles 
of EUT. 
The results from Kahneman and Tversky’s studies confirmed that in human 
decision processing the choices’ framing heavily affects judgment outcomes and that 
the value of prospect outcomes are inferred from decision weights thus setting the 
foundations for the explanatory and predictive value of PT (1979). Kahneman and 
Tversky also showed that people in decision making overweigh choices that are certain 
when contrasted with choices that are of known probability but of unknown outcome, 
e.g. an expressed preference for certain £50 rather than a 50% probability of winning 
£100, an effect they labeled the “certainty effect” (1979). Kahneman and Tversky also 
showed that, according to prospect theory, the expected utility for each prospective 
outcome, certain or probabilistic, is assessed by multiplying it with a decision weight. 
However decision weights do not obey any formal rules deriving from subjective 
probability, but instead they are “inferred from choices between prospects much as 
subjective probabilities are inferred from preferences in the Ramsey-Savage approach”, 
and thus “should not be interpreted as measures of belief” (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). Highly controlled experiments in PT systematically demonstrated that human 
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decision making processes repeatedly violate all the fundamental principles of EUT in a 
consistent manner (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman; 1992). 
Kahneman and Tversky’s empirical findings (1979), along with other 
researchers’ results (Rabin 2000a,b; Rabin & Thaler 2001, Thaler, 1992; 1991; 1980; 
Tversky 1991), demonstrate that human decision making and observed economic 
behavior go against the normative assumptions of classical subjective utility theory that 
permeates classical neo economics. 
PT, unlike expected utility theory, is a descriptive model that accurately explains 
people’s risk taking behavior. PT’s value function “is concave for gains and convex for 
losses”, which basically means that a decision agent will exhibit risk aversive behaviour 
when choosing within a gains domain, i.e. when the decision maker encounters positive 
alternatives, and risk seeking behaviour when choosing within a losses domain, i.e. 
when the decision agent encounters negative alternatives. 
According to PT, people overall exhibit loss aversive behaviour “because equal-
magnitude gains and losses do not have symmetric impacts on the decision. Losses hurt 
twice as much as gains satisfy” (Ariely et. al. 2005). Decision makers exhibit such a 
behavior because they tend to systematically replace probabilities, i.e. occurrence of a 
particular outcome, with personal decision weights that bear a subjective value. The 
decision agent relies on decision weights because each individual perceives monetary 
outcomes in terms of essential changes from the individual’s own reference point, i.e. 




Figure 1: The Prospect theory S shaped value function. Here we can see that the S shaped 
value function “is concave for gains and convex for losses”, illustrating that a decision agent will exhibit 
risk aversive behaviour when choosing within a profitable domain and risk seeking behaviour when 
choosing within a domain that incurs losses. The vertical axis shows the psychological impact of the 
decision outcome, the horizontal axis shows changes in material wealth (extrinsic incentive), and the 
crossing of the two axis represents the decision maker’s own reference point (subjective state). 
 
 
According to Thaler the S shaped value function of PT “shows changes in 
material well-being on the horizontal axis, rather than levels as in expected utility 
theory, because humans (and other species) have a strong tendency to adapt to their 
environment and react only to perceived changes. The vertical axis shows happiness 
resulting from these changes. The S-shape displays diminishing marginal sensitivity to 




PT illustrates that people systematically fail to provide accurate and reliable 
assessments of utilities presented as alternative choices in everyday life conditions and 
cannot translate utility values in objective terms thus failing in the most basic 
prescriptive requirements of EUT. PT primarily treated monetary outcomes but besides 
the well documented economic behavior it has been applied to choices involving other 
attributes, such as quality of life and well being, political decisions, strategic decisions 
and policy making. Recently Hastie and Dawes concluded that PT is “the best 
comprehensive description we can give of the decision process. It summarizes several 
centuries’ worth of findings and insights concerning human decision behaviour. 
Moreover, it has produced an unmatched yield of new insights and predictions of 
human behaviour in decision making” (2001, p. 310). 
However, PT in its original form stumbled upon the problem of violating first 
order stochastic dominance. First order stochastic dominance postulates that for two sets 
of risky prospects X and Z, the prospect set of preferences X may be preferred to the set 
of preferences Z if the cumulative distribution of the set values X is on average greater 
than the cumulative distribution of the set values Z, i.e. the decision agent’s probability 
of maximizing his utility is significantly greater by choosing the prospect set X over the 
prospect set Z. Tversky and Kahneman (1986) illustrated how first order stochastic 
dominance is satisfied when the decision problem in question is transparent and is not 
satisfied when the decision problem in questions is not transparent, i.e. it has been 
masked, eliciting a faulty decision making behaviour (the masking “tricks” the decision 
maker in a sense luring him to choose the wrong option) resulting in a major violation 
of first order stochastic dominance. Although a number of descriptive theories, 
including cumulative prospect theory, supposedly satisfy stochastic dominance there is 
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a growing body of research that demonstrates that when a formula derived stochastic 
dominance decision problem is presented to the individual the decision making 
behaviour in question does not, in any way, satisfy stochastic dominance (Birnbaum & 
Navarette, 1998). The decision problems that follow have been directly adopted from 
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) and illustrate the stochastic dominance masking 
example presented above. 
Problem 1 (Transparent stochastic dominance)  
State of the world         1    2    3    4    5  
Option A: Probability .90 .06 .01 .01 .02   
Outcome                     $0 $45 $30 -$15 -$15  
Option B: Probability .90 .06 .01 .01 .02   
Outcome                     $0 $45 $45 -$10 -$15  
 
In problem 1, it is quite evident and thus obvious for the research participant to 
spot (calculate) that option B dominates, i.e. is more valuable, option A. In a series of 
decision problems in a study conducted by Tversky and Kahneman’s all research 






Problem 2 (Non-transparent stochastic dominance)  
Option C: Probability .90 .06 .01 .03   
Outcome                    $0 $45 $30 -$15 
Option D: Probability .90 .07 .01 .02  
Outcome                    $0 $45 -$10 -$15   
 
The second problem is equal, it terms of probability weights and actual value, to 
the first problem, but the stochastic dominance relationship between the options C and 
D is non-transparent, i.e. it is masked. We know that option C has been altered and 
developed by combining the last two prospects in option A, and that option D has been 
altered as well and developed by combining the second and third prospects in option B. 
The way Kahneman and Tversky decided to present the second problem, which 
nonetheless was of equal value to the first problem, empowered “the attractiveness of C, 
which has two positive outcomes and one negative, relative to D, which has two 
negative outcomes and one positive,” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). This 
reformulation of the prospect set values, although being equal, led to a significant 
preference reversal with 58% of the research participants opting for the dominated 
prospect set C (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). 
Subsequent theoretical improvements by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
overcame the problem of first order stochastic dominance in risky choice and the study 
of risk taking behaviour. A revised version of PT, now called cumulative prospect 
theory (CPT), solved the problem of first order stochastic dominance employing a 
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probability assessment method adopted from rank-dependent expected utility theory 
(Quiggin, 1981, 1982b). In order to overcome dominance related problems, CPT was 
developed to account for an infinite and continuous number of prospective outcomes, 
assuming that any potential future event could be defined as a real number, and “applies 
to uncertain as well as to risky prospects with any number of outcomes, and it allows 
different weighting functions for gains and for losses. Two principles, diminishing 
sensitivity and loss aversion, are invoked to explain the characteristic curvature of the 
value function and the weighting functions” and at the same time observing internal 
consistency rules such as transitivity and the basic laws of probability (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). 
Loss Aversion 
Loss aversion is an empirically validated finding of prospect theory and 
“provides a complete account of risk aversion for risks with equal probability to win or 
lose” (Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005).  Loss aversion gives rise to risk aversion, i.e. 
risk-averse individuals dislike to be exposed to risk, any sort of risk whether this has to 
do with economic behaviour or with everyday life choices like taking the bike over 
catching the bus. Risk aversion is the reluctance of an individual to accept a choice with 
a probabilistic outcome rather than a choice that would involve a more certain outcome. 
The prospect theory S shaped value function is “concave for gains and convex for 
losses”, which means that a human decision agent will exhibit risk aversive behaviour 
when choosing within a gains domain and risk seeking behaviour when choosing within 
a domain that incurs losses. This explains why utility curves while are similar across 
people differ in domains of gain from those in domains of loss. The preference shift 
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effect that has been observed from domains of gain to domains of loss has been termed 
as a “losses loom larger than gains” effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
The fundamental assumption of the “losses loom larger than gains” effect is that 
potential losses, shortages, and misfortunes of any sort stemming from one’s own 
decisions will have a much stronger psychological impact on the decision agent’s well 
being than potential gains, benefits and profits stemming from one’s own decisions will 
have. This consequently will affect how the decision agent evaluates and assesses 
choice dilemmas and their prospective outcomes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1992). A direct, empirically validated, result of the losses loom larger 
than gains effect is that “the loss of utility associated with giving up a valued good is 
greater than the utility gain associated with receiving it” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). 
The observed systematic difference, named the “endowment effect” (Thaler, 1980), 
which is a direct expression of loss aversion, while assessing a valued good is very 
likely to significantly change when an item of value, any value, is integrated into what a 
decision agent assumes as his/her own possession because a) the person adapts to self-
signaling effects ownership over time (Strahilevitz & Lowenstein, 1998) and seems to 
attach emotionally to it (Ariely et. al. 2005) and b) people tend to posses different 
cognitive perspectives while experiencing losses and gains, and as a consequence, the 
differences in perception can be accounted for by considering the different perspective 
on the cognitive task the person who loses a valued good faces relevant to the person 
who gains (Ariely et. al. 2005). The effects of ownership, which is widely known as the 
endowment effect, are equally strong when the decision agent feels or thinks that owns 
something and this happens because the status quo of the decision agent is a subjective 
state, a personal reference point, not a fixed one in time and space that would mandate a 
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numerical description. We know that this effect can be observed but we also know that 
it doesn’t fit any mathematical model of expected utility and thus it violates EU’s core 
assumptions. Ariely and colleagues suggest, with regards to decision agents’ cognitive 
perspectives, that “the differential perspective account suggests that different decision-
making roles”, e.g. buyers versus sellers, “impose a differential focus on the attributes 
of the transaction” (2005) leaving the decision agent exposed to his own feelings, i.e. 
experiencing the loss and as a consequence future decisions will be affected by previous 
experiences that evolved out of similar decision making processing. The loss aversion 
effect has great implications for PT offering evidence that “the carriers of utility are 
generally not states but rather changes relative to a reference point” (Novemsky & 
Kahneman, 2005). This definition goes against the EUT’s standard assumptions which 
postulate that only the final outcome should influence the decision agent’s preferences, 
i.e. the decision agent is a rational actor and calculates only changes in final wealth 
without being affected by intermediary processes, (Camerer, 2000; Kahneman, 2002).  
 
Framing Effects 
Framing has been generally a popular topic of research in judgment and decision 
making research. According to Tversky and Kahneman a “framing effect” occurs when 
the final decision completely shifts dependent on differences in context presentation of 
the same decision problem (1981). According to the subjective expected utility theory 
(Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944, 1947; Fishburn, 1968, 1970, 1981) rational 
decision making agents ought to obey a set of a priori axioms which, in the face of a 
given choice set, would offer certain assessment criteria for the selection of the rational, 
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i.e. mathematically optimal, choice. Thus rational choice theory postulates that the 
utilities of prospects with uncertain outcomes are equal to their payoff multiplied by 
their probability and thus in the face of a decision problem presenting a choice set the 
rational decision agent ought to opt for the choice that has the highest expected utility 
(Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944, 1947; Fishburn, 1968, 1970, 1981). 
Research on framing effects empirically demonstrates that the decision making 
agents’ outcome preferences are heavily dependent on the context in which a decision 
problem is presented, that is decisions and outcome preferences are highly sensitive and 
dependent on the formulation of the given problem “as it is often possible to frame a 
given decision problem in more than one way” by simply changing the wording 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Final decision shifts dependent on the formulation of a 
given problem have been a significant empirically validated finding in support of PT 
and have revealed additional observed violations of the rational agent choice theory 
with regards to decision behaviour. 
However, Tversky and Kahneman did not end their framing research 
investigation in the framing of a problem’s formulation in search of significant 
differences between decision outcomes, they also framed expected decision outcomes in 
search of shifts in the decision agent’s perception of the choice as a gain or loss--in the 
agent’s perceived preferred order of the final choice (1981). Final prospects and future 
events are usually processed and assessed as positive or negative in association with a 
particular prospect, i.e. a current situation, that is considered middle ground solution 
with regards to the decision agent’s own status quo. Therefore, any visible changes in 
the decision agent’s status quo, i.e. his/her own reference point could potentially 
influence the decision maker’s perception with regards to whether a final outcome is 
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evaluated and classified positively or negatively, i.e. if it will be considered as a 
prospective gain or as a prospective loss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Therefore, 
Tversky and Kahneman, with regards to “framing” a prospect or a potential future 
outcome they conclude that “because the value function is generally concave for gains, 
convex for losses, and steeper for losses than for gains, shifts of reference can change 
the value difference between outcomes and thereby reverse the preference order 
between options” (1981). Complete preference reversals are a norm in behavioral 
decision theory experiments and signify how context interacts and influences final 
decisions. This effect is mediated by an inherent fear of loss that most decision agents 
experience unconsciously. 
 
 Risk perception, the Affect heuristic, Dual Process theories, and the 
Psychometric Paradigm as a Panacea for the measurement of perceived risk 
Many decisions involve the possibility of gaining or losing and such possibilities 
involve emotional arousal in the face of their expected outcome. But what happens 
when the probabilities are way beyond estimation (e.g. the risk of an accident in a 
nuclear powered station)? How individuals arrive in a decision or a plan of action (e.g. 
vote and/or protest against nuclear development) under the possible emotional 
discomfort that the decision making process bears? The perception of such a risk is a 
purely subjective experience and a thorough evaluation of it would include many 
alternatives and highly complex decision processing thus rendering the evaluation 
process cost ineffective and effortful. Risk means different things to different people 
and the various notions of risk, by definition, cannot be assessed on the basis of 
52 
 
standard numerical values, the calculation of probabilities, or the computation of 
algorithms because it is inherently linked with a natural human reaction, fear. 
Despite the fact that there is not an ideal theory explaining how individuals 
perceive risks and how they weigh their judgments and decisions relevant to risk, 
research findings from different disciplines show that our understanding of the 
complexity of risk has increased over the years (Slovic 1987; Slovic 2000; Slovic et. al. 
2002). Risk perception has attracted a lot of attention for a number of reasons, the most 
important are as follows: a) among psychologists and cognitive scientists the debate is 
whether the perception of risk is processed rationally or intuitively—dual process 
theories pertaining to risk as analysis and risk as feelings, and b) it has become a much 
discussed topic among policy makers concerned with technology, the environment, and 
urban development. As a consequence, psychological investigation of the phenomenon 
of perceived risk has experienced a significant increase. Studying subjective 
experiences such as perceived risk regarding a rare event has not yielded yet a standard 
straightforward procedure of evaluation but some models seem to be favored among 
psychology researchers (Slovic et. al. 2003). 
Individual perception of risk is part of an intricate cognitive mechanism that 
guides judgment and influences decision making processes affectively not rationally, 
and this is due to the fact that human decision agents automatically translate risks into 
dangers and thus link them with fear. There are two fundamental cognitive systems, 
Stanovich and West (2000) recently proposed neutral labels to distinguish between 
intuitive processing and analytic reasoning such as “System 1” and “System 2”, of 
human cognitive architecture that distinguish between affective and rational decision 
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making processes, between intuitive thinking and reasoning—heuristics is part of the 
first and rationality is part of the second. 
The first system, is intuitive, effortless, associative, habitual, automatic, rapid, 
parallel processing, it is what enabled the human species to survive during their long 
evolution and is up to date the most common way to preserve survival and a mechanism 
that naturally responds to risky conditions; while the second system is effortful, 
deliberately controlled, deductive, slow and serial, involves the heavy use of 
algorithmic calculations and normative rules, it also requires self awareness (Kahneman 
& Frederick 2002). The intuitive system relies on cognitive shortcuts, image processing 
and associations, it is linked by experience to emotion and associates potential risks 
with emotional states and feelings, and informs us whether our environment is safe or 
not, i.e. it is an environment and domain-specific process. The rational analytic system 
helps us assess formal risk, calculate probabilities and offer formal logical explanations; 
the second system represents risk as analysis. 
The two systems of reasoning are not operating independently from each other, 
“there is a complex interplay between emotion and reason that is essential to rational 
behavior”, they operate in a parallel fashion and each decision processing model 
depends on the other for feedback and drive (Slovic et. al. 2004). In the words of Daniel 
Kahneman, the disparity in cognitive processing “provides the most useful indications 
of whether a given mental process should be assigned to System 1 or System 2” 
(Kahneman, 2002). However, due to the fact that the human brain’s computational 
power with regards to information processing is rather limited; Kahneman argues that 
“effortful processes tend to disrupt each other, whereas effortless processes neither 
cause nor suffer much interference when combined with other tasks” (2002). 
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An array of studies in neurology, neuropsychology, and cognitive psychology 
have demonstrated that rational decision making will never be efficient and fruitful 
unless it is guided by intuitive and emotional processing (Sloman 2002; Kahneman & 
Frederick 2002; Bechara et. al. 2000; Damasio et. al. 1996, Damasio, 1994). Although 
there has been conducted extensive research and theoretic modeling regarding dual 
process theories (for a review see Stanovich and West, 2008) dual system models of 
decision making under risk and uncertainty based on the dual systems aspect described 
above have not been established yet. 
However, it is worth to point out that recently Mukherjee proposed a flexible 
and behaviorally grounded model for the study of dual system theories of decision 
making under risk and uncertainty (2010). Mukherjee’s dual sytem model proposal for 
the study of decision making under risk and uncertainty provides a convincing account 
of important decision making observations, problems, and phenomena and has a very 
important advantage, compared to other models, like EUT and CPT, by incorporating a) 
“different thinking dispositions, a feature of the decision maker”, b) “affective content 
of the outcomes, a feature of the risky gambles” and c) “different task construals, a 
feature of the nature of the task, within its framework” (2010). According to Mukherjee, 
decision making models like EUT and CPT avoid to address these particularly 
important dimensions of human decision making processes (2010). Mukherjee’s model 
for the study of dual system theories is still theoretical in nature and the only 
experimental observations available come from a single study (Mukherjee, 2010). 
Zajonc (1980, 1984) was among the first to discuss the importance of affective 
processing in decision making arguing that the employment of emotional reactions to 
stimuli are usually the very first reactions occurring automatically in order to guide 
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judgment, and decision making. Zajonc has also proposed that people’s perceptions 
involve affective reactions and other researchers that followed in his steps concluded 
that indeed risk taking behavior may be influenced from the decision agent’s affective 
states in a variety of contexts and environments (Isen 1984; Isen et. al. 1987). 
Furthermore people’s risk perception guided by affective reactions may drive judgments 
and arrive at decisions excluding relevant information processing—i.e. a systematic and 
balanced evaluation of the alternative options (Shafir et. al. 1993). The well studied 
assumption which postulates that there is an “observed inverse relationship between 
perceived risk and perceived benefit” and that people generally heavily rely on affect 
when judging and deciding about risks and benefits (Finucane et. al. 2000) seems to 
leave little space for debate regarding the role of affective states in human judgment and 
decision making processes and the parallel operation of the intuitive and analytical 
systems of reasoning (Slovic et. al. 2004, 2002; Pham, 1998). 
During the last few decades a large number of studies have examined perceived 
risk in order to determine, measure, understand and predict individual responses to 
certain risks (see Burns, 2007; Slovic & Weber, 2002; Fischhoff 1995). A well balanced 
relationship among different levels of public concern regarding
 
risk is based on the 
suggestion that risk perception is influenced from many factors and is eventually shaped
 
by personal attitudes and beliefs. The most popular measure of perceived risk is the 
“psychometric paradigm” (PP) and was brought forward by Slovic P. and colleagues 
(Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978). 
The PP extended previous work done by Kahneman and Tversky (1974) which 
showed that human decision agents employ cognitive heuristics in order to process and 
evaluate subjective information which nonetheless could be a source of systematic, 
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context specific and generic biases in the comprehension of a particular decision 
problem or domain. The PP identifies a number of aspects responsible for affecting 
individual perception of risk turning the focus on the roles of affect and emotion—risk 
as feelings theory (Lowenstein et. al 2001; Slovic et. al. 2004). Slovic and colleagues 
argue that “perceived risk is quantifiable and measurable” and also can be 
systematically predicted and as such it can be studied on a “metric” level (Slovic & 
Weber, 2002). Thus the PP with regards to risk perception proposed and developed 
taxonomic schemes and other numeric measures of uncertainty that have been used to 
measure, recognize, and comprehend individual’s responses to certain risks (Sjoberg, 
2003). According to Slovic and Weber the PP should be the most common approach for 
studying and measuring risk perception because “a taxonomic scheme might explain, 
for example, people’s extreme aversion to some hazards, their indifference to others, 
and the discrepancies between these reactions and expert’s opinions” (Slovic & Weber, 
2002). 
Although the PP views perceived risk—a subjective experience—as something 
“quantifiable and measurable” other theories of risk perception, such as cultural theory 
for example, draws on a different line to study risk perception. On a final note we 
should bring attention to the fact that popular models that have been used to measure 
“perceived risk” have received a lot of criticism due to a lack of adequate explanations 
for certain categories of perceived risk and low accounts of explained variance (Sjoberg 
et. al. 2004). In addition, extended literature reviews have concluded that well received 
models of the past such as the popular PP are “not sufficiently based on empirical data 
and appropriate analysis” (Sjoberg et. al., 2004). 
57 
 
Emotions in decision making
9
 
Another very important domain in behaviour decision theory is the dominant 
role emotions play in the decision making process. Lay people, and more importantly 
decision making researchers until recently, did not know that human reasoning and 
decision making is largely influenced and guided by emotions (Slovic et. al. 2004). The 
past 20 years a large and ever increasing body of scientific evidence illustrates 
emotions’—that is the limbic system and equally importantly amygdala—crucial role in 
decision making processes (De Martino et. al. 2010; Knutson & Greer 2008; Berridge, 
2007; Naqvi et. al. 2006; Kuhnen & Knutson 2005; Camerer et. al. 2005; McClure et. 
al. 2004; Bechara, 2003; Loewenstein et. al. 2001; Bechara et. al. 2000a,b; Bechara et. 
al. 1999; Bechara et. al. 1994). Historically emotions have been regarded as a bad 
consultant to human reason (Damasio, 1994) but modern research has repeatedly 
showed that the part of the brain that accounts for emotions informs and affects 
reasoning at best and that reason and decision making processes are impaired when the 
parts of the brain that mediate emotional information are isolated from the frontal part—
particularly the ventromedial prefrontal cortex—of the brain that is responsible for 
executive functioning (Bechara et. al. 2000; Damasio, 1996; 1994; LeDoux, 2000). 
Research performed in patients with ventromedial damage in the prefrontal 
cortex (VMPFC), that is the substrate for human learning, shows a dramatic reduction 
of risk avoidant behaviour, that otherwise is commonly exhibited by normal human 
participants, and the experience of profound abnormalities while processing emotions 
and feelings (Damasio et. al. 1991; Bechara et. al. 1994, Bechara et. al. 2000a). 
                                                           
9
 The assumption that “emotions play a crucial role in decision making” has been brought forward 
primarily through research (working independently) performed by Joseph LeDoux (1992, 1994), Antonio 
Damasio and Antoine Bechara (best summarized in Damasio’s book “Descarte’s Error” 1994). 
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Remarkably, the level of abnormality does not allow for emotional engagement 
regarding complex social situations and events (Damasio et. al. 1991, Damasio & 
Anderson 1993). Findings have been confirmed on several experiments and are now 
what is considered to be the cornerstone of the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 
1994). 
The somatic marker (SM) hypothesis is an integrated systems neuroscience 
theoretical framework that accounts for the regulation of decision making processing 
and the exerted influence on the brain’s decision processing by emotional signals to 
make value relevant decisions under uncertain outcome and relate them in complex 
social situations (Bechara et. al. 2000a). According to the SM hypothesis emotional 
defects play a dominant role in processes of impaired human reasoning and decision 
making (Damasio, 1996). Many researchers have also pointed to the role emotions play 
in decision making that involves risk and uncertainty where emotions may act at an 
explicit level (Peters et. al. 2006; Hastie & Dawes, 2001). 
Experiments conducted on the same line of research as those of Bechara and  
Damasio indicate that the basal ganglia, particularly amygdala which accounts for 
storing memories of emotional experiences and thus is thought to be responsible for fear 
conditioning and emotional learning (Bechara et. al. 1999, 2000)—similar results have 
been observed form a number of independent studies (De Martino et. al, 2010; Talmi et. 
al. 2010; Whalen 2007; Hsu et. al. 2005; Hommer et. al. 2003; Kahn et. al. 2002)—and 
the brain’s limbic system and the dopamine associated reward pathway (McClure et. al. 
2004) are also significantly involved in human reasoning and decision making 
processing. The amygdala, research findings show, holds a very important role in 
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affective processing and emotional regulation (LeDoux, 2000; Adolphs et. al. 1999, 
1995). 
Additional research findings show that amygdala is actively involved in 
monetary reward anticipation (Hommer et. al. 2003), prospective outcome of risky 
choice (Kahn et. al. 2002), and in choice preference and risk-taking (Talmi et. al. 2010). 
Additional experimental findings indicate that the amygdala brain region is actively 
involved in a role in which it is very likely to contribute in the detection of uncertainty 
(Whalen 2007) and ambiguity (Hsu et. al. 2005) in the environment and as a 
consequence generate emotional arousal and overt attention in task specific contexts. 
Risking and losing are essential aspects of the decision making process. 
Therefore, the way in which human decision agents perceive and process the 
possibilities of risk and loss reveals particular behavioural preferences that could 
account for or highlight erratic decision making behaviour (DeMartino et. al. 2010). 
Research indicates that higher levels of ambiguity in choice based experimental 
tasks positively correlate with activation in the regions of amygdala and ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex showing that varying degrees of uncertainty activate neural systems 
that are thought to process and regulate emotional information (Hsu et. al. 2005). 
According to this research framework human reasoning and decision making are 
heavily guided by and are dependent on emotional processing neural mechanisms such 
as the amygdala and the ventro medial prefrontal cortex (Bechara et. al. 1999, Bechara, 
2004). In addition, even decision making, problem solving, and the selection of choices 
that otherwise seem intellectual and rational are actually processed under the direct 
influence of emotional signals that interact in a complex way with the decision process 
(Bechara et. al. 2000a,b; Bechara, 2004). The fact that emotional regulating mechanisms 
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interact in a complex way and influence human judgment and decision making 
processes can hardly be disputed but there are still a lot of questions that need to be 
answered and a lot of work ahead until these findings can be integrated in one single 
experimental paradigm that would account for a general and descriptive model of 
human judgement and decision making behaviour. 
 
 
Probability Blindness—Major Flaws in Probability Assessment 
Humans are not hard wired for rapid probabilistic assessments and rational 
judgments under uncertainty. This is not an assumption but a set of empirically 
validated facts (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Humans 
have evolved to be able to fast process information relevant to simple risky situations 
involving a possibility of a dangerous survival threat, such as tigerrun for your life, 
and responding to mildly optimal conditions implying a reward, such as coconutclimb 
the tree to get it. That is with regards to human decision behaviour we readily process 
information responding to matters that for example activate the “fight or flight” 
mechanism or stimuli that activate our pleasure seeking mechanisms—both examples 
clearly belong to our intuitive and effortless information processing system. 
Any cognitive processing that requires the assessment of probabilities, risk 
evaluation, and requires us to offer formal logical argumentation and explanations 
regarding a particular course of action is a highly effortful mental process and 
represents risk and probability assessment as a time consuming analysis—this form of 
decision processing belongs to our rational analytic system that involves the heavy use 
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of algorithmic calculations and the incorporation of normative rules. The assessment of 
uncertain, i.e. probabilistic, outcomes is an indispensable aspect of the human 
experience and for a long period over the course of human evolution the survival of the 
species has relied on it. 
In modern life a large number of significant choices are based unavoidably on 
the likelihood of such uncertain events and rely on probabilistic assessments such as 
“the guilt of a defendant, the result of an election, the future value of the dollar, the 
outcome of a medical operation” or even the outbreak of a pandemic and the risk of an 
armed conflict (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Our brains do not have adequate mental 
processing capacity to effectively asses the probabilities of such events as those 
presented above, thus intuitive judgment is the most readily available cognitive 
approach for assessing uncertainties, i.e. decisions on a given problem based on 
incomplete or missing information (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). 
Consider the following highly informative example of bias in understanding 
probability (a test that illustrates a case study of departure from rational behaviour, it 
was administered in professional medical doctors—adopted from Bennett (p. 159, 
1998): 
“A test of a disease presents a rate of 5% false positives. The disease strikes 
1/1000 of the population. People are tested at random, regardless of whether they are 
suspected of having the disease. A patient’s test is positive. What is the probability of 
the patient being stricken with the disease?” 
The results of this simple quiz showed that most of the medical doctors 
answered that 95% of the population would be stricken with the disease—note that they 
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had been informed that the screening for the disease was random, thus they should have 
inferred that their answers were quite likely not to be true since the disease had been 
shown to afflict only 1/1000 of the general population. Yet, the medical doctors 
probably took into consideration that since the test administered to the human sample 
had a 95% accuracy rate thus would afflict 95% of the people. However, the true answer 
to the quiz is that the probability of any one individual actually getting sick and this 
probability being reflected in the medical test was more like a 2% rather than the 
unrealistic 95% that was reported by the majority of the physicians. In this literature 
case study example of bias in understanding probability, Bennett reports, that less than 
1/5 professional medical doctors gave the correct answer (1998). 
People always strive towards an understanding of probability and its wide range 
applications in the real world but probabilistic understanding is not something that 
comes along effortlessly. Henk Tijms in his book “Understanding probability” 
compares the popularity of modern probability theory and its wide range every day 
applications with the wide range applications of geometry (2004). Probability theory 
permeates our lives and seems to be at the heart of most scientific disciplines. 
“Countless problems” Tijms says “in our daily lives call for a probabilistic 
approach. In many cases, better judicial and medical decisions result from an 
elementary knowledge of probability theory. It is essential to the field of insurance. And 
likewise, the stock market, ‘the largest casino in the world,’ cannot do without it. The 
telephone network with its randomly fluctuating load could not have been economically 
designed without the aid of probability theory. Call-centers and airline companies 
apply probability theory to determine how many telephone lines and service desks will 
be needed based on expected demand. Probability theory is also essential in stock 
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control to find a balance between the stock-out probability and the costs of holding 
inventories in an environment of uncertain demand. Engineers use probability theory 
when constructing dikes to calculate the probability of water levels exceeding their 
margins; this gives them the information they need to determine optimum dike elevation. 
These examples underline the extent to which the theory of probability has become an 
integral part of our lives.” 
Although we have developed formal probability theory and we are able to 
calculate it with great accuracy and apply it in a range of domains, since modern 
probability theory has become an integral part of our lives, when the same probability 
enters real life scenarios humans seem to have very little understanding of it. Tversky 
and Kahneman report that outside the experimental area of random sampling 
“probability theory does not determine the probabilities of uncertain events—it merely 
imposes constraints on the relations among them” distinguishing, for example, that the 
likelihood of an event A to occur is more probable over the likelihood of an event B to 
occur (1983). 
Similar results like those of the medical quiz presented above have been 
replicated on several controlled experiments showing that people naturally, probability 
experts included too, fail to formally assess probability in realistic scenarios because 
there is a tendency to rely on intuitive inferences which have repeatedly been shown to 
fool human perception (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, 1984). It seems to be so primarily 
because the assessment of probability requires a great deal of effortful thinking, 
something that the brain is willing to skip and engage in a system 1 intuitive thinking, 
processing the information associatively that provides a faster and effortless outcome to 
any given decision problem. 
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The assessment of probability is an evaluation of missing information while 
dealing with a decision problem presented as a choice under uncertainty. Tversky and 
Kahneman report significant violations of basic qualitative laws of probability, e.g. such 
as the conjunction rule, which arise in a number of decision making domains such as 
“estimation of word frequency, personality judgment, medical prognosis, suspicion of 
criminal acts, and political forecasting” (1983). Tversky and Kahneman, further report 
that these frequently observed violations of the “conjunction rule”, a phenomenon that 
has been termed the conjunction fallacy, are regularly reported “in judgments of lay 
people and experts in both between-subjects and within-subjects comparisons” (1983). 
Tversky and Kahneman conclude that these systematic violations of basic qualitative 
laws of probability occur because judgment under uncertainty, i.e. the assessment of 
probabilities on a given decision problem, are often mediated by simple reproducible 
cognitive errors called simple heuristics that cannot be explained by the “conjunction 
rule” (1983). The mediation of a probabilistic assessment by intuitive thinking that 
relies on cognitive shortcuts, such as the availability and the representativeness 
heuristics, produces systematic errors in judgment and decision making (Tversky & 










CHAPTER 3: ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY & SIMPLE HEURISTICS 
 
Ecological Rationality 
According to the ecological rationality (ER) principle, human reasoning, 
judgement and decision making behaviour are ecologically rational when they are 
environmentally adapted and suit an evolutionary purpose. According to Gigerenzer 
(2001), unlike other decision theories that are based on internal consistency rules such 
as transitivity and additivity of probabilities, ER places “less weight on internal 
consistency” emphasizing “performance in the external world, both physical and 
social”. 
ER refers to a generic connection between a specific decision strategy and the 
environmental context, it usually refers to the decision agent’s environment, on which 
the decision problem is presented (Gigerenzer, 2001). ER manifests as an evolutionary 
mechanism, a set of simple domain-specific decision strategies that “can exploit the 
structure of environments” and be robust in their simplicity. Thus, ER is an evolutionary 
concept that illustrates how human cognition constantly interacts with the environment 
and adapts to it. 
Acting rational, i.e. adapting, in a challenging habitat allowed proto-humans to 
master their environment and ensure survival. This explanation of human rationality, as 
an evolutionary and ecologically adaptive mechanism, goes contrary to the established 
models of economic theory, according to which decision making behaviour may only be 
classified as rational when it obeys the axiomatic principles of logic and preserves 
internal consistency rules. ER thus clashes with economic theory in the sense that it 
doesn’t conform to any rational or logically inferred rules and probabilistic 
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assumptions. On the contrary, ER employs simple decision heuristics which yield 
accurate decisions in particular problems, domain-specific, exploiting cues and 
inferences from their environmental structure and ordering (Todd et. al. 2000). The ER 
heuristics illustrate several rather simplistic but highly accurate decision making models  
through which decision agents draw inferences and solve problems in a non-
compensatory fashion utilizing simple “stopping” or “one good reason” rules that 
dictate rapid and effortless cue processing. 
ER postulates that heuristic cognitive processes maybe best understood as 
simple decision making mechanisms that exploit and benefit from natural 
environmental structures and clues in order to achieve a more general purpose of 
optimization in the decision making process, including accuracy, mental agility, speed 
and effortless processing, under any situation and in any context (Bullock & Todd, 




Every single living organism, from bacteria to animals and humans, makes 
inferences about its environment and most of the times within a limited temporal 
framework, information, and computational ability. Therefore, living organisms’ 
decision making ability is restricted in several respects and is by far removed from 
many rational inference models that claim unbounded rationality and are based on 
internal consistency principles. As we have explained in the previous chapter, bounded 
rationality can best be understood as maximum optimization under several restrictions 
such as limited cognitive ability and information processing power. 
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According to Kahneman and colleagues heuristics are employed in an automatic 
manner and most of the times unconsciously when people have to use abstract 
reasoning, i.e. to assess “abstract beliefs concerning the likelihood of uncertain events” 
(Kahneman et. al. 1982, p. 3), in order to arrive at an optimal solution to a particular 
problem. Simple heuristics “have evolved” to solve simple problems in an 
environmentally fitting manner and while relying on them people tend to “reduce the 
complex task of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental 
operations” (Kahneman et. al. 1982, p. 3). Tversky & Kahneman also showed that 
relying on simple heuristic cognitive shortcuts translates into automatic and rapid 
simplification of complex assessments in specific domains where there is scarcity or 
complete unavailability of guiding cues—uncertainty—such as the assessment of 
subjective probabilities (1974). 
However, another line of research has proposed that heuristics need to be 
interpreted from a Darwinian perspective, i.e. to place them within an “irrational” 
decision theory context in order to be able to capture the non-linear dynamics of human 
judgement and decision making. Todd argues that decision making mechanisms such as 
the simple heuristics were evolutionary by-products of “selective pressures favouring 
rapid decisions” (2000). According to evolution theory, there is no master plan to 
account for all changes observed in living organisms. There are only small adaptations 
that are environment specific, in this light heuristics maybe interpreted as cognitive 
evolutionary adaptations that serve a particular purpose in a specific ecological 
framework. In a broader evolutionary context, according to Gigerenzer, the “adaptive 
tool box” theoretical framework understands the human mind as a “modular system” 
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whose basic building blocks are simple heuristics that draw rapid inferences on 
minimum information as environmentally adaptive decision making strategies (2008). 
The adaptive toolbox comprises a variety of fast and frugal heuristics that are 
ecologically rational, i.e. “domain specific” rather than “domain generic” that operate as 
evolutionary adaptive cognitive processes that invest minimally on informational 
evaluation, i.e. they require minimum informational input yet they are accurate and 
robust. Why did the adaptive toolbox evolved in such a way as to rely heavily on 
heuristics? For two very simple yet important reasons: a) heuristics are fast and b) 
heuristics are frugal, that is in order to draw an inference they require very small 
temporal cognitive loads relying on minimal cue processing or even totally ignoring 
related information. 
Heuristics, historically, were understood as decision making strategies that drive 
information processing, search for clues, and adapt and adjust to diverse problem 
formulations to facilitate optimal and advantageous decisions (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
2002; Gigerenzer et. al. 1999; Simon, 1955). Traditionally, Gigerenzer and Goldstein 
argue, heuristics have formed a distinct and promising group of constructive and 
crucial, yet somewhat  alternative, propositions to deal with linear problems “that 
cannot be handled by logic and probability theory” (2002). Gigerenzer and Goldstein go 
one step further to give an account of how the heuristics terminology has been 
transformed to the point of “inversion” coming to “denote strategies that prevent one 
from finding out or discovering correct answers to problems that are assumed to be in 
the domain of probability theory” (2002). According to the proposed viewpoint simple 
heuristics are evolutionary cognitive shortcuts that relieve the mind from complicated 
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and effortful computations that would, otherwise, be cognitively demanding to the point 
of compromising optimal performance. 
The new definition of heuristics, Gigerenzer and Goldstein argue, is as follows, 
heuristics are “poor surrogates for optimal procedures rather than indispensable 
psychological tools” that compete for an optimal solution in a non-compensatory 
manner, i.e. minimizing cognitive load by reducing the decision processing time and 
discarding information in excess, i.e. usually operating under a one good reason mode 
(2002). Thus, evolutionary cognitive shortcuts “do not provide a universal rational 
calculus, but a set of domain-specific mechanisms […] and have been referred to 
collectively as the ‘adaptive toolbox’” (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001). 
 
Homo Heuristicus: The Fast and Frugal Mind 
The foundation of the simple heuristics approach as we have already outlined 
above is hard lined on their ER which postulates that heuristics should be 
conceptualized as simple decision making strategies that exploit and benefit from their 
natural environment. Understanding, however, heuristics from a Darwinian perspective 
calls for an evaluation of their universality. Principles of evolution would suggest that if 
simple heuristics or other equally simple rules of thumb were to be observed across 
species then their universal character would be difficult to challenge. Hutchinson and 
Gigerenzer did just that, collected a number of simple heuristics observed in human 
behaviour, compared and contrasted them with simple rules of thumb observed in lower 
species and particularly social insects such as ants, bees, wasps, etc (2005). Do these 
observations warrant a universal acceptance of heuristics and rules of thumb across 
species? No, the authors claim, however, it is a strong indication. Although, rules of 
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thumb in social insects and other lower species is an established field of research the 
simple heuristics from an evolutionary approach is a rather new field of research lacking 
conclusive evidence regarding the internal validity of cognitive heuristics. In an earlier 
work Gigerenzer and Todd argue, that adherence to these simple rules of thumb actually 
makes humans smart, and explains how human decision agents cope with their 
environment, process and evaluate asymmetric loads of information in limited time and 
with minimum computational  effort (2000). 
In a recent paper Gigerenzer and Brighton made a case for consideration, 
heuristics, they argue, are universal, and present evidence of heuristics and simple rules 
of thumb which claim that exist across species; the authors also discuss a number of 
research findings from experiments conducted in human populations regarding 
adherence to simple heuristics and propose a Homo Heuristicus model for human 
decision making aspiring to convince the reader why biased minds make better 
inferences (2009). 
Gigerenzer and Todd discount the quite common assumption that less 
information processing will result in reduced accuracy, “less information, computation, 
and time can in fact improve accuracy”, claiming that a number of replicated research 
findings suggest that a significant majority of individuals are using fast and frugal 
heuristic decision making strategies (2009). Based on that proposition they argue for a 
model of human decision making behaviour that relies heavily on the individuals’ 
adaptive use of heuristics to make inferences about its environment (Gigerenzer & 
Brighton, 2009). 
Homo Heuristicus, according to Gigerenzer and Brighton, is a decision agent 
with a biased mind that tends to systematically ignore an important part of the 
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information available; “yet”, they claim “a biased mind can handle uncertainty more 
efficiently and robustly than an unbiased mind relying on more resource-intensive and 
general-purpose processing strategies” (2009). Thus Homo Heuristicus, unlike Homo 
Economicus, does not claim unbounded rationality, does not view decision making 
behaviour as rational or irrational that needs to be adjusted or corrected, he is neither 
self aware nor he promotes his own self interest in any way, neither does he perform 
fast and cost effective calculations to maximize his utility. Homo Heuristicus is, taking 
into account the Darwinian perspective, an evolutionary by-product that utilizes drastic 
cognitive shortcuts and simple rules of thumb in order to exploit the structures of his 
environment, he is “ecologically rational” i.e. “fast, frugal, accurate and adaptive at the 
same time” (Todd, Gigerenzer & the ABC research group, 2000) 
 However, Gigerenzer and Brighton’s Homo Heuristicus model did not go 
unchallenged primarily because of the formulation of the model which was based on the 
adaptive toolbox of fast and frugal heuristics which claimed that simple heuristics’ use 
is pervasive, i.e. a statistically significant number of individuals employ the use of 
heuristics, and that reliance on cognitive heuristics is an inherent and essential feature of 
the human decision making process (2009). Hilbig and Richter challenged this claim, 
they provided counter evidence showing that “recognition information is not generally 
used in a non-compensatory fashion but integrated with further knowledge” (2010”. 
According to Hilbig and Richter’s counter evidence, although reliance on heuristics is a 
core element of the “adaptive toolbox” approach, evidence, at present, regarding the 




Although an extensive analysis of the methodological implications regarding 
pervasive use of cognitive heuristics and their universal character is beyond the scope of 
this project we may summarise a few key points regarding the ecological validity of 
heuristics, a) heuristics are a core element of the “adaptive toolbox” approach that 
favours fast and frugal information processing and ecological adaptation, b) adherence 
to simple heuristics has been observed in human judgement and decision making, 
however, evidence for  continuous and persistent use of evolutionary cognitive shortcuts 
in human judgement and decision making are rather far from conclusive, c) a significant 
number of experimental findings challenge the view that simple heuristics form a core 
cognitive tool in human judgement and decision making processes but at the same time 
they cannot be discarded due to the fact that these findings also show that people utilize 
these simple strategies under certain domain-specific conditions to make inferences. 
 
 
The Recognition, Take the Best, and Priority Heuristics 
Although some experimental findings cast doubt on simple heuristic strategies 
and particularly on the “adaptive toolbox approach”—which basically implies that 
decision agents possess and heavily rely on a number of fast and frugal heuristics in 
order to arrive at optimal decisions very fast and with very little effort invested—as a 
universal account of human judgment and decision making processes, the 
complementary purpose of simple heuristics with regards to the study of human 
decision making holds value and is actively pursued. In this section we will present the 
most central heuristics of the adaptive toolbox approach that are both fast and frugal and 
satisfy the principle of ecological rationality as simple decision making strategies. 
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Due to the very recent emergence of the “adaptive toolbox” approach new 
heuristics are added to the collection constantly. An exhaustive discussion of simple 
heuristics would be beyond the scope of the present project, thus we chose to present 
those heuristics that have drawn the attention of the research community and directly 
represent speed and frugality, i.e. rapid decision making and minimum effort invested as 
“one good reason” decision making strategies, namely the recognition heuristic (RH), 
the take the best heuristic (TB) and the priority heuristic (PR). The discussion by no 
means will be exhaustive because these cognitive heuristics, except the RH, have not 
been experimentally tested systematically and thus still some controversy remains 
regarding their prowess as efficient decision strategies and their ecological validity. 
The priority heuristic (PH) is relatively the most recent heuristic to emerge out 
of the three that we will discuss in this section. Brandstatter and colleagues were the 
first to formulate the PH model and presented it as an efficiently descriptive model of a 
“one good reason” decision making strategy under risk (Brandstatter, Gigerenzer & 
Hertwig, 2006). Although, PH is a “variant of a lexicographic semi-order” it is 
considered a fast and frugal heuristic because it is argued that according to PH decisions 
are based on one “good” reason only, i.e. the strongest piece of information, ignoring or 
avoiding to examine all other reasons—pieces of information. Thus the PH operates as a 
simple rule of thumb opting for the strongest piece of information in order to arrive at a 
decision in a computationally cost effective manner. 
As a cognitive logarithm PH follows strong ordinal and quantitative assumptions 
to decide between sequential and non-compensatory cues in decision making under risk. 
According to Fiedler the serial non-compensatory cues are: a) “the difference between 
worst outcomes”, b) “the difference in worst case probabilities” and c) “the best 
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outcome that can be obtained” (2010). In the original PH formulation Brandstatter et. al. 
(2006) reanalyzed data that had been published in the past and showed that the PH 
explained the data more accurately than already established descriptive models of 
decision making under risk and uncertainty—such as Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) 
cumulative prospect theory (CPT) and Birnbaum’s (1997, 1999b, 2004a) transfer of 
attention exchange (TAX) model—(Birnbaum, 2008a). Brandstatter (2006) and 
colleagues report that the PH is a much better predictor than prescriptive and other 
utilitarian heuristic models with regards to individual rational agents’ decisions (Hillbig, 
2008b). 
 Brandstatter and colleagues argue that the PH model represents a decision 
making strategy under risk which actually explains in a descriptive fashion the series of 
steps taken—as in A --> Β --> C—by any decision agent while processing the available 
information to arrive at a particular decision without trade-offs, i.e. strictly avoiding any 
information integration during the evaluation process, acting strictly as a “one good 
reason” decision making model (2006). The original paper (Brandstatter et. al. 2006) 
regarding the descriptive properties of the PH has become the topic of very hot debates 
in the cognitive decision making field (for a review see Hilbig, 2008b and for a follow 
up on the debate see Birnbaum, 2008a; Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2008; 
Johnson, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Willemsen, 2008; Rieger & Wang, 2008). 
Brandstatter et. al. stated that the case regarding the PH model was to be able to 
distinguish between expected utility theory (EUT) and paradigms of observed risk 
taking behaviour, i.e. risk-averse behaviour and risk-loving behaviour under different 
risk levels, claiming at the same time that the PH successfully predicts a) “the Alais 
paradox”, b) “risk-aversion for gains if probabilities are high”, c) “risk-seeking for gains 
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if probabilities are low”, d) “risk-aversion for losses if probabilities are low”, e) “risk-
seeking for losses if probabilities are high”, f) “the certainty effect”, g) “the possibility 
effect” and h) “intransitivities” (2006). 
Although the PH model had some success at predicting aspects of risk taking 
behaviour in some of the categories mentioned above it was far off from outperforming 
established descriptive models like Tversky and Kahneman’s cumulative prospect 
theory CPT for the following reasons a) it violated stochastic dominance (a serious 
handicap of prospect theory as well that was later relieved by cumulative prospect 
theory), b) it could not account for intransitivity (as the authors initially claimed), c) it 
could not account for expected values of gambles that differed by a ratio greater than 
2:1, d) it was excluded from evaluating strict dominance gambles. According to 
simulations performed by Birnbaum, the listed shortcomings and restrictive conditions 
mentioned above limit the PH model’s use to bellow an estimated 50% of a arbitrarily 
generated cluster of binary choice gambles (Birnbaum, 2008a). Furthermore, the PH 
model’s shortcoming to be applied in a larger set of data by no means guarantees that its 
process predictions are sufficient in the number of cases to which the PH model is 
argued to effectively apply (Hilbig, 2008b). 
The take the best heuristic (TB) is one among the “simple heuristics that make 
us smart” which was pioneered by Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC research Group 
(1999). TB is a small lexicographic semi-order structure and belongs to the one good 
reason decision making strategies. According to the TB model, when the inference is 
based on a binary set or a set of multiple reasons the TB operates in the following way, 
it tries the available reasons one at a time according to their predetermined cue validity 
and a decision is made following the first good reason that separates the two prospects, 
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i.e. a good reason is the decisive factor to opt for a particular choice, all rest information 
is ignored. 
When the TB model is presented with a binary choice set, it predicts which of 
the two options may bear the highest value considering a criterion that distinguishes 
between the options. Thus the alternatives are evaluated taking into account the 
weighted reasons’ values, or the measurable characteristics that both options have in 
common. The first accurate reason encountered, i.e. cue validity, is the first good reason 
to be heavily counted and evaluated by the TB and usually constitutes the one good 
reason that would satisfy the TB model’s requirements. According to Gigerenzer and 
colleagues, the cue validity indicates a strong relationship of a one good reason with 
regards to the criterion of interest (1999). If that one good reason distinguishes between 
the given alternatives, the TB opts for the favourable choice discarding any further 
information. Thus the TB “assumes a subjective rank order of cues” and then searches 
through relevant cues according to their validity in a hierarchical manner starting with 
the one that bears the higher validity and then if no decision is made continues to the 
next, i.e. second best, cue with the higher validity and so forth and so on until it reaches 
a point where a cue distinguishes between the alternative options and a decision is made 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer et. al. 1999). 
As a consequence of this hierarchical information search processing the TB 
model takes the ultimate decision assessing the most optimal good reason encountered 
that happens to be the most influential in distinguishing between the available choices: 
“Take the Best (cue) and ignore the rest” (Gigerenzer et. al. 1999). In a series of real-
world environment simulations Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, and Goldstein showed that the 
TB model had a very high percentage of accuracy (77%) trailing behind multiple linear 
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regression only by 2 percentage points in the same decision making tasks such as 
determining the city with the largest population in binary choice sets (1999). The TB 
model has a large set of applications and with minor modifications has been 
successfully applied in medicine, artificial intelligence, financial and political 
forecasting (Graefe & Armstrong, 2010a). The only requirements of the TB model in 
order to be applied in a condition is that a) the condition involves dual choice settings 
where alternative options are considered, and b) the alternative options share some 
attributes upon which the computational inference will be based following the TB 
model steps we discussed above Gigerenzer et. al 1999). 
A fundamental characteristic of the simple heuristics, according to the “adaptive 
toolbox” approach is that they are ecologically rational. The TB model is ecologically 
rational in the sense that “the performance of Take the Best is equivalent to that of a 
linear model with a non-compensatory set of weights (decaying in the same order as 
Take the Best’s hierarchy (of cues)). If an environment consists of cues that are 
noncompensatory when ordered by decreasing validity, then the corresponding weighed 
linear model cannot outperform the faster and more frugal Take the Best” (Martignon & 
Hoffrage, 1999, p. 123 Op Cit in Nellen, 2003). Although the TB model performs quite 
well scoring highly accurate predictions, Czerlinski et. al. report scores up to 77% 
whereas multiple regression models hit an upper limit of 79% (1999), on dual-choice 
dilemmas in real world environments and has found a wide range of applications such 
as medicine and political forecasting among others, still doesn’t constitute an 
undisputable decision making strategy. The TB under certain simple conditions 
paralyzes and opts for randomized decisions, e.g. Gigerenzer and Goldstein report that 
the TB in order to make an inference chooses the object with the positive cue value, 
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however, if there is no cue good enough to discriminate from, then the TB chooses 
randomly (1996). Resorting to randomized inferences is among the major limitations of 
the TB decision strategy. Among other limitations are that, although, it is an 
ecologically rational strategy, it doesn’t replicate human reasoning because human 
agents’ mimic the TB model only under severe pressure, i.e. when under pressure to 
take a financial decision in a limited time (Nellen, 2003) or under specific 
circumstances. Newell and colleagues also point that the number of people that follow a 
TB pattern of reasoning are approximately 33%, these findings warrant against claims 
of TB’s universality and imply that a similar pattern of decision strategy may be 
adopted only when the decision agent is under pressure as Nellen (2003) showed 
questioning TB’s predictive power (Newell et. al. 2002). 
Regarding the ability of simple heuristic strategies to mimic human reasoning, 
Nellen states that if a decision agent was presented with decision dilemmas “where the 
application of different heuristics would evoke different responses, it would be easy to 
check whether there is an initial preference for the ecologically rational strategy or 
whether the strategy that eventually dominates behaviour emerges gradually and in 
response to the manipulations” of the decision task (2003). Therefore, when researchers 
try to make a distinction with regards to whether the decision agent actually mimics a 
one good reason simple heuristic strategy or whether the agent’s behaviour emerges due 
to the experimental manipulation, and thus would differentiate under alternative 
experimental conditions, is not clear. 
As a counterargument against simple heuristic strategies, Nellen (2003) remarks 
that “especially in decisions involving high risk, searching out all information reduces 
the probability to overlook that one crucial item which perhaps will make all the 
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difference” but again this is actually the thesis of the one good reason simple heuristics 
strategy, to identify that one crucial element that would make the difference in the the 
final decision. As is the case with the PH also is with the TB, experimental evidence are 
inconclusive regarding its empirical validity, and although the TB model performs very 
well in some domains it fails to explain in a realistic way human reasoning strategies 
under different domains. 
The recognition heuristic (RH) is an optimal statistical like procedure, like all 
simple heuristics, indicating that decisions rely on recognition. According to the RH, the 
decision agent chooses “a recognized object more than an unrecognized one whenever 
recognition is related to the criterion” (Pohl 2006). The strongest claim of the RH model 
is that decisions are affected by recognition to such an extent that the decision agent 
ignores any further information that he may possess regarding the choice dilemma. The 
RH is usually implicated in choice dilemmas where the decision agent is required to 
infer among the options available resorting to recognition, i.e. making inferences from 
memory, thus unavoidably, the decision agent’s recognition memory is involved in the 
decision making process. 
The relationship among RH and memory may be more straightforward in the 
following example by Goldstein and Gigerenzer “consider the task of inferring which of 
two objects has a higher value on some criterion (e.g., which is faster, higher, stronger). 
The recognition heuristic for such tasks is simply stated: “If one of two objects is 
recognized and the other is not, then infer that the recognized object has the higher 
value” (1999). Based on these straightforward proposals the RH is basically an assertion 
that the “inference can be made merely on the basis of the presence or absence of 
information in memory” (Tomlinson et. al. 2011). Goldstein and Gigerenzer, argue that 
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the RH model is a decision strategy that differentiates from other related decision 
concepts such as notions of “availability” and “fluency” (1996, 2002). The 
distinguishing elements that differentiate the RH model from other related concepts are 
a) the processing and evaluation of the available information as a dual-choice system, 
i.e. in a “binary” manner, and b) the “inconsequentiality” of any related knowledge, i.e. 
to ignore the knowledge, according to a principal decisive factor criterion, in this 
particular case recognition, on which the inference will be based (Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer, 1996; 2002). 
The RH model, Goldstein and Gigerenzer argue, is beyond doubt the “most 
frugal of all heuristics” because it “makes inferences from patterns of missing 
knowledge” and “exploits a fundamental adaptation of many organisms: the vast, 
sensitive, and reliable capacity for recognition” (2002). The RH utilizes the notion of 
recognition, a core cognitive ability of the human brain, “in order to make inferences 
about unknown quantities in the world” (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011). Gigerenzer 
and Goldstein, recently reviewed and evaluated a decade’s worth of research regarding 
the RH model and concluded that up to present time there have been generated 
sufficient evidence which show that a) “the recognition heuristic predicts the inferences 
of a substantial proportion of individuals consistently, even in the presence of one or 
more contradicting cues”, b) “people are adapting decision makers in that accordance 
increases with larger recognition validity and decreases in situations where the validity 
is low or wholly indeterminable”, and c) “in the presence of contradicting cues, some 
individuals appear to select different strategies” implying that there may be additional 
explanatory power that could be contributed by individual differences (2011). 
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At this point it is worth to outline three essential conditions, according to which 
the RH models inferences a) “there is substantial recognition validity”, b) “inferences 
are made from memory, rather than from tables of information (“inferences from 
givens”), meaning that cue values for unrecognized objects are missing values”, and c) 
“recognition stems from a person’s natural environment (i.e. before entering the 
laboratory), as opposed to experimentally induced recognition” (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 2011). The three prerequisite conditions upon which the modelling of 
inferences from memory is based stresses the notion that the RH is not a “domain-
generic” decision strategy but an evolutionary selected simple heuristic adapted in a 
way to exploit the environmental structure, i.e. domain-specific, of the decision agent.  
The RH model, although it is the core foundation of the “adaptive toolbox” 
approach and despite its relatively high validity, has not been free of criticism. 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein emphasize that the criticism concerning the RH model has 
been largely based on three broad misconceptions, namely that a) all decision agents 
rely on the RH model without discrimination and under all circumstances b) the 
definition of non-compensatory strategies which the authors define as “a relationship 
between one cue and other cues, not a relationship between one cue and the criterion”, 
i.e. recognition, and c) an often quoted categorization which claims that the RH model 
is a decision strategy of “inference in general, rather than of inference from memory” 
(2011). 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011) argue that the simplicity of the RH entails 
robustness, however, other commentators explain that the single most important 
problem to the RH model is that it does not explain the “crucial evaluation step” in the 
decision making process thus rendering ineffective the decision making factor of RH, 
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i.e. each of the inferences based solely on memory (Newell & Shanks, 2004; Newell, 
2011). This means, as Newell and Shanks argued, that “it is not pure recognition that 
determines an inference but recognition plus an appropriate reason for knowing why a 
particular object is recognized […] why he or she recognizes the object and makes an 
inference on the basis of this secondary knowledge” (Newell and Shanks, 2004). 
Although, evidence exists to support both critics and supporters’ claims regarding the 
non-compensatory nature of the RH model and its ecological validity (Oppenheimer, 
2003; Pohl, 2006; Richter & Spath, 2006; Hilbig et. al 2009a; Hilbig et.al. 2009b; 
Hilbig, 2010; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011) it is 
important to emphasize that the RH model is indisputably an experimentally observed 
factuality embedded in our neural and cognitive architecture (Voltz et. al. 2006, 
Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011), a simple heuristic strategy that drives decision making 
between alternatives drawing inferences from memory and thus exploiting the decision 
agent’s natural environment as a “domain-specific” algorithm (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 
1996; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Gigerenzer & Goldstein; 2011). 
The RH model has been rigorously assessed in a number of diverse domains and 
results show that it is widely utilized by a significant number of individuals under 
certain decision making domains. The inherent link of the RH model with memory 
recognition allows the individual to select between alternatives using a simple and 
straightforward “stopping” rule but still further practical research evaluation is needed 
in order to unmask the crucial factor that will enable us to understand how the selection 





Plausibility of Simple Heuristics 
Gigerenzer and colleagues (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer e. al. 
1999; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Hutchinson & 
Gigerenzer, 2005; Brighton & Gigerenzer, 2009; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011; 
Brighton & Gigerenzer, 2011) proposed a different program of cognitive heuristics that 
is not based on rational decision theory models, i.e. it does not satisfy internal 
consistencies and normative processes, but rather on a theoretical framework that argues 
for an irrational decision theory paradigm, i.e. the “adaptive toolbox” approach that 
stresses the importance of fast and frugal heuristics that harness the decision agent’s 
natural environment searching for strong enough cues upon which to base their 
inferences. 
The “adaptive toolbox” approach is in accordance, according to Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer, with fundamental psychological mechanisms that account for human 
decision making behaviour (2002). The common denominator of the “adaptive toolbox” 
and the simple heuristics approach are a set of fast and frugal cognitive shortcuts that 
assist decision agents for a) “search, that is, where to search for cues”, b) “stopping, that 
is, when to stop searching without attempting to compute an optimal stopping point at 
which the costs of further search exceed the benefits” and c) “decision, that is, how to 
make an inference or decision after search is stopped” (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). 
The “adaptive toolbox” approach is a project that was designed to assess and validate a 
set of computational models of simple decision strategies that share a number of 
characteristics which are defined as ) “ecologically rational” (i.e., they exploit structures 
of information in the environment)”, b) “founded in evolved psychological capacities 
such as memory and the perceptual system”, c) “fast, frugal, and simple enough to 
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operate effectively when time, knowledge, and computational might are limited”, d) 
“precise enough to be modelled computationally”, and e) “powerful enough to model 
both good and poor reasoning” (Goldstein & Gigerenzer 2002). By introducing the 
“adaptive toolbox” approach, the aim of Gigerenzer and colleagues was to challenge the 
widely accepted belief that the success and accuracy of an inference is proportional to 
the availability to information, i.e. the more information available the more the 
inferential accuracy (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000). 
The widely held belief that more information leads to more accurate inferences 
has its origins in the development of complex statistical techniques such as ANOVA, 
multiple regression, and Bayesian statistics, statistical procedures which revolutionized 
the field of psychology. Contrary to normative “more is more” effects which originate 
in the view that the human mind is a parallel processor performing statistical 
computations, i.e. more information leads to more accurate observations, Gigerenzer 
and colleagues juxtaposed a “less is more” effect, i.e. that less information leads to 
higher accuracy arguing that human cognitive processing “rests on an ability to make 
accurate inferences from limited observations of an uncertain and potentially changing 
environment” illustrating that simple decision strategies which rely on minimum 
information and have little time available may be quite accurate (Brighton & 
Gigerenzer, 2011). The “adaptive toolbox” simple decision strategies’ success depends 
on rapid evaluations of the structure of the decision agent’s natural environment 
employing simple “one good reason” or “stopping” rules and on the fundamental 
abilities of the human brain such as recognition memory (Gigerenzer, 2004). 
Although, the highly complex relationship between the natural environment and 
the human brain’s fundamental abilities is far off from being incorporated in a precise 
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model formulation, fast and frugal decision strategies have been “domain-specific” 
successful depending on central cognitive capacities, such as recognition and short term 
memory. These simple decision strategies are highly successful in particular domains 
because a) they evolved together with fundamental psychological mechanisms and b) 
because they evolved in order to address particular decision problems which they were 
programmed to handle well. A major shortcoming is that within the “adaptive toolbox” 
program the complex relationship between the natural environment and the 
psychological mechanisms involved in the decision making process has rarely been 
explored with detailed models of core human brain capacities. 
According to Gigerenzer & Goldstein the simple decision strategies presuppose 
particular cognitive abilities such as recognition memory without embedding this 
particular cognitive aspect directly into the “adaptive toolbox” (2002). This basically 
means that the simple heuristics model of decision making is under developed because 
it does not specify how decision making will be affected by the interaction between the 
natural environment and specific psychological mechanisms that underlie human 
judgement and decision making processes. The interplay between mind and 
environment remains a trivial task to be explained, however, in order to address this 
problem, the development of theories “capable of explaining how the cognitive system 
functions so effectively despite this uncertainty is a key step toward understanding 
cognition” (Brighton & Gigerenzer, 2011). Among other limitations of the “adaptive 
toolbox” approach are a) the “ecological rationality” principle which postulates that 
simple heuristics exploit the decision agent’s environment to make accurate inferences, 
however, ecological rationality does not explain why in some situations simple 
heuristics lead to poorer decisions violating its core definition, b) the “less is more” 
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effects as they seem to compromise rationality for the sake of speed and frugality and 
although this is listed as an advantage, critics of the “adaptive toolbox approach” argue 
that inferential decision making is based on knowledge while supporters argue that it is 
based on cues without signifying what the strategy selection is, and c) the “non-
compensatory” nature of inferences and information processing as it is argued that 
simple heuristics seem to actually consult other information integrated with general 
knowledge besides the “one good reason” cues to make inferences. 
Simple heuristics can be in domain-specific situations a very effective way of 
making inferences both in terms of cost effective decision processing, that is fast and 
frugal, and superior performance with highly accurate outcomes. In ecologically rational 
environments, research shows that human decision agents tend to heavily rely on simple 
heuristics’ use. Thus, we may conclude regarding the plausibility of simple heuristics 
that when ignoring available information, such as cues and relationships between cues, 
the decision agent can “simultaneously achieve robust, functional, and tractable 
responses to environmental uncertainty” (Brighton & Gigerenzer, 2011). In addition, in 
situations where statistical analysis, computational optimization, and logistic 
calculations are not tractable, or when a given decision problem is under detailed with 
missing information and when time is pressing then simple heuristic strategies seem to 
be the best candidates for offering highly accurate responses and making superior 







CHAPTER 4: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES & DECISION MAKING 
 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide a relevant review of established biologically based 
theories regarding the role of individual differences in the study of decision making and 
risk-taking behaviour. A review of previous theoretical formulations regarding the role 
of individual differences in the study of decision making and risk-taking behaviour will 
give the reader the opportunity to understand the context within which the present 
studies were performed and which contributions these studies will bring to the current 
discourse. Furthermore, this chapter will explore the individual differences research 
field contributions in the study of decision making attempting to build a bridge between 
research in behavioural decision making and personality theory. However, in order to 
process and understand the contributions of individual differences in the study of 
decision making a prerequisite is to understand both the individual traits involved and 
the risk-taking framework, situation and context setting, within which an agent operates 
and is called to arrive at a decision. 
 
Dispositional Theories of Risk-Taking Behaviour 
From the individual differences point of view, risk-taking behavior in humans is 
expressed through engagement in everyday social activities such as gambling, extreme 
sports, smoking, alcohol drinking, substance abuse, engaging in unprotected sex, etc. 
and may be due to the complex interplay of a set of factors, among others, such as 
genetic endowment, individual personality traits, cognitive ability, and affective states. 
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A number of influential personality theories such as Eysenck’s, Zuckerman’s, 
and Gray’s have showcased particular dispositional traits such as extraversion, 
impulsive sensation seeking, and the BAS and BIS systems which may contribute in the 
quest for understanding human risk-taking behaviour by attributing significant weight 
on the biological basis of the dispositional traits in question. 
The dispositional theories of risk-taking behaviour that will be discussed in this 
chapter are Eysenck’s theory of introversion and extraversion, Zuckerman’s theory of 
impulsive sensation seeking, and Gray’s behavioural activation and behavioural 
inhibition systems. The theories mentioned above form the core of a set of theories that 
emphasize potential relationships between dispositional traits and specific physiological 
brain-structures and brain functions. We chose to present and discuss these theories 
because they have been the most influential over the years to shape the personality 
research field and have paved the way for the understanding of some essential aspects of 
human risk-taking behaviour by exerting great influence in the way research scientists 
have been thinking about personality traits and risk-taking situations. We believe that 
these theories, although maybe robust in their own domain, have contributed very little 
so far in understanding human risk-taking behaviour. This maybe because the 
biologically based personality theories are not static systems but still evolving and are 
being defined by new findings that shed light in the neural function of the brain. 
 
Eysenck’s Introversion and Extraversion 
Hans Eysenck’s work “the biological basis of personality” (1967) postulates a 
number of causal links between personality traits and neurological and physiological 
brain mechanisms (Corr, 2004). Eysenck attempted to differentiate the causal 
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mechanisms between excitation and inhibition proposing that the fundamental 
differences between extraverts and introverts could be explained by corresponding 
physiological differences in cortical activation and more particularly by distinct 
morphological differences in a brain structure known as ascending reticular activating 
system (RAS) of the human brain stem. The RAS is a specific brain area composed 
from multiple neuronal pathways connecting the brain stem to the cerebral cortex 
encompassing the reticular formation and its connections and is primarily responsible 
for regulating arousal and sleep-wake patterns (Steriade, 1995, 1996). 
The RAS is principally involved in two highly complex functions of the human 
brain: a) regulating cycles of sleep-wake patterns and b) mediating transitions from 
relaxed to high attention and concentration states (Steriade, 1995, 1996). Therefore, 
heightened RAS activity maintained by increased regional blood flow is accompanied 
by alertness and highly active mental states whereas a decreased RAS activity 
precipitated by a lower blood flow is accompanied by reduced attention and underactive 
mental states (Evans, 2003). 
Recent evidence indicates that there is significant differentiation in RAS 
physiology that could potentially account for particular differences in human behaviour 
(Evans, 2003). With regards to cortical activity and personality traits expression, 
Eysenck postulated that physiological differences in the ascending RAS could explain 
personality differences among extraverts and introverts. Eysenck’s personality 
theorizing basically linked “Extraversion with the reticulo-cortical circuit and 
Neuroticism with the reticulo-limbic circuit” (DeYoung & Gray, 2009). Eysenck 
maintained that due to a higher level of regional stimulation in the ascending RAS 
introverts are over stimulated whereas extraverts experience a lower level of regional 
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stimulation in the ascending RAS. This lead him to hypothesize that a) “extraverts have 
lower baseline levels of cortical arousal than introverts and therefore choose more 
arousing activities in order to achieve their preferred level of arousal” and b) “extraverts 
may have higher preferred or optimal levels of arousal” (DeYoung & Gray, 2009). 
According to Eysenck’s propositions an introvert, due to high cortical arousal, 
would exhibit a low profile behaviour being quiet, introspective, reserved, avoiding 
excitement and seeking low-stimulation external environments in order to control their 
heightened arousal levels. On the contrary, an extravert, due to low cortical arousal, 
would be in constant need of excitement and in search of external stimulation and 
would engage in such a behaviour that would compensate for his/her low cortical 
arousal; this would translate in sensation seeking and risk-taking behaviour that would 
boost arousal. Eysenck’s propositions have not been empirically verified and have 
attracted little attention in recent years. Eysenck’s propositions, however, with regards 
to the physiological differences in the brain’s morphological functions between 
introverts and extroverts have direct implications for understanding human decision 
making processes. For example by taking into account the specific high sensation 
seeking behaviour exhibited by extraverts, according to Eysenck’s theory, one could 
hypothesize that extraverts would tend to be more prone to risk-taking behaviour, to 
impulsive sensation seeking and/or chase after and expose themselves in high risky 
situations and environments in an attempt to increase external stimulation in order to 
obtain higher levels of arousal. 
Research findings indicate that the positive correlation hypothesis between 
extraversion and risk-taking behaviour is grounded on the proposition that “risk 
propensity is rooted in personality” (Nicholson et. al. 2005). However, the concept of 
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“risk propensity” has not been established as a personality trait and still is the “subject 
of both theoretical and empirical investigation” (Nicholson et. al. 2005). Other research 
findings that examined the relationship between the trait of extraversion with rewarding 
stimuli and risk-taking behaviour indicate that risk-taking behaviour in a range of 
domains such as personal health, career goals, financial behaviour, risk and safety, and 
social risk overall was correlated positively with extraversion and openness (Nicholson 
et. al. 2005). In addition further research suggests that extraversion has established links 
to specific domains of social risk taking behaviour such as smoking (McCrae et. al. 
1978; Helgason et. al. 1995; Vollrath & Torgensen, 2002), alcohol consumption 
(Martsh & Miller, 1997; Vollrath & Torgensen, 2002; Hussong, 2003), pathological 
gambling (Roy et. al. 1989) in financial risk preferences and more specifically in 
portfolio theory (Vestewig 1977), and also has been associated with the tendency to 
participate in high-risk “extreme” sports (Castanier et. al. 2010). Extraversion has also 
been associated, besides risk-taking behaviour, with a preference for appetitive stimuli 
and pleasant reward cues. DeYoung and Gray report that extraversion is positively 
associated with positive reward stimuli “in the brain structures that have been identified 
“as particularly important in the circuitry of reward and approach behaviour” (2009). 
 
Zuckerman’s Impulsive Sensation-Seeking 
Zuckerman’s work “the psychobiology of personality” (2005) followed in the 
same lines of Eysenck’s work and proposed an individual differences framework which 
suggests that individuals who score high in Zuckerman’s Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS) 
require a lot of external stimulation, just like Eysenck’s extroverts do, in order to reach 
a pleasant level of arousal that would satisfy their sensation seeking predisposition. 
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Zuckerman explained, following Eysenck’s steps, in another critical dimension of his 
theory that the roots of personality are to be found in human biology. Zuckerman 
devoted a great part of his research in order to study the role of neurotransmission as a 
causal factor of sensation seeking behaviour. He managed to associate “personality 
traits to underlying behavioural mechanisms, which he in turn linked to the brain 
functions of various neurotransmitters, hormones, and enzymes” (DeYoung & Gray, 
2009). A very important aspect of Zuckerman’s theorizing comes from his work on “the 
psychobiology of personality” which argues that significantly lower levels of 
monoamine oxidase (MAO) were a particular characteristic of individuals that sought 
external stimulation exhibiting sensation seeking behaviour (2005). 
MAO are a broad family of enzymes that their main purpose is to catalyze the 
oxidation of monoamines in the human body (Tipton et. al. 2004). The two types, A & 
B, of MAO and their role in the human nervous system is primarily the deactivation of 
certain neurotransmitters (Edmondson et. al. 2004). The MAO’s crucial role in 
regulating neurotransmission is the deactivation of certain monoaminergic 
neurotransmitters, i.e. breaking down key mood-regulating chemical messengers, such 
as dopamine serotonin, norepinephrine, epinephrine, phenethylamine, benzylamine, etc. 
By deactivating the monoaminergic neurotransmitters, MAO regulates 
neurotransmission and ensures that the nervous system is working efficiently keeping 
neural excitation and inhibition under control. However, imbalances in MAO threshold 
levels, either below or above threshold levels, have been reported to be associated with 
particular psychiatric and neurological dysfunctions such as depression and 
schizophrenia (Meyer et. al. 2006; Domino et. al. 1976). according to Zuckerman’s 
theory, lower levels of MAO would translate into a larger availability of monoaminergic 
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neurotransmitters inhibiting excitation and thus individuals with below threshold MAO 
levels would exhibit sensation seeking behaviour in order to increase stimulation and 
thus reach a pleasant—for the sensation seeker—level of arousal. There are sufficient 
evidence indicating that low MAO levels are directly associated with social dominance, 
sociability and aggression (Zuckerman, p. 108, 2003), and a MAO-A genetic 
polymorphism that is associated with aggression, impulsivity and seretonergic 
responsivity in the central nervous system (Passamonti et. al. 2005; Manuck et. al 2002, 
2000, 1998).  
In later research Zuckerman resorted to uniting the impulsivity and sensation-
seeking scales because they resulted in high correlations between self-report measures 
and basically predicted the same sort of behaviour and biological traits (Zuckerman, p. 
149, 1979a Op. Cit. Zuckerman p. 64-65, 1994). Zuckerman defined sensation seeking 
(SS) as the “seeking of varied, novel, complex and intense sensations and experiences, 
and the willingness to take physical, social, legal and financial risks for the sake of such 
experiences.” (Zuckerman p.27, 1994). Research conducted on sensation seeking 
behaviour, which nonetheless also includes a “willingness to take risks” (Zuckerman, p. 
62, 1994), shows that there is a direct association among SSS and a number of social 
risk-taking behaviours. 
McDaniel and Zuckerman showed that individuals who tend to score higher on 
Zuckerman’s impulsive sensation-seeking scale were more prone to gambling and 
financial risk-taking behaviour than the participants who achieved low and medium 
scores on the scale (2003). Pathological gambling is generally classified as an impulse 
control disorder in the DSM-IV and sensation seeking and impulsivity are two 
personality constructs that are thought to be associated with socially risk-taking 
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behaviour, including gambling. Besides McDaniel and Zuckerman, other researchers 
too have pointed to a strong relationship between impulsivity and compulsive or 
pathological gambling (Derevensky et. al. 2004; Hollander & Rosen, 2000). Results 
regarding gambling and impulsivity are mixed and the evidence is not conclusive with 
regards to impulsivity and sensation seeking as major predictors of social risk-taking 
including all forms of gambling, recreational or pathological. 
In a recent study conducted by Dannon and colleagues (2010) impulsivity was 
shown to be a rather poor predictor of pathological gambling while performance on 
other more comprehensive neurocognitive tests proved to be a rather accurate predictor 
of pathological gambling. Sensation seeking and impulsivity have also been associated 
with engaging in risky behaviours such as fighting, substance abuse, alcohol 
consumption, drunk driving, and reckless driving behaviour (Pfefferbaum & Wood, 
1994; Read et al., 2003; Donohew et al. 1999a,b, 1990). A study by Zuckerman and 
colleagues (1990) also relates sensation seeking with socially risk-taking behaviours 
such as smoking. Another social risk-taking behaviour that sensation seekers have 
reportedly engage in is risky sexual situations. Individuals who scored high in 
Zuckerman’s sensation seeking tend to have more sexual partners and exhibit more 
permissive sexual attitudes (Zuckerman et al., 1976). Furthermore, individuals who 
score high in sensation seeking also tend to engage in unprotected sexual behaviour 
without which makes them vulnerable against disease (Arnold et al., 2002; Donohew et. 
al. 2000). 
Taking into account mediating effects that may be present in any given 
population sample we should mention that research by Clarke showed that impulsivity 
was found to “mediate the relationship between depression and gambling” and predict 
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real-world risky decision making behaviour (2006). With regards to this study it is not 
clear whether impulsivity or depression could be considered as the cause of the risk-
taking activity. Clarke reports that the research findings were associated with “an 
integrated model of problem gambling wherein the path of emotional vulnerability 
(depression) to the severity of problem gambling, is mediated by an impulsive trait” 
(2006). However, Clarke did not discuss any possible confounding factors that could 
have potentially biased his results. 
Impulsivity has also been identified as a predictor of risky decision making in 
research conducted by Fuentes and colleagues (2006). Further to this, research results 
obtained from a slightly different risk-taking domain indicate that a) “higher levels of 
impulsivity do not significantly correlate with risk-taking” and b) “higher levels of 
sensation-seeking are associated with increased risk-taking” (Demaree et. al. 2008). The 
research literature that has been discussed so far suggests that individuals who score 
high on sensation seeking tend to have a preference for specific social context risk-
taking behaviour, i.e. they are domain specific risk takers. Domain specific risk taking 
behaviour could possibly drive preferences for external stimulation in order to adjust for 
the perceived imbalance from a sensation seeker’s point of view. Therefore, it seems 
that both sensation seeking and impulsivity have been implicated in some sort or 
another of social risk taking behaviour, however, research results on some occasions 
have been conflicting and a general consensus has not yet been achieved as to whether 
sensation seeking and impulsivity may be regarded as accurate predictors of socially 





Gray’s Behavioural Activation System and Behavioural Inhibition System 
Gray’s Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST) is one of the most important 
biological personality theories and is primarily based, at least the first version of the 
model, on the Eysenckian tradition. Gray’s RST emphasizes “the development of a 
‘conceptual nervous system’ describing functional systems that could be mapped onto 
brain systems” (DeYoung & Gray, 2009). RST has been evolving as a paradigm for 
nearly four decades, “seeing its major revision in 2000 by Gray and McNaughton, and 
even further elaborations and refinements subsequently” (Pickering & Corr, 2008) and 
has become the most useful theoretical framework among a group of biological 
personality theories concerning approach and avoidance behaviour processes. RST 
assumes that individual differences lie on fundamental neural circuits that respond to 
punishment and reward (Bijttebier et. al. 2009). These individual differences are the 
underlying factors of personality that correspond to anxiety and impulsivity (Bijttebier 
et. al. 2009). 
According to Corr, Gray’s RST model that attempted to delineate the core 
biological elements of personality obeys a number of distinct steps: a) “first identify the 
fundamental properties of brain-behavioural systems that might be involved in the 
important sources of variation observed in human behaviour” and b) “then relate 
variations in these systems to existing measures of personality” (2008). Corr further 
explains that he most important aspect of this “two-stage” backwards/forwards feeding 
empirical process was due to the hypothesis which claimed that the observed variation 
is the core element of what we have come to know as personality at present (Corr, 
2008). Put more simply “personality does not stand apart from basic brain-behaviour 
systems, but rather is defined by them” (Corr, 2008). 
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RST is primarily constructed  “upon a state description of neural systems and 
associated, relatively short-term, emotions and behaviours, which, according to the 
theory, give rise to longer term trait dispositions of emotion and behaviour” (Pickering 
& Corr, 2008). Pickering and Corr also explain that, according to Gray’s RST, a number 
of “statistically defined personality factors are sources of variation that are stable over 
time and that derive from underlying properties of an individual; it is these, and current 
changes in the environment, that comprise the neuropsychological foundations of 
‘personality’” (Pickering & Corr, 2008). Therefore, we could argue that individual 
differences are the result of variation that corresponds to activation in specific neural 
circuit modules that control related functions to their respective classes of external 
stimuli. For example, the major constituents of the proposed conceptual neural network 
are “the Behavioral Approach System (BAS), which responds to cues for reward, and 
the Fight-Flight-Freezing System (FFFS) and Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS), 
which respond to two distinct classes of threatening stimuli” (DeYoung & Gray, 2009). 
The three major systems of emotion have emerged through a gradual development of 
the standard RST model and were substantially revised in the 2
nd
 edition of the RST in 
2000 (Corr, 2008). Among the three systems, the BIS and BAS have received most of 
the attention from the research community while the FFFS has at times being neglected 
as a system that is not very clear with regards to the functions it serves. 
 
Smillie and colleagues point out that the BIS system which has been the focal 
point of Gray’s research was initially “thought to mediate responses to conditioned 
signals of punishment (resulting in passive-avoidance) and conditioned signals of 
frustrative non-reward (resulting in extinction of a response), and was suggested to 
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provide the causal basis of Anxiety” (2006). On the other hand the BAS system was 
initially “thought to mediate responses to conditioned signals of reward (resulting in 
approach behaviour) and conditioned signals of relieving non-punishment (resulting in 
active-avoidance), and was suggested to provide the causal basis of Impulsivity” 
(Smillie et. al. 2006). The most well studied systems from Gray’s model are the BAS 
system which has been broadly associated with impulsivity, and the BIS system which 
has been broadly associated with anxiety (Pickering & Gray, 1999; DeYoung & Gray, 
2009). 
As we have already discussed the BIS and BAS functional systems respond to 
distinct external signs that reinforce behaviour but it is worth mentioning that the 
systems activation is “thought to give rise to the affective dimensions of positive and 
negative mood” (Smillie et. al. 2006). Specifically, the BAS system activation by 
reward is “thought to lead to increased positive affect” and the BIS system activation by 
punishment is “thought to lead to increased negative affect” (Smillie et. al. 2006).  
Consequently, it is argued that, specific individual differences in BAS/BIS and 
approach/avoidance behaviour “are thought to correspond to stable differences in 
positive and negative emotionality” (Smillie et. al. 2006). 
At present there are not strong empirical links tying the RST with affect and 
emotion and although the BAS system has been associated with specific “emotional 
reactions to negative stimuli”, however, the causal links that give rise to particular 
emotions have not been deciphered and most importantly have not been linked with 
specific personality dispositions (Smillie et.al. 2006). Research conducted by Demaree 
and colleagues suggest that higher scores in the BAS scale have been linked with 
“greater positive affective experience and increased goal-directed behaviour to 
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appetitive stimuli” (2008). While this chapter’s scope is beyond delving into the depths 
of the theoretical debate as to whether the BAS scale actually captures and measures the 
BAS system function, it is worth to clarify—in light of Demaree’s results—that the 
association between the BAS scale score and the positive affective experience could 
have been mediated by some 3
rd
 situational factor. As we have already discussed, 
measures of risk-taking behaviour and personality sensitivities often are domain specific 
and usually are being defined by situational and cross situational factors (Ferguson et. 
al. 2011). 
While the BAS seems to be activated by signs of an impending reward or relief 
from punishment the BIS seems to be activated by signs of an impending punishment 
(Corr, 2008). According to Gray’s RST emotion based functional systems model, the 
BAS and BIS are two control modules that compete with each other (Gray & Smith, 
1969). The BAS is usually framed as a forward function which once is stimulated 
triggers approach behaviour while the BIS is usually framed as a preventive function 
which once is stimulated triggers behavioural inhibition, that is avoidance behaviour, 
allowing the individual more time for further information processing. According to this 
conceptual framework the BIS reaction is activated within a context that signs of an 
impending punishment are imminent and cautions the organism of potential threatening 
or harmful outcomes which as a result could produce “vigilance, rumination, and 
passive avoidance, as well as anxiety and even potentially depression” (DeYoung & 
Gray, 2009). 
According to the standard RST model literature, the BAS system is thought to be 
involved in specific dopaminergic pathways (Gray, 1987). DeYoung & Gray also report 
that the BIS system is primarily linked “to the septo-hippocampal system but also to the 
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amygdala”, and the FFFS system is linked “to the amygdala, hypothalamus, and 
periaqueductal gray” (2009). Demaree et. al. suggest that the BAS conceptual system is 
most likely a by-product of the brain’s neural networks that are characterized by 
dopaminergic activity and are thought to increase responsiveness both to external and to 
internal stimuli (2008). The mesolymbic dopaminergic pathways are also generally 
regarded as the pleasure system of the brain. In addition the mesolimbic dopaminergic 
system is highly implicated in systematic substance abuse (Thomas et. al 2008; 
Maldonado et. al. 2006), and research on affective disorders also implies the direct 
involvement of the mesolymbic dopaminergic system is directly involved in emotion 
processing (Rubinow & Post, 1992). 
As research has already showed, the relationship between substance abuse and 
stimulation of the dopaminergic neural networks is an irreversible fact (Thomas et. al. 
2008). Gray’s theoretic model sparked a revolution in the study of personality linking it 
with distinct neural mechanisms and laid the foundations for explaining the associations 
between substance abuse, dispositional traits and affective disorders. To further 
establish the relationship between Gray’s BAS/BIS conceptual systems with brain 
anatomy and function, Zurawicki (p. 165, 2010) cites studies conducted by Barros 
Loscertales and colleagues (2006, a&b) showing that a number of patterns of BAS/BIS 
systems activity are directly related with specific characteristics of human brain 
anatomy. More specifically Zurawicki argues that “BIS activity correlates with the 
increased volume of gray matter in the amygdale and hippocampus, whereas the gray 
matter volume in the areas associated with reward (dorsal striatum) and in the prefrontal 
cortex is negatively correlated with the overactive BAS” (p.165, 2010). According to 
Zurawicki these results basically suggest that enhanced approach sensitivity and deficits 
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in avoidance sensitivity might be associated with the reduced gray matter volume in the 
striatum (p.165, 2010). 
 According to Gray’s RST theoretic formulation substance abuse is best 
understood as behavioural control of approach over avoidance, resulting in an impulsive 
predisposition towards external stimulation and sensation seeking situations and is 
highly affected by the positive reinforcement resulting from the addictive properties of 
substances such as, for example, cocaine and alcohol. Besides substance abuse and 
addiction, Gray’s model has also been implicated on psychopathology. There is 
sufficient evidence which indicates that BAS/BIS over activity “can lead to 
maladjustment” (Revelle, 2006). Revelle argues that a very important hypothesis with 
regards to the RST model and its relation to mental disorders is that “psychopathology 
represents extreme scores on normal personality traits” (2006) and as we will see later 
on the BAS/BIS systems capture and measure these extreme scores effectively. 
As was discussed earlier (DeYoung & Gray, 2009) the mesolimbic 
dopaminergic pathway bears some observable similarities with the BAS conceptual 
system, more specifically it has been shown to respond to impending rewards and as a 
result it has been empirically associated with incentives and feelings of reward. In 
addition recent research shows that the mesolimbic dopaminergic pathway is heavily 
implicated in neurobiological frameworks of schizophrenia and depression (Crow, 
1980; Stevens 2003; Nestler & Carlezon, 2005; Laviolette, 2007; Van den Heuval & 
Pasterkamp, 2008; Nestler & Hyman, 2010). 
The BAS and BIS systems have also been implicated in schizophrenia, 
psychopathy, depression, and the personality spectrum disorders such as those that 
constitute the bipolar spectrum disorder (Scholten et. al. 2006; Newman et. al. 2005; 
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Gard et. al. 2007; Johnson et. al. 2002; Alloy et. al. 2009, 2008, 2006, 2004). As we 
have seen so far there is sufficient evidence implicating the mesolimbic dopaminergic 
pathways in a range of psychological disorders. Additionally there is sufficient evidence 
linking the same psychological disorders with the RST model as this is captured and 
measured by the BAS/BIS scales. However, at this point we need to clarify that we do 
not assume a structural and morphological causal link between the discussed brain 
structures, i.e. the mesolimbic dopaminergic system, and the RST model based on the 
observed relationships that link them to the same psychological disorders. A plausible, 
yet hypothetical, explanation is that both psychological disorders and the RST model as 
is measured by the BAS/BIS scales are both defined by basic brain-structures and minor 
or greater malfunction of these brain structures reflects both to psychopathology and the 
BAS/BIS variables. 
Gray’s RST model has evolved out of research based on rats, however the last 
three decades, as is reported by Torrubia and colleagues “a great deal of human 
experimental or psychometric research has been carried out, taking as a point of 
departure Gray’s RST” (Torrubia et. al. 2008). Although there is rather limited research 
on human subjects to providing strong evidence in favour or against the RST model, 
however, evidence are in favour of the crucial importance of the RST model (Torrubia 
et. al. 2008). Furthermore, Torrubia and colleagues report that “RST-derived 
hypothesis” have been tested in human populations “by examining the behavioural, 
psychophysiological, clinical or psychometric correlates of a number of self-report 
measures” that have been used to evaluate “the habitual level of functioning” in the BIS 
and BAS systems that form the core of the standard RST model (Torrubia et. al. 2008). 
With regards to sound theoretical formulation and experimental accuracy, Revelle asks 
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whether “a biological driven theory”, which “derived from rats”, could be of any 
purposeful use to the human population (2008). According to Revelle and other 
researchers’ work (Revelle, 2008; Otorny, Norman & Revelle, 2005) the answer to the 
question seems to be “yes” because as Revelle puts it most of the behaviour implicated 
in the RST model “is reflexive or routine and does not involve complex cognition” 
(Revelle, 2008). Based on the assumption that RST is a model firmly grounded on 
biology we should expect that it has the potential contribute to unravel the biological 
basis of human personality by linking dispositional traits with brain topography. 
Trying to capture and measure aspects of the RST has not been free of 
challenges in the recent past, primarily because the scientific community has not yet 
agreed into a standard measure of the RST derived constructs (Torrubia et. al. 2008). 
Nevertheless, a number of researchers have constructed specific questionnaires in order 
to capture and measure individual approach/avoidance behaviour sensitivities in the 
BAS/BIS systems, which nonetheless has led to “greater heterogeneity in the measures 
used and the results obtained” (Torrubia et. al 2008). The first researchers to attempt to 
measure an aspect of RST devising their own measures were MacAndrew and Steele 
(1991) who, “following an empirical procedure”, they built an MMPI-derived 
questionnaire (MS-BIS) in order to measure BIS sensitivity (Torrubia et. al. 2008). The 
questionnaire seemed to be successful at discriminating between a clinical group that 
was expected to express high BIS scores (in this case the group consisted of mentally ill 
individuals) and an antisocial behaviour group that was expected to express low BIS 
scores (in this case the group constituted of prostitutes) (MacAndrew & Steele, 1991). 
The scale was successful in distinguishing measurable active avoidant behaviour 
sensitivities between these two particular groups, but we we should clarify that the 
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groups were polar and thus the MacAndrew and Steele scale has limited if any 
implications about actually capturing and measuring individual differences in BIS 
sensitivities in the general population. Another shortcoming of this 30 item scale was 
that some of its items’ content “did not reflect directly the functioning of the BIS” 
(Torubia et. al. 2008). 
Rafael Torrubia and colleagues have recently introduced the Sensitivity to 
Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Quastionnaire (SPSRQ) as a measure of Gray’s 
“anxiety and impulsivity dimensions” which has evolved from earlier attempts to 
measure individual level variations in the activity of the BIS (Torrubia et. al 2001). In 
particular the SPSRQ was the revised version of the Susceptibility to Punishment (SP) 
scale (Torrubia & Tobena, 1984) which initially aimed at measuring BIS sensitivity 
(Torrubia et. al. 2001). A later improved version of the SP scale set out to measure 
individual differences in BIS dependent functions in “checking and control modes” 
(Torrubia et. al. 2001): The new SP scale was designed to capture a) “behaviour 
inhibition (passive avoidance) in general situations involving the possibility of aversive 
consequences or novelty” and b) “worry or cognitive processes produced by the threat 
of punishment or failure” (Torrubia et. al. 2001). 
Based on subsequent research efforts, the Sensitivity to Reward (SR) scale was 
designed by Muntaner and Torrubia (1985) in order to measure individual level 
variations “in the impulsivity dimension” according to Gray’s BAS system explanatory 
value (Torrubia et. al. 2001). De Flores and Valdez (1986) endorsed the SR scale 
providing significant results but a more refined version was required in order to 
embrace new theoretical contributions by Fowles (1987), Gray (1987c) and Newman 
(1987) to the function of BAS and thus improve the SR scale’s psychometric properties 
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(Torrubia et. al 2001). According to Torrubia and colleagues, the SPSRQ is a thorough 
self-report measure particularly designed to evaluate individual differences in Gray’s 
tri-dimensional RST model that is “the anxiety or sensitivity to punishment dimension, 
and the impulsivity or sensitivity to reward dimension” (Torrubia et. al. 2001). The 
SPSRQ has been instrumental, yet on a small scale, to “generate a set of experimental 
studies to test Gray’s predictions” receiving integral support for its validity and has 
generally been well received (Torrubia et. al. 2001); nonetheless, it hasn’t succeeded in 
establishing itself as a major and global tool for measuring individual differences in 
Gray’s tri-dimensional RST model. 
Another scale that seems to have fared better than the previously discussed 
competitors and actually succeeded in establishing itself as a major and global tool for 
measuring individual differences in Gray’s RST model is Carver and White’s BAS/BIS 
scales (1994). Carver and White may have originally based their predictions regarding 
Gray’s personality theoretical framework in earlier research conducted by Fowles 
(1987). Fowles, along with Gray (1987c) and Newman (1987) had contributed to 
understanding Gray’s BAS function by showing that individuals who score high on BIS 
generally tend to be more successful at staying away and clear from anxiety laden social 
contexts and as a result, these individuals experience—and thus self report—lower 
anxiety (Fowles, 1987). Fowles also warned that there are indeed a significant number 
of individuals that “are unable to accurately report their emotional states” and as a 
matter of fact he explained that there are the tools available to identify these individuals 
(1987). Carver and White both on a theoretical and a practical level overcame these 
impediments and managed to feed into the literature concerning Gray’s understanding 
of the BAS function by constructing a comprehensive scale that would focus on 
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measuring BAS/BIS (approach/avoidance) sensitivities through a thorough evaluation 
of individual responses to specific situations-statements avoiding in this way to engage 
in evaluating the individual’s affective state (1994). 
Carver and White (1994) illustrated that previous attempts to measure BIS and 
anxiety focused on levels of anxiety and not on an individual’s susceptibility to distress 
and anxiety. Further research from large community samples has supported Carver and 
White’s findings showing that a factor analysis of the BAS/BIS items supports the “4-
factor structure” originally proposed by Carver and White, “as well as a 2-factor 
structure reflecting separate behavioural inhibition and behavioural activation systems” 
(Jorm et. al. 1998). Heubeck and colleagues conducted research in order to investigate 
the internal validity of Carver and White’s scales as well as investigating the scales’ 
relationship with “well established concepts and scales” in personality theory “like 
Neuroticism, Extraversion, and positive and negative emotionality” (1998). They 
reported in their findings an “exact replication of the principal components analysis” 
that was highly relevant to the analysis presented by Carver and White (1994) in their 
original paper (Heubeck et. al. 1998). According to Heubeck and colleagues, further 
support  for Carver and White’s is indicated by confirmatory factor analyses which 
“demonstrated that a correlated four factor model provided the relatively best, but 
modest fit to the data” (1998). A thorough examination of Carver and White’s scales is 
well beyond the scope of this chapter; however, we should mention that there are 
sufficient indications which suggest that Carver and White’s BAS/BIS scales are widely 
accepted—despite minor criticisms and calls for refinement (Smillie et. al 2006; 
Pickering & Smillie, 2008)—as a global tool for the assessment of individual 
differences regarding Gray’s RST model. 
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On a short note, the BAS and BIS systems have been implicated in a range of 
risk-taking behaviours. Research conducted in a non clinical human population sample, 
Suhr and Tsanadis (2007) showed that the two core (BAS and BIS) systems of the RST 
model as they are measured by Carver and White’s BAS and BIS scales affect both risk-
seeking and risk-aversive decisions immediately after a reward or punishment feedback 
is given in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). According to the authors, the research 
results obtained indicate that “state mood (particularly negative affect) and personality 
(particularly Fun Seeking) are independently related to risky performance on IGT” 
(2007). Suhr and Tsanadis also suggest that there is a need to evaluate “both affect and 
personality dimensions when attempting to explain poor IGT performance” (2007). 
Demaree and colleagues have also showed that risky decision making is 
“governed more by concern for a loss (measured by BIS) than desire for a win 
(measured by BAS), although both variables impact risk-taking preferences” in a 
probability and utility gamble task (2008). In short, a summary statement from the 
authors regarding the obtained results is the following: lower representations in the 
absolute avoidance/approach ratio, and significantly lower scores on the BIS scale, are 
“associated with increased risk-taking” both in the utility and probability gambling tasks 
(Demaree et. al. 2008). 
Another study by Kim and Lee (2011) showed that net results scores in a simple 
gambling task, individuals who had previously scored high on the BAS scale and low 
on the BIS scale proved to be more risky decision-makers after winning experiences in 
the gambling task, whereas individuals who had previously scored low on the BAS 
scale and high on the BIS scale proved more cautious and risk aversive after losing 
experiences in the gambling task. These results, according to the authors of the study, 
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support Corr’s (2001, 2002) Joint Subsystems Hypothesis (JSH) “suggesting that the 
effects of the relative strengths of the BAS and BIS affect decision-making” (Kim & 
Lee, 2011). 
On a final note we need to mention that there are a number of other ways that 
researchers have tried to measure Gray’s three main functional systems of the RST 
model, which nonetheless cannot be addressed in depth here due to limited space in this 
thesis. Namely they are Ball and Zuckerman’s (1990) General Reward and Punishment 
Expectancy Scales (GRAPES) that were developed “following a cognitive interpretation 
of Gray’s model”, Wilson, Gray, and Barrett’s (1989, 1990) Gray-Wilson Personality 
Questionnaire which was designed in order to “measure individual differences in the 
activity of the three RST systems” (Torrubia et. al 2008). For the one reason or the other 
the use of the scales mentioned above has not picked up and is rather restricted. Thus 
their use is not widely accepted in the literature. For each new scale being developed the 
route from purely experimental use to being widely accepted for the measure of a 
variable takes a significant amount of time and usually frequent revisions of the 
measure to increase its reliability and ecological validity. 
 
Discussion of Biologically based Personality Theories 
Eysenck, Zuckerman and Gray’s biological personality theories showcase a 
number of dispositional factors that account for important human personality 
dimensions. More specifically, Eysenck and Zuckerman’s personality theories and 
Gray’s RST share a significant common denominator which manifests as an impulsive 
and risk-taking dimension of personality. As we have already discussed above, both 
extraversion and sensation-seeking explain and highlight a particular archetype of 
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individual behaviour that is highly likely to seek external stimulation and engage in 
impulsive sensation seeking and/or socially risk-taking behaviour in order to achieve a 
pleasant level of arousal. Both personality theories attribute the tendency for risk-taking 
behaviour to biologically based dispositional traits that are associated with specific 
brain function imbalances—that is lower cortical activity according to Eysenck and 
lower levels of MAO according to Zuckerman. Although conceptually related, it is not 
very clear whether Eysenck and Zuckerman’s personality models describe the same 
dispositional traits. 
Research conducted by Zuckerman and Cloninger (1996) showed that both 
Eysenck and Zuckerman’s personality scales correlate negatively with individual levels 
of monoamine oxidase, according to Zuckerman (1991) low levels of MAO forms the 
biological basis for the individual to seek external stimulation and exhibit sensation 
seeking behaviour. However, in this particular research experiment no significant 
evidence were found linking MAO levels and sensation seeking behaviour as this was 
measured by both scales. Zuckerman and Cloninger also report that the novelty and 
sensation seeking measures incorporated in their study were highly inter correlated 
indicating that the two personality measures capture aspects of the same trait (1996). In 
Addition research by Smillie and colleagues indicates that Gray’s BAS system is largely 
related to Extraversion (2006). So far there are clear indications suggesting that both 
Gray’s BAS system and Zuckerman’s impulsive sensation seeking are both linked and 
interrelated with Eysenck’s extraversion. Furthermore, all three theories describe 
specific dispositional constructs which are generally thought to be rooted in biology. As 
we have already discussed individually for each of the biological based theories 
(Eysenck, Zuckerman, and Gray), research indicates that the particular personality traits 
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in question—extraversion, impulsive sensation seeking, and BAS function—are directly 
linked with a number of risky decision making behaviours such as social risks. 
The biologically based personality theories presented here has a distinct way of 
explaining socially risk taking behaviour. According to Zuckerman (1994), individuals 
will engage in a risk-taking activity or will choose to refrain from it only insofar their 
decision to engage or not in risky behaviour will assist them in meeting their goals that 
are compatible with their personal temperament (e.g. extraverts will engage in risk 
taking activity because they are in constant need of external stimulation and sensation 
seeking in order to achieve a pleasant level of arousal, according to this formulation the 
risk-taking activity is the medium to achieve higher levels of arousal). 
According to Eysenck risk-taking behaviour is the outcome of extravert 
individuals exhibiting sensation seeking behaviour in order to elicit external stimulation 
and thus increase arousal in their ascending RAS. According to Zuckerman’s theoretic 
formulations and evidence deriving from his studies there are supporting indications 
pointing to higher scores in Zuckerman’s sensation-seeking scale and a number of 
explicit social risks such as gambling, fighting, substance abuse, alcohol consumption, 
drunk driving, and reckless driving behaviour (Pfefferbaum & Wood, 1994; Read et al., 
2003; Donohew et al. 1999a,b). 
Research studies that have investigated Zuckerman’s impulsivity and sensation 
seeking constructs have had little success in identifying the origins and/or the causal 
links of these biological based dispositional traits. Zuckerman’s assumptions with 
regards to low MAO levels and high sensation seeking have not been empirically 
verified so far as only a rather small relationship between low MAO levels and high 
scores on the sensation seeking scale have emerged in the literature (Zuckerman, 1991). 
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Gray’s RST describes socially risk-taking behaviour as an imbalance in the two, central 
in his theory, BAS and BIS systems, according to which, the risk-taker is sensitive to 
behaviour associated rewards and insensitive to potential behaviour associated 
drawbacks. As we briefly discussed earlier, Gray’s BAS and BIS systems are thought to 
have biological roots in distinct neural networks that are responsible for mediating 
arousal and pleasure. 
Eysenck, Zuckerman, and Gray’s biologically based personality theories seem to 
be highly inter-related regarding dispositional constructs and their association with 
socially risk-taking behaviour in several domains. Each one of these theories focuses on 
a different physiological origin regarding the cause of the dispositional trait in question 
and provides a slightly different explanation regarding the association of the trait with 
risk-taking behaviour in general. Although there are some indications that individuals 
who score higher on extraversion and sensation seeking are more prone to social risk-
taking behaviour little is known whether these dispositional traits may be able to predict 
other forms of risk-taking such as instance based risk-taking behaviour with monetary 
incentives. 
Gray’s RST model and particularly the post 2000 version of it has the potential 
to become a useful model that would provide a conceptual amalgamation of the 
biologically based theories of personality. Research findings have shown, to a certain 
extent, which the dispositional traits that we have discussed so far in this chapter seem 
to be the expressions of relative differences between the BAS and BIS functional 
systems (Smillie et. al. 2006). Therefore, according to the revised version of the RST 
model, personality differences could possibly be explained by functional imbalances 
between the the two competing BAS and BIS systems. Regarding the BAS and BIS 
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systems’ relevance to the decision making process we would need to generate and test 
hypotheses directly based on the post 2000 revised version of the RST model. On the 
one hand this could possibly highlight potential associations between individual 
differences as they are expressed through the BAS and BIS systems and the decision 
making process measured both in controlled (laboratory) and in real world risk-taking 
conditions. On the other hand it would serve as a driving force in understanding risk-
taking variability which may be influenced by a combination of personality 
predispositions and situational and cross situational variables such as loss and gain, and 
a number of heuristics and biases that have been identified and established in the 
behavioural decision research literature such as, to name but a few, frame, preference 
consistency, time preference, and temporal risky choice variation. 
 
 
Individual Differences in the Study of Decision Making 
 
Sex 
Sex differences in a large variety of risk-taking behaviours have been widely 
reported in the literature. Although exceptions emerge at times, it is well established 
that males are more likely to engage in risky decision making and favour risky choices 
in their personal lives than female individuals. An important reference point in the 
literature is a meta-analysis conducted by Byrnes and colleagues where they revaluated 
results from 150 studies. The authors examined the risk-taking attitudes of male and 
female individuals “with respect to type of task (e.g., self-reported behaviours vs. 
observed behaviours), task content (e.g., smoking vs. sex), and 5 age levels” and found 
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that there are significant gender differences (ranging in effect depending the type and 
content of the task) indicating that male participants are consistently greater risk-takers 
than female participants (Byrnes et. al. 1999). More specifically the authors report that 
the “average effects for 14 out of 16 types of risk taking were significantly larger than 0 
(indicating greater risk taking in male participants) and that nearly half of the effects 
were greater than .20. However, certain topics (e.g., intellectual risk taking and physical 
skills) produced larger gender differences than others (e.g., smoking)” (Byrnes et. al. 
1999). 
These results suggest that, across many real world situations regardless of 
context, male individuals typically engage in more risk-taking behaviours than do 
female individuals. Further to this, the authors of the meta-analytic study regarding risk-
taking behaviour between males and females report that a) “there were significant shifts 
in the size of the gender gap between successive age levels” and b) “the gender gap 
seems to be growing smaller over time” (Byrnes et. al. 1999). The authors’ major 
conclusion is that their research findings “clearly support the idea that male participants 
are more likely to take risks than female participants” (Byrnes et. al. 1999). 
The consensus in the literature seems to be in favour of the hypothesis that men 
tend to engage in risky business more often than women do. Another study conducted 
by Weber and colleagues (2002) evaluated individual perceived risk between males and 
females in risk-taking behaviours across five distinct social domains, i.e. “financial, 
health and safety, recreational, ethical, and social” decision making. Significant gender 
differences were reported in four out of five social risk-taking domains (all but social 
decision making) with male participants clearly reporting lower levels of perceived risk 
suggesting a larger probability of participating in risk-taking activities (Weber et. al. 
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2002). In a follow up study that utilized the same methodology and risk-taking domains, 
similar gender differences were reported in a large German sample (Johnson et. al. 
2004). Both studies reported large variability in individual levels of perceived risk—i.e. 
an indicator of actually engaging in a risk taking activity with those individuals that 
perceive less risk being more likely to engage in the risk-taking activity—with regards 
to engaging in risk-taking behaviour across domains (Weber et. al. 2002; Johnson et. al. 
2004). These findings, according to the authors of the studies, indicate that the 
likelihood of engaging in risk-taking behaviour neither originates nor is being mediated 
by dispositional traits that influence risk-taking behaviour but rather individual 
differences in risk-taking behaviour are largely due to varying individual perceptions of 
risk-taking across different domains (Weber et. al. 2002; Johnson et. al. 2004). 
Sex differences in risk-taking behaviour are abundant in the literature but a 
growing number of studies indicate that underpinning biological factors such as 
endogenous steroids, testosterone, genetic variations (Cesarini et. al. 2009; Zyphur et. 
al. 2009; Coates et. al. 2008; Apicella et. al. 2008) may mediate risk-taking and even 
drive risk-taking behaviour leaving sex as a secondary trait that mostly tends to 
influence, if at all, risk-taking behaviour only in context specific situations and the 
nature of risk measure that was used to evaluate riskiness (Byrnes et. al. 1999; Weber et. 
al. 2002; Johnson et. al. 2004). Also it is worth to note at this point that studies that 
report significant sex differences in risk taking behaviour come from researchers that 
have primarily used undergraduate populations as research participants (Byrnes et. al. 
1999). Equally important is the fact that sex differences with regards to risk taking 
behaviour have been significantly reduced over time (Byrnes et. al. 1999). There have 
also been reported very important real-world research findings that do not support the 
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hypothesis that females are more risk-averse than males (Basso & Oulliers, 2009; 
Croson & Gneezy, 2009). 
Research findings that come from real world environments suggests that female 
professionals are willing to take equally weighted risks as male professionals are willing 
to take (Atkinson et. al 2003; Master & Meier, 1988). Another national wide research 
project that examined risk-taking behaviour in mutual fund investors reports that “the 
greater level of risk aversion among women that is frequently documented in the 
literature can be substantially, but not completely, explained by knowledge disparities” 
(Dwyer et. al. 2002). Thus we conclude that there seem to be significant sex differences 
in risk-taking behaviour in several domains but the level of risk taking can be a) 
affected by context and type of the task, b) explained by knowledge and experience, and 




Late age has been associated with cognitive decline that is often intertwined with 
a number of serious cognitive diseases with deleterious effects (Bishop et. al. 2010). 
Aging has also been implicated in human judgement and decision making. Although sex 
differences present a clear homogeneous pattern of associations in various decision 
making tasks and contexts, the relationship between age differences and decision 
making are not as clear. Regarding risk-taking behaviour, older individuals are expected 
to differ from younger individuals in several ways such as a) how they perceive risk, b) 
to which extent and how often they exhibit risk-taking behaviour, and c) how they relate 
to various risk-taking contexts that may affect or mediate risk-taking behaviour. As we 
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have discussed in chapter 2, getting involved in a decision making process that involves 
risk exerts a certain cognitive load on the individual due to the fact that the assessment 
and evaluation of the alternatives options is an effortful process that requires cognitive 
engagement and information processing, probability estimation, weighing alternative 
options, judging and outcomes and forecasting future consequences of the impending 
decision. 
It is an established fact in the literature that even healthy aging is associated with 
cognitive decline due to frontotemporal deterioration (Haug et. al. 1983). MacPherson 
and colleagues state that recent “neuropsychological models propose that it is this 
frontal-lobe deterioration that is responsible for many age-related cognitive changes” 
(2002). Research findings indicate that aging selectively affects some cognitive 
mechanisms but not others, e.g. as we mentioned above frontotemporal decline appears 
earlier than other brain regions impacting executive functions.—the frontal lobes, 
among other things, have a crucial effect in human judgement and decision making 
processes by regulating amygdala activity (De Martino et. al. 2010; Knutson & Greer 
2008; Berridge, 2007; Naqvi et. al. 2006; Bechara, 2003; Bechara et. al. 2000; Damasio, 
1996; 1994; LeDoux, 2000). 
The theoretical framework that involves the frontal lobes in the decision making 
process postulates that the use of affect and emotional regulation are crucial components 
of advantageous decision making and without them the decision agent exhibits 
significant decision making deficits. Research findings have associated age-related 
cognitive deficits to degraded neural circuit activity in the ventro medial prefrontal 
cortex (Hedden and Gabrieli, 2005; Cabeza et al., 2005). Evidence from 
neuropsychological studies that suggest an association between aging and cognitive 
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decline could possibly be used as anchors to build some strong hypothesis regarding 
aging differences in decision making processes. For example, as research findings 
indicate, older individuals may have a lower ability to evaluate risky outcomes for a 
number of reasons such as markedly lower reaction times (Mueller et. al. 1980; Geary & 
Wiley, 1991), lower levels of cognitive engagement and concentration in the task 
(Chagnon & McKelvie, 1992), and maybe more vulnerable to external distracters during 
the problem solving process than younger individuals (Hoyer et. al. 1979). 
Cognitive decline as a likely explanation of why older individuals are expected 
to perform worst than younger individuals in decision making is not likely to hold due 
to sufficient evidence which suggest that healthy aging brain develops specific ways to 
cope with and compensate for the cognitive loss that occurs with aging evolving and 
adopting in many ways by redirecting specific neural circuit growth in selected brain 
regions (Dror & Morgret, 1996). 
There have been reported significant age differences for various risk-taking 
behaviours both concerning naturalistic risk-taking domains such as extreme sports and 
decisions concerning decision making under risk and uncertainty in simple and complex 
decision making domains. A study shows that age is a significant factor in driving 
behaviour, for example younger drivers are reported to be much riskier drivers than 
older drivers (Turner & McLure, 2003). In addition an important amount of research 
findings in economic behaviour investigating the effect of individual differences on 
risk-taking behaviour suggest age is a determinant of risk-taking behaviour and more 
specifically that risk-taking is decreasing with age (Morin & Suarzez, 1983; Holmstrom 
& Milgrom, 1987; Kanodia et al., 1989; Riley & Chow, 1992; Jianakoplos & Bernasek 
2006). In support of the findings presented above, large scale survey projects studying 
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the effects of aging in risk-taking behaviour in the general population provide additional 
support to the established observation in the decision making literature which postulates 
that risk-taking behaviour is markedly decreasing while age increases, i.e. aging is 
illustrated as a determining factor in decision making highlighting an inverse 
relationship between aging and risk-taking behaviour (Barsky et al., 1997; Donkers et 
al. 2001; Dohmen et al., 2006). 
 
Further support for the effect that maintains a decreasing risk-taking behaviour 
in older individuals comes from neurocognitive function and performance utilizing the 
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT
10
) and point to negative correlations between risk-taking 
behaviour and age, i.e. older adults tend to avoid disadvantageous decisions at 
significantly greater rates than pre-adolescents, adolescents and young individuals 
suggesting that older individuals tend to make more advantageous decision making 
(Cauffman et. al. 2010; Fein et al., 2007; Denburg et al., 2005, Zamarian et al.,2008). 
Findings that come from a slightly different research line also give support to the older 
the wiser effect regarding advantageous decision making showing that violations of the 
                                                           
10
 The Iowa Gambling Task involves decision making between four decks of cards. The decision agent 
has to undergo a long run of decisions (varies between 60 like the original version to 100 and 150 in 
newer versions, however, the length of the task does not affect its core function as a measure of decision 
making).  Decision agents are given an initial capital and are asked to choose one card each time. Upon 
selecting a card, the decision agent is either rewarded with a certain amount of money, or punished and 
has to suffer a financial loss. The sum of the financial rewards and punishments is revealed immediately 
after each decision and differs depending on the deck chosen. Decks A and B reward much higher on the 
short run than decks C and D; however, decks A and B also incorporate a number of strict punishments 
outweighing many fold the punishments received when choosing between decks C and D. in order to 
maximize his/her prospects in the game, the decision agent needs to select cards from decks C and D 
securing in this way long term rewards rather than instant gratification due to higher payoffs if he had 
chosen cards from decks A and B. decision agents have no prior knowledge or training with regards to the 
reward and punishment distribution among decks. They are informed that the ultimate goal of the game is 
to maximize their profits on the initial capital and that the selection process is not restricted to cards or 
deck and change of preferences and/or strategies is permitted. 
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axiomatic principles of expected utility theory are significantly lower in older 
individuals (Kume and Suzuki, 2010; Harbaugh et al., 2002). 
Knutson and Bossaerts report findings suggesting that except executive function 
deficits, aging is also involved in the estimation of expected value (2007). Individuals 
that are able to estimate expected values tend to take more optimal decisions, thus, if 
aging is positively associated with expected value estimation, as Knutson and Bossaerts 
(2007) suggest, then older individuals are also expected to take advantageous decisions. 
There is a large body of studies in the literature advocating that older age in healthy 
adults facilitates ability for advantageous decision making in the long run and avoiding 
selecting disadvantageous options where the risks for potential punishments 
significantly outweigh the chance to obtain rewards.  
 
Cognitive Abilities and Risk-Taking Behaviour 
Higher cognitive abilities have been predictive in a number of problem solving 
and selection tasks’ performance (Stanovich & west, 1998a). Higher cognitive abilities 
have also been predictive in selected problem solving tasks’ performance under specific 
heuristic analytic frameworks (Evans, 1989, 1995, 1996). The importance of numeracy 
and as a result effective probability judgement have also been reported as essential 
factors that influence health and social judgements in everyday life by enabling 
individuals to exercise more informed and risk free judgements (Reyna & Brainerd, 
2007). 
Individuals with higher intelligence (IQ) are commonly regarded as exceptional 
and are thought to differ in several ways from individuals with a lower intelligence. A 
large number of research findings show that individuals with higher IQ tend to live 
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longer, earn higher wages, perform better on working memory tests, have faster reaction 
times, and experience fewer health related problems (Frederick 2005). General 
intelligence has not been criticism free and has been challenged as a global trait 
(Schonemann 1983; 1977a; Guttman 1992; van der Maas et. al 2006). However, as we 
know it and measure it at present, general intelligence seems to be related according to 
research findings with higher performance on a significant number of social activities 
such as occupational and educational performance and has been referred to as a 
heritable trait (Gerhard, 2005; Devlin et. al. 1997; Jensen, 1969). General intelligence 
and a range of particular cognitive abilities may be significant predictors of risk-taking 
behaviour, judgement and other important decision making processes such as time 
preferences, risk preference, ambiguity aversion, probability assessment, etc. A number 
of growing research findings suggests that individual differences in cognitive abilities 
and skills are associated with more informed and accurate, i.e. with regards to 
assessment and weighting of risks, judgement and decision making (Stanovich & West, 
1998; Frederick 2005; Peters et. al. 2006; Peters & Levin 2008). 
Frederick reports that individuals with higher cognitive abilities (measured by a 
3 item mathematical problem solving test, namely the Cognitive Reflection Test) 
outperformed individuals with lower cognitive abilities in two risk taking tasks (2005). 
Frederick showed that performance with regards to expected value preferences were 
correlated with performance on his cognitive reflection test (CRT), that was developed 
to evaluate an individual’s dependence on controlled deep analytical thinking instead of 
giving in reflexive intuitions (2005). His three item CRT, that consists of logical 
problems that initially elicit a reflexive answer that is not correct, was also shown to 
correlate with other general “cognitive ability or cognitive style” measures such as “the 
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Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT), the Need For Cognition scale (NFC) and self-
reported SAT and ACT scores” (Frederick, 2005). Fredericks finding showed that 
individuals who scored higher on the CRT did not exhibit the often quoted 
asymmetrical valuations with respect to positive and negative frames as predicted by the 
cumulative prospect theory (i.e. between a sure win of £150 and a 50% chance of 
winning £350, prospect theory predicts that the decision agent will be aversive to risks 
and will opt for the sure win) however prospects with greater expected values (i.e. 
choosing the risky option with the probability 50% multiplied by the potential gain--
£350, which is predicted by the expected utility theory as the “right” choice) (2005). 
These findings basically indicate that risk-taking behaviour may be mediated by higher 
cognitive abilities. General intelligence for example may drive individuals to take 
riskier choices by computing expected utility values thus follow a specific goal oriented 
approach to risk taking (i.e. taking risks to maximize profit). Possible calculation of 
expected utility values seems to play a role in driving risky behaviour but evidence are 
far from conclusive as there may be other additional factors and cognitive limitations, 
i.e. working memory limitations, that may affect one’s course of action (Stanovich & 
West, 2000). 
Stanovich and West also state that that the divide between normative, i.e. utility 
theory, and descriptive, i.e. prospect theory & cumulative prospect theory, explanations 
of rationality “can be interpreted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human 
cognition” (2000). They further argue that there may be alternative interpretations that 
could possibly account for irregularities and disparities in human rationality because 
human rationality is largely seen as “rational” (Stanovich & West, 2000). The four 
alternative interpretations that according to Stanovich and West could account for 
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human irrationality in decision making are a) “performance errors”, b) “computational 
imitations”, c) “the wrong norm being applied by the experimenter”, and d) “a different 
construal of the task by the subject” (2002). Cokely and Kelley comenting on Stanovich 
and west’s model argue that it is a set of propositions which suggest that “individual 
differences in normative judgments and decisions often arise from working memory 
capacity limitations on computation, implying that high ability individuals may make 
expected-value choices via expected-value calculations” (2009). 
Stanovich and West provided sufficient evidence in support of their model as a 
competitor to address differences in human cognitive irregularities in rational thought. 
In several studies involving classical decision making gambles they “examined the 
implications of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations” 
that are likely to account for the differences between normative and descriptive 
explanations of rationality (2002). The study findings suggest that “performance errors 
are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations underlie non-normative 
responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive 
decontextualization. Unexpected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong 
norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be 
considered appropriate” (Stanovich & West, 2002). 
A well studied factor that explicitly indicates higher cognitive ability is 
numeracy and mathematical aptitude. High numeracy scores associate with higher 
general intelligence. Research on intelligence has shown, as we have already discussed, 
that people with higher general intelligence scores may take better, more informed, 
more balanced and thus more beneficial decisions in several domains (Frederick, 2005). 
Research conducted by Peters and colleagues (Peters & Levin, 2008; Peters et al., 2006) 
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shows that individual differences in risk-taking behaviour may be triggered by specific 
variations in an individual’s A) general knowledge, B) contextualized knowledge that is 
related with the decision making task, and C) numerical and mathematical ability to 
comprehend and assess differences in probabilities and different risk levels. For 
example individuals with high mathematic aptitude and analytic skills, and more 
specifically, the authors argue, the capacity to comprehend and rapidly transform 
probabilistic outcomes, fractions, percentages, and frequencies into equivalents of loss 
and gain, i.e. advantageous and disadvantageous prospects regarding future events, 
seem to be significantly less affected from framing effects that have been shown to 
directly cause preference reversals that violate the axioms of expected utility (Peters & 
Levin, 2008; Peters et al., 2006). Thus, individuals with exceptional mathematic and 
analytic skills, research shows, tend to make in a systematic way better, more informed, 
and more balanced judgements and decisions. This performance is attributed to the 
possession of a more accurate and objective sense between potential variables that could 
affect the situation and a better understanding of the gains and losses involved in the 
given domain or other probabilistic transactions involved in the decision making 
problems in question (Peters & Levin, 2008; Peters et al., 2006). 
Another very important study conducted by Dohmen and colleagues in a 
population sample randomly drawn to represent the general population found significant 
relationships between cognitive ability and decision making performance (Dohmen et. 
al. 2010). Research findings by Dohmen and colleagues suggest that decision agents 
with higher general intelligence and “cognitive ability are significantly more willing to 
take risks in the lottery experiments and are significantly more patient over the yearlong 
time horizon studied in the intertemporal choice experiment” (Dohmen et. al. 2010). 
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These findings indicate, as Cokely and Kelley reported earlier (2009), that superior 
cognitive abilities are strongly related to advantageous decision making. Dohmen and 
colleagues also report that associations between and risk taking behaviour and higher 
scores in cognitive ability measures are “present for both young and old, and for males 
and females, although the relationship is somewhat weaker for females and younger 
individuals” (Dohmen et. al. 2010). However, the most important finding from this 
study is that the association for “both traits with cognitive ability remains strong and 
significant, even after removing variation due to personal characteristics such as gender, 
age, and height, as well as important economic variables including education, income, 
and liquidity constraints” (Dohmen et. al. 2010). The authors of this study, contrary to 
the model proposed by Stanovich and West (2000), state that the diverse facets of the 
experimental procedure or the cognitive ability tests are not likely to “explain the 
correlations”, and also taking into account “confusion about incentives in the choice 
experiments, different propensities to engage in arbitrage, differences in test-taking style 
for people who are more risk averse or more impatient, and the potential role for 
personality type, or noncognitive skills, to influence performance on the cognitive 
ability tests” (Dohmen et. al. 2010). Thus research findings indicate that the significant 
contribution of cognitive abilities in “superior” or beneficial decision making remain 
unchallenged thus far, however, attempts to incorporate them in a single descriptive 
model of human rationality still remain elusive. 
Further evidence for the involvement of cognitive ability and cognitive skills in 
the decision making process comes from a study by Burks and colleagues (2009b). The 
authors showed, analyzing data from a large sample of trainee truckers, that people with 
higher cognitive skills (as these were measured by three different cognitive ability 
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measures such as nonverbal IQ, numeracy, and a test of the ability to plan) tend to a) be 
“more patient, in both short- and long-run” b) exhibit a “greater willingness to take 
calculated risks”, c) be more socially aware d) be better forecasters with regards to 
“others’ behaviour and distinguish their behaviour and alter their strategy “as a second 
mover more strongly depending on the first mover’s choice” in in a sequential strategic 
game, i.e. prisoner’s dilemma, and e) persevere in a “job setting with a substantial 
financial penalty for early exit” (Burks et. al. 2009b). These results come in support of 
the hypothesis that higher cognitive abilities predict an ability for advantageous decision 
making in the long run—through an array of attributes such as high competence in 
taking calculated risks and be able to assess, rather accurately, complex social factors by 
forecasting one’s own and others’ behaviour—and avoid high risk laden situations that 
bear insignificant gains in comparison with potential risks they pose. 
 
Affective States and Risk-Taking Behaviour 
In chapter 2 we have discussed the crucial role emotions play in the decision 
making process and also briefly touched upon the affect heuristic and the influence it 
exerts in people’s risk perceptions. However, the role of affective states, whether natural 
or induced for particular research purposes, is less well understood in the decision 
making process and to what extent they influence risk-taking behaviour. Zajonc (1980, 
1984) highlighted the significance of affective processing in decision making arguing 
that emotional reactions to a variety of stimuli are the first reactions occurring 
automatically and drive judgment, and human decision making processes. Zajonc also 
proposed that people’s perceptions involve affective reactions (1980, 1984) and 
Lowenstein argues that decision agents often “mispredict their own behavior and 
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preferences across affective states” (2005). Other researchers suggest that risk taking 
behavior may be influenced from the decision agent’s affective states in a variety of 
contexts and environments (Isen 1984; Isen et. al. 1987). Individual risk perception 
guided by affective reactions may influence judgments, facilitate prospects and 
estimates of risky options excluding or bypassing relevant information processing—i.e. 
a systematic and balanced evaluation of the alternative options (Shafir et. al. 1993; 
Sunfey 2003; Kuhnen & Knutson, 2011). 
The well studied assumption that there is an “observed inverse relationship 
between perceived risk and perceived benefit” suggests that people generally heavily 
rely on affective processing when judging and deciding about risks and benefits 
(Finucane et. al. 2000, Sunfey 2003). Research findings regarding the role of affective 
states on decision making and risk taking behaviour leave little space for debate 
regarding the influence of affective states in decision making processes and more 
specifically in risk-taking behavior (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2011; Slovic et. al. 2004, 
2002; Sunfey et. al. 2003; Pham, 1998). The research findings that were discussed so far 
suggest that both natural variations in affective states and experimentally induced 
affective states facilitate decision-making processes and influence risk-taking behavior 
in a variety of settings. Variation in affective states while facing different types of 
options that have either risky or uncertain potential prospects, i.e. information are not 
complete, and multi outcome prospects, i.e. when an option may have more than one 






Genetic Variability and Risk-Taking Behaviour 
The assumption that risk-taking behaviour has biological underpinnings such as 
genetic variation, endogenous steroids and testosterone has been a research subject of 
intense study (Cesarini et. al. 2009; Zyphur et. al. 2008; Coates & Herbert, 2008; 
Apicella et. al. 2008). Genetic variability and risk-taking behaviour research studies, 
particularly of risks linked with immediate rewards, aim to identify genetic factors that 
account for a predisposition for advantageous decision making in the long run on 
controlled settings and real world environments. Risk-taking behaviour indicates an 
individual’s ability to engage into or avoid decision making that entails risks in a variety 
of settings. Genetic variation, according Frydman and colleagues, affects risk taking 
behaviour “through at least two neurocomputational mechanisms: they may affect the 
value assigned to different risky options, or they may affect the way in which the brain 
adjudicates between options based on their value” (Frydman et. al. 2010). 
The proposition that genetic variability influences risk taking behaviour through 
genes that encode for serotonin and dopamine, as Frydman and colleagues explain 
(2010), suggests that individual risk taking behaviour differs in the extent to which a 
decision agent is “willing to take risks” of different levels may be explained in part by 
individual differences in heritable traits. Specific genetic polymorphisms that have been 
shown to regulate serotonin and dopamine also influence information processing and 
evaluation of rewarding and punishing stimuli (Frank & Foslsela, 2011; Yacubian et. al. 
2007; Klein et. al. 2007), in addition they have also been associated with personality 
traits such as extraversion (Reuter & Hennig, 2005; Smillie et. al. 2010), novelty 
seeking (Ebstein et. al. 1996) and anxiety (Lesch et. al. 1996). Further support for the 
links between serotonergic and dopaminergic brain systems and risk taking behaviour 
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comes from Kuhnen and Knutson (2005) who showed that particular brain regions that 
involve serotonin and dopamine associated neural pathways influence risk taking 
behaviour. 
A number of research findings from twin-studies support the notion that genetic 
variability explains, albeit partially, risk taking behaviour, showing that some of the 
variation in the decision agent’s willingness to engage in risk-taking behaviour can be 
attributed in heritable traits (Cesarini et. al. 2010; Cesarini et. al. 2009; Zhong et. al. 
2009). An important contribution with regards to the role of genetic variability in risk-
taking behaviour comes from Frydman and colleagues where they showcased that the 
decision agent is engaged in risk-taking behaviour only when “being risky” was an 
advantageous strategy for obtaining maximum profits (Frydman et. al 2010). 
The mounting evidence that illustrate how genetic variability affects decision 
making processes and risk-taking behaviour in particular is a relatively new, yet 
another, attempt to generalize models of decision making and take them beyond the 
axiomatic principles of classical economic theory and embed them in a greater system 
that allows observed human behaviour to be a significant factor in explaining human 
rationality bridging normative and descriptive models of human rationality. 
 
  Emotional Intelligence and the TEIQue in Decision Making 
 Emotional intelligence (EI) may be broadly defined as a skill to recognize, 
understand and to a certain extent manage one's own emotions, that of others and of 
groups. EI is regarded as a positive characteristic because it allows a person to better 
connect with other people by understanding their emotions. 
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 The most often quoted criticisms regarding EI have focused on a) the low 
predictive validity of EI, b) whether EI is actually a real measurable intelligence, and c) 
whether it has incremental validity over IQ measures. EI as is currently understood, 
used and measured by various instruments EI is divided in three main models: a) ability, 
b) mixed, c) trait. EI has been increasingly popular in the literature and various EI 
models such as ability models and the trait EI model have been proposed as accurate 
descriptions and the most prominent accounts of EI. Ability models usually emphasize 
the person's ability to understand,  process and regulate emotions and integrate 
emotional cues to aid cognitive functions such as thought processes (Mayer, Salovey, 
Caruso & Sitarenios, 2001). The trait EI model's definition postulates that trait EI is "a 
constellation of emotional self-perceptions located at the lower levels of personality" 
and thus encompasses behavioural dispositions and self perceived abilities (Petrides, 
Pita & Kokkinaki, 2007). 
 Ability and trait models are widely accepted in the scientific literature although 
they have not been criticism free. EI models have face criticisms both with regards to 
their theoretical formulation and the way they have been measured. The major 
criticisms EI models have received on a theoretical level lie with the claims that a) EI 
cannot be regarded as a form of intelligence (Locke, 2005), and b) EI has a low 
predictive value (Landy, 2005). EI measurement critics also argue that widely used EI 
models have significant measurement shortcomings. Critics argue that a) ability EI 
measures actually measure conformity instead of ability (Roberts, Zeidner, & Matthews 
(2001), b) ability EI measures measure the knowledge one has on emotions, not the 
ability to assess emotions (Brody, 2004), c) ability EI measures actually measure 
personality and general intelligence (Schulte, Ree, & Carretta, 2004; Fiori & Antonakis, 
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2011, Antonakis & Dietz, 2011a,b). Other frequently quoted EI criticisms include 
among others that a self report measure may be faked and that the predictive power of 
EI models is based on exaggerated claims (Landy, 2005). 
 In the present studies it seemed plausible to use the trait EI model along with 
other personality and affective states inventories in order to determine any predictive 
value trait EI may have on risk taking behaviour and the decision making processes. 
 To the best of our knowledge no link exists in the literature between emotional 
intelligence and behavioural decision making data. In the present studies we decided to 
utilize the trait emotional intelligence uestionnaire (TEIQue) to explore whether trait 
emotional intelligence is related to risk taking behaviour in instance based decision 
making tasks. 
 
 Individual differences in applied decision making studies: an integration 
  The studies presented here are multidisciplinary in nature drawing 
insights from the fields of individual differences, classical economics, cognitive 
psychology, and behavioural decision making. We present classic concepts that 
highlight the differences between normative and descriptive models in the field of 
decision making, and at the same time we attempt to discuss potentially fruitfull ways in 
which individual differences may contribute in our understanding of human judgement 
and decision making processes. The continuing confrontation between normative and 
descriptive models for the better part of the past century has led to the challenge of 
classical normative models highlighting the need for revising fundamental definitions in 
the field of decision making sciences (e.g. the concept that assumes that all human 
beings are fully rational decision agents). Psychology and particularly what has come to 
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be known as economic psychology has offered numerous contributions towards our 
understanding of human judgements and decision making sciences primarily by 
challenging established economic concepts that were based not on empirical 
investigations but rather on prescriptive assumptions. Normative models of decision 
making provide a priori assumptions according to which each individual decision maker 
ought to behave to maximize its utility. Descriptive models of decision making unveil a 
wealth real life decision making applications revealing a poverty of prescriptive 
assumptions. 
 Behavioral decision theory has managed to integrate empirical knowledge from 
the fields of economics and cognitive psychology and apply it in an array of real life 
decision making problems. Psychologists looking at the relationship of economics and 
psychology tried to disentangle human behaviour from the abstract prescriptive 
assumptions of economics settling for recorded observations of actual decision making 
behaviour in the lab and real life applications. The behavioural decision making 
example, i.e. the integration of psychological insights into economics, started feeding 
back into the discipline of economics where slowly but steadily the lessons learned are 
both empirically verified and applied into practice. The most significant contributions of 
the psychology economics interaction were a re-evaluation of methodological concepts, 
improved measurement in normative economic models, and the formalization of new 
hypotheses that were easily recognized and utilized from both disciplines. Thus is clear 
by now that the field of decision making sciences functions as a multidisciplinary field 
where psychologists, economists, statisticians, neuroscientists, and sociologists 




 Although behavioural decision theory has come a long way to inform and 
influence human judgement and decision making sciences asnother disciplinary 
challenge has started emerging in recent years; that of integrating individual differences 
insights in behavioural decision theory and human decision sciences. That stems from 
the fact that economists have difficulty accepting behavioural decision theory let alone 
insights offered by fields such as personality theory. As we have already discussed 
individual differences have the potential to play a pivotal role in the understanding of 
human decision making behaviour. The main obstacle for the integration of individual 
differences in the decision making sciences stems dirrectly from economists and 
cognitive psychologists difficulty to accept traditional methods (e.g. self report 
questionnaires) used by personality psychologists to measure personality traits, mood 
and affect states etc. Although decision making experts with a background in economics 
or in cognitive psychology are keen to hear about and usually welcome hardcore 
methods such as fMRI, EEG, behavioural and molecular genetics for the study of 
human decision making processes; nonetheless they are most of the times reluctant to 
incorporate in their studies personality theory frameworks and methods. For the 
betterment of the decision making field and for a better understanding of real life 
decision making behaviour researchers should be open to methods that have shed light 
in the understanding of human personality and what it means to be human in a scientific 
community that is preoccupied with hard science methods. Individual differences and 
personality theory in particular have started gaining ground recently mostly due to the 
fact that personality traits and general frameworks have been empirically verified in 
experimental studies. Integrating individual differences in the study of human decision 
making processes will better inform and influence the study of decision making. 
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CHAPTER 5: METHODS 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter we present the variables and discuss the research design of the 
three studies conducted for the purposes of the present project. The general objective of 
the project was to strengthen the relationship between individual differences and 
decision theoretical frameworks and provide some additional groundwork that would 
contribute a small piece of knowledge helping in this way to establish individual 
differences research as a key component in understanding human judgment processes 
and risk taking behaviour. The specific objective of the project was to examine the 
predictive validity of specific individual differences such as emotional intelligence, 
affect, and personality in instance based decision making under risk and uncertainty. In 
order to achieve these objectives we designed three exploratory studies aiming to 
examine the predictive validity of emotional intelligence, affect, and personality in 
instance based decision making under risk and uncertainty. 
 
Research Design 
The field of behaviour decision theory is a well defined field of research that has 
shed light in the differences between normative and descriptive models of human 
rationality and more particularly models of human judgement, decision making, and 
economic behaviour. It has been characterized by significant psychological insights in 
the study of human rationality driving the research focus from mathematical 
prescriptive modelling, i.e. axiomatic, to a more descriptive approach that better 
accounts for the often observed human irrationality that accompanies decision making 
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and economic behaviour. The field has traditionally been dominated by a cognitive 
approach to describe human rationality and, although significant discrepancies have 
been reported in aggregate models of human decision making processes, little 
contribution has come by psychometric studies that could potentially account for the 
discrepancies that have been observed. 
For the purposes of our studies we chose to follow an exploratory pattern of 
research. However, we based our hypotheses on solid research background. Primarily 
we decided to conduct exploratory research because there are no sufficient accounts 
available from earlier models advocating strong links between specific psychometric 
constructs and risk-taking behaviour. 
Although, as we have discussed in the previous chapter, there have been some 
attempts to build models of naturalistic risk-taking behaviour but there are a) no 
established links between sensation seeking, impulsivity, appetitive behaviours and 
consistent risk taking activity and b) very little attempts have been made to relate 
individual differences and instance based decision making with monetary incentives. In 
order to pursue such a research line under the uncertainty that previous conflicting 
research results have presented the only “safe” way to approach this was through 
exploratory studies. We have taken of course earlier theories, which were discussed in 
the previous chapter, as an anchoring point to address the contribution of individual 
differences in decision making processes but with great caution with regards to the 
interpretations that have been given to earlier descriptive psychometric models because 
they come from a) varied contexts, b) assess different types of risk, and c) the temporal 





Emotional Intelligence Measure: TEIQueSF 
According to Petrides and Furnham the trait EI construct postulates that “people 
differ in the extent to which they attend to, process, and utilize affect-laden information 
of an intrapersonal (e.g., managing one’s own emotions) or interpersonal (e.g., 
managing others’ emotions) nature” (2006). For the purposes of our exploratory studies 
we used the trait emotional intelligence questionnaire-short form (TEIQueSF). The 
TEIQueSF is a 30-item scale that was developed to assess global trait emotional 
intelligence (trait EI).  The short form measure is developed by extracting items from 
the full form of the TEIQue (a 150-item questionnaire). In the TEIQueSF 2 items have 
been selected for inclusion from each one of the 15 facets of the TEIQue, based 
primarily on their correlations with the corresponding total facet scores (Cooper & 
Petrides, 2010; Petrides & Furnham, 2006). The TEIQueSF is a 30-item self-report 
inventory specifically designed to measure trait EI using a 7-point likert scale (1= 
completely disagree, 7= completely agree). The TEIQueSF provides a number of 
phrases, which describe one’s own behaviour regarding his/her emotions, and the 
participant is asked to use the rating scale provided in order to describe the extent to 
which he/she thinks he/she agrees or disagrees with each statement. The trait emotional 
intelligence construct is considered to be a personality trait, as opposed to distinct 
cognitive ability, and has been located within established personality taxonomies 
(Mikolajczak et. al 2007). However, trait EI is a relatively new construct, thorough 
investigations of the psychometric properties of the TEIQue inventory have been 
established (Petrides & Furnham, 2006; Mikolajczak et. al 2007; Petrides et. al. 2007; 
Cooper & Petrides, 2010). 
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Emotional Regulation Measure 
In the studies conducted emotional regulation was assessed on a 10-item 
questionnaire designed to measure emotional regulation (EMRE). The 10-item 
questionnaire was developed by extracting items from the full form of the TEIQue (a 
150-item questionnaire). EMRE is a scale that measures to what extent an individual is 
capable of controlling his/her own emotions with higher scores indicating individuals 
that are highly aware of their emotional state and lower scores indicating individuals 
that are less aware of their emotions. 
 
Impulsivity Measure: Dickman’s Impulsivity Inventory 
Individual scores of functional and dysfunctional impulsivity were assessed 
using Dickman’s Impulsivity Inventory (Dickman, 1990). The Dickman Impulsivity 
Inventory (DII) is a 23 item self-report inventory specifically designed to measure two 
types of impulsivity, functional and dysfunctional, using a 5-point likert scale (1= 
strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree). The DII provides a number of phrases, which 
describe people’s behaviour, and the participant is asked to use the rating scale provided 
in order to describe the extent to which he/she thinks each statement best describes 
him/her. Dickman (1990) makes the distinction in two versions of impulsivity: 
dysfunctional impulsivity which manifests as a “tendency to act with absence of 
forethought when this tendency could be a source of problems”; and functional 
impulsivity, which manifests as a “tendency to act without forethought when this 





Measure of Affect: Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule 
The Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) is a self report measure 
consisting of 20 items that further split in 2 10-item scales which represent positive 
affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). According to 
Watson’s et. al. guidelines participants must rate themselves on each one of the 20 items 
using a 5-point scale (1= very slightly or not at all, 5= extremely). The PANAS scale, 
according to instructions, numbers 20 select words that are associated with diverse 
affective states asking the participant to provide an appropriate answer next to the word 
which indicates the extent to which he/she is experiencing the corresponding feeling or 
emotion at the moment the study takes place. Asking the participant to report what 
he/she feels at the moment tha study takes place the researcher measures the 
participant's affective state. Cronbach’s alpha are, for the PA scale: .89, and for the NA 
scale: .89, furthermore, eight week test-retest results for the scales are, for the PA scale: 
.54 and for the NA scale: .45 (Watson et al., 1988).  
 
Personality Measure: Behavioural Activation and Behavioural Inhibition  
Scales 
The behavioural inhibition and behavioural activation scales (BIS/BAS) scale; is 
a 24-item self-report measure which was developed to assess Gray’s personality model 
of behavioural inhibition and behavioural activation (Carver & White, 1994). BIS/BAS 
psychometrics have been utilized in a number of research projects by several 
researchers (Carver & White, 1994; Heubeck et. al., 1998; Jorm et. al, 1999). The BIS 
scale is a measure of behavioural inhibition that consists of 7 items and the BAS scale is 
further divided in three subscales: reward responsiveness that consists of 5 items, drive 
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that consists of 4 items, and fun seeking that consists of 4 items—the remaining 4 items 
out of a total of 24 are fillers (Carver & White, 1994; Jorm et al., 1999). A study 
conducted by Jorm et. al indicates that the BIS/BAS scale is considered both reliable 
and valid reporting a .76 Cronbach’s alpha for BIS and a .83 for BAS (1999). It is 
important to note at this point that, in the same study by Jorm et. al, the three BAS 
subscales’s reliability has been found to be relatively lower (e.g. reported Cronbach’s 
alpha by Jorm et. al., at .65 for reward responsiveness, .80 for drive and .70 for fun 
seeking), although still acceptable (1999). Although scale scores tend to vary, it is 
considered normal for the three BAS subscales to have a Cronbach’s alpha somewhat 
lower than .70 that is the threshold for accepting a Cronbach’s alpha score. 
 
Measures of Decision Making Behaviour 
Study 1-A Task: The Binary Choice Task 
The binary choice task was, adopted from Moore and Chater (2003), a four 
versions of a short choice-task consisting of 16 binary choice gambles of the form 
“choose between A.) £120 OR B.) a 60% chance of winning £300” for a total of 64 
gambles. “For the ‘p chance of winning y’ section of the choice, p values were set at 
20%, 40%, 60% or 80%; y values were set at £100, £200, £300 or £400. The certain 
amount (option A in the example above) was calculated from the formula: x = y.p^1/γ 
where x is the certainty equivalent (rounded to the nearest £1 for x < £20 and to the 
nearest £5 for x > £20”. Values of γ, corresponding to different levels of risk aversion, 
were set at 0.35, 0.5, 0.65 or 0.8 giving 64 trials. The 4 sections of the decision making 
task, of 16 trials each “were developed in such a manner that each participant was 
exposed to all four values used to construct the stimuli”. The four values of amounts 
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presented above correspond to different levels of risk aversion that were used to 
determine the participants’ risk behaviour in this decision making task (Moore & 
Chater, 2003). 
 
Study 1-B Task: The Binary Double Gamble Task 
The double gamble task was, adopted from Rogers and colleagues (1999) but 
was slightly modified to match the task in study 1-A yielding different levels of risk and 
different probability levels for both options. According to the guidelines presented in 
the description of the previous task, four versions short choice-task consisting of 16 
binary choice double gambles of the form “choose between A.) 95% chance of winning 
£100 OR B.) 20% chance of winning £600”. For the ‘p chance of winning y’ section of 
the choice, p values were set at 99%, 92%, 85% or 75% of an ‘x’ price (the probability 
of the first choice has a value ‘x’ that bears an equal utility with the correspondent y 
value when taking into account the probability for both events, e.g. a.) 99% chance of 
winning £5 or b.) 5% chance of winning £100, the expected utility for both choices are 
approximately equal, £5 in this case); y values were set at 5%, 9%, 16%, 25% for the 
following incremental set values £100, £200, £300 or £400. The amount for (A in the 
preceding example) was calculated from the formula: pA.x = pB.y where x is the utility 
equivalent (rounded to the nearest £1 for x < £20 and to the nearest £5 for x > £20) (see 
Rogers et. al. 1999). 
 
Study 2: The Classic City Size Task  
In this study we identified participant’s use & non-use of the Recognition 
Heuristic (RH) through the classical city-size task (Pohl, 2006) performance. Initially, 
140 
 
11 cities were randomly chosen from a list of the 100 most populous (at the time when 
the study conducted) cities in the world. Subsequently, the 11 cities were exhaustively 
paired with each other resulting in 55 comparison pairs to be employed in the inference 
city size task. Each participant’s performance was assessed in order to determine to 
what extent the participant used his/her knowledge or whether he/she relied on the 
recognition heuristic criterion while being tested in the pair comparison city size task. 
Specifically, the participant’s performance was assessed by calculating the “individual 
absolute scores of the discrimination index” (Hilbig & Pohl, 2008). The discrimination 
index (DI) can be calculated by obtaining the “(absolute) difference between the 
proportion of choosing the recognized object” only if this corresponds to a correct 
choice and the “proportion of choosing the recognized object” when this corresponds to 
a wrong choice. Following these guidelines, the DI score is calculated “across all cases 
in which a participant recognizes one but not the other” city (Hillbig & Pohl, 2008). 
According to Hilbig and Pohl (2008) “a DI score of zero”
11
 is required in order for a 
participant to be considered a user of the RH. If the participant relies solely on 
recognition—DI 0— he either ignores or doesn’t access any knowledge that would 
allow him/her to discriminate between cases where an inference is correct vs. wrong. 
Contrary to that, a DI score other than zero is considered a sufficient indication to 
conclude that the participant may have considered some additional information criterion 
other than recognition, i.e. evidence for access to further knowledge. 
 
                                                           
11
 The ideal DI score is 0, but other scores may be included using a 95% confidence interval. For example 
a relative number of participants who had DI scores significantly below zero, close to zero, or 
significantly above zero (as identified by a 95% confidence interval around zero) were included in this 
statistical analysis. The cut-off according to literature usually depends on the experiment/sample because 
this influences the size of the 95%-confidence interval. 
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CHAPTER 6: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES & DECISION MAKING 
UNDER RISK 
Introduction 
Neoclassical economics are based on a fundamental assumption, i.e. every 
individual is a rational decision agent that aims to maximize personal profit, wealth, and 
well-being. This general assumption was formed on the premise that every decision 
agent strives to achieve a maximum personal interest. Economists also assume that 
every individual’s choices, risks and preferences, judgments of choice, and decision 
making processes in general should be guided by the prospect that acting rational will 
maximize one’s own over all utility in the long run. However, human observed 
behaviour showcases that people are clearly far from rational decision agents when 
making choices under risk. Many people frequent casinos to gamble, buy lottery tickets 
and insurance and even more do not really plan ahead of time in a strategic way to 
maximize benefits from pension plans and saving options available to them. 
The assumption that people are utility maximizers is not a recent one. Bernoulli 
was the first to propose, as a solution to the Petersburg paradox, that a decision agent 
strives to maximize the expected value of a utility function where the choice for utility 
maximization represents the decision agent’s strength of preference, i.e. belief in, for 
certain outcomes (1954). However, it was not until Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
provided a theoretic framework, i.e. the axioms of rational choice, for expected utility 
that economists started using it as a guide to decision making under risk (1944). 
Decision making under risk was, according to the axioms of rational choice, thought to 
be driven primarily by the decision agent’s ability to act rationally and maximize the 
expected utility in choices under risk. The expected utility prescriptive model regarding 
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economic behaviour has largely remained unchanged the past seven decades although 
new evidence suggests that economics and decision sciences need a theoretic 
framework that either predicts or describes human economic behaviour in decision 
making under risk. Contrary to the established model of utility theory, a large body of 
research in behavioural economics suggests that individuals are not rational actors and 
most importantly evidence shows that people do not follow the axioms of rational 
choice when called upon to act on a decision problem clearly violating the assumptions 
of utility theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; 1986; 
1991; 1992; Weber & Camerer, 1987; Camerer & Weber, 1992; Benartzi & Thaler, 
1995; 1999; Barberis et. al. 2003; Kahneman, 2003). 
Although aggregate models of economic behaviour in general and decision 
making under risk and uncertainty in particular have been extensively studied (see 
Camerer et. al. 2003), research on the predictive value of individual differences in 
decision making under risk and uncertainty has been rather neglected (Vigil-Colet, 
2007). Some attention regarding individual differences research on decision making has 
looked into risky choice framing effects (Levin et. al. 1986; Levin et. al. 2002). 
Sensation seeking has been a well investigated trait in risk-taking behaviour and the 
most plausible explanation for individual differences in risk taking behaviour is that 
varied, novel and complex stimuli can provide the high arousal that sensation seekers 
need (Lauriola & Levin, 2001). 
Impulsivity has also been implicated in risky decision making but it is not clear 
whether it predicts risk-taking behaviour as there are conflicting results published in the 
literature both in favour and against its predictive validity in risky decision making 
(Franken & Muris, 2005; Clarke, 2006; Suhr & Tsanadis, 2007; Vigil-Colet, 2007). 
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Further to the observations above, research results obtained from a risk-taking task in 
the form of gambles, i.e. the Iowa Gambling Task that was also used by Franken and 
Muris (2005) and Suhr and Tsanadis (2007), indicate that a) “higher levels of 
impulsivity do not significantly correlate with risk-taking” and b) “higher levels of 
sensation-seeking are associated with increased risk-taking” (Demaree et. al. 2008). 
However, Vigil-Colet discusses research findings which show that impulsivity is not 
associated with risky decision making but it is “related to an impulsive decision making 
style in low risk” conditions (2007). 
Affective states have also been shown to influence risky decision making. 
Moore and Chater (2003) report that happier participants were more prone to go for 
advantageous riskier choices than sad participants who were more risk averse. Holland 
and Witteman also showed that individuals with reported and induced positive mood 
states, compared to reported and induced negative mood states, tend to opt for 
advantageous decision making systematically avoiding disadvantageous risks. 
Fasolo and colleagues showed that participants scoring higher in “openness to 
experience and ability to solve reasoning tasks” proved better strategically oriented 
switching easier their “choice processes in adaptive ways” (2003). Levin and Hart also 
demonstrate that there are some significant research findings which indicate that there 
are substantial “individual differences in reaction to potential gains and losses” in 
simple risk-taking tasks among young children under the age of 5 (2003). The literature, 
with regards to the influence of individual differences in decision making processes, 
seems promising and may prove helpful in explaining the large discrepancies that have 
been observed in descriptive models of economic behaviour, i.e. PT and CPT. 
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The most frequently reported method for assessing decision making under risk in 
behavioural economics has been the measuring, over trials and over time depending on 
the task, of a participant’s willingness to receive or choose a risky prospect whose 
outcome is based on probability instead of choosing an alternative equivalent of a sure 
option. According to this method of assessing risk preferences, a decision agent is risk-
loving when he chooses the risky prospect over the alternative option of a certainty 
equivalent and risk-averse when he opts for the sure option over the risky prospect. 
Prescriptive models such as utility theory state that the decision agent should 
always try to maximize utility even when the option with higher expected utility 
involved a certain risk. However, according to descriptive frameworks of human 
decision making under risk and uncertainty such as prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky; 1979) and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman; 1992) clear 
violations of the axioms of expected utility theory have been observed that highlight the 
natural tendency of human decision agents to rely on a subjective reference point, that 
in theory is usually shaped by past experiences, which will eventually influence their 
final decision and one’s own risk preferences. Prospect theory illustrates that individual 
decision agents seem to be risk-averse in risk-taking domains of gain but risk-loving in 
risk-taking domains of losses (Kahneman & Tversky; 1979). This behaviour cannot be 
explained by the normative assumptions of expected utility theory according to which, 
as Kahneman and Tversky state, the outcome of observed decision making behaviour in 
the negative frame or context “should mirror” decision making behaviour in the positive 
frame or context (1979). 
Lauriola and Levin highlight the importance of investigating the predictive 
validity of personality traits in decision making under risk in controlled experimental 
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tasks (2000). In the studies that follow we sought to investigate the predictive validity of 
individual differences such as personality traits, affective states, and emotional 
intelligence in risk-taking behaviour on instance based decision making in two 
controlled experimental tasks. To our knowledge the research designs of both the study 
concerning the binary choice task (1-A) and the study concerning the binary double 
gamble (1-B), have not been used in previous studies to explore the predictive validity 
of dispositional traits and affective states in decision making under risk and uncertainty. 
With the present studies we aimed to see whether a stable dispositional trait and/or 
reported affective states underlie decision making under risk and uncertainty. The 
studies utilized diverse student samples and the differentiation between the tasks 
allowed controlling for a) different levels of risk in study 1-A and b) for different levels 
of measurable uncertainty in study 1-B. 
 
Hypotheses 
Due to the fact that both studies used the same material, except for the decision 
making tasks, we formulated the following hypotheses. 
H1: “positive affect will be positively correlated with risky behaviour on the 
decision making tasks”. 
H2a: “functional impulsivity will predict advantageous risky decision making, 
i.e. an attempt to achieve or maximize personal gain depending on the choice set 
situation” 
H2b: “dysfunctional impulsivity would predict risk aversive decision making 
that involves no “real” gain, i.e. in a risky choice set situation with a negative payoff” 
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H3: “an overactive BIS, i.e. higher BIS scores, will be positively correlated with 
risk aversive behaviour in the decision making tasks” 
H4a: “individuals scoring high in the fun seeking subscale of BAS would 
exhibit significantly higher risk taking behaviour in the decision making tasks than low 
scoring fun seeking individuals” 
H4b: “we predict that the possibility of prospective rewards will elicit risk 
taking activity, so total BAS scores will be positively correlated with risk taking activity 















STUDY 1-A: Individual Differences and Risk Taking Behaviour in an 
Instance Based Binary Choice Task 
The Task 
The instance based binary choice task (BCT) was a 4 sets short choice-task 
consisting of 16 binary choice gambles of the form “choose between A.) £120 OR B.) a 
60% chance of winning £300” for a total of 64 gambles 
Participants 
64 participants (N = 39 females, N = 25 males) volunteered in return for course 
credit and were recruited from the 1
st
 year undergraduate pool at the University of 
Edinburgh psychology department. Participants’ age ranged from 18 to 31 years of age 
(M = 20.9 years, SD = 3.4). 
Procedure 
Participants initially they agreed to take part in the research and then provided 
their informed consent signing all the relevant forms. They then completed their 
assessments which were carried out individually in one session. Each participant 
completed the personality scales and then the choice task, all on their own pace. Upon 
completing and returning all the study materials the participants were debriefed, had all 
their questions regarding the decision making task and the overall purpose of the study 
answered and were granted course credit for their participation. The research process 
did not take longer than an estimated 35-40 minutes. The participants were also given 
the researchers contact details in order to withdrew from the study so they wished in the 





The following self-report scales, scored according to guidelines, were used for 
assessing dispositional traits, affective states, and emotional intelligence. The short form 
trait emotional intelligence (TEIQueSF) questionnaire (Mean=137.19, SD=17.99, 
α=.79). The emotional regulation (ER) questionnaire (Mean=38.79, SD=9.98, α=.74). 
The Dickman’s Impulsivity Inventory (DII) designed to measure functional impulsivity 
(Mean=32, SD=6.30, α=.73) and dysfunctional impulsivity (Mean=32.21, SD=6.37, 
α=.74). The Positive Affect Negative affect Scales (PANAS), Positive affect 
(Mean=27.95, SD=6.22, α=.70), and Negative Affect (Mean=16.89, SD=5.04, α=.71). 
The Behavioural Inhibition and Behavioural Activation Scales (BIS/BAS), Behavioural 
Inhibition (Mean=15.04, SD=5.1, α=.71), and the BAS subscales Drive (Mean=10.33, 
SD=2.94, α=.71), Fun Seeking (Mean=9.72, SD=2.94, α=.72), Reward Responsiveness 

















   
Study 1-A    
Measure    
 Mean StD α 
BCT 28 15.68 .62 
ER 38.80 9.98 .74 
TEI 137.19 18 .79 
FI 31.90 6.30 .73 
DI 32.21 6.37 .74 
PA 27.95 6.22 .70 
NA 16.90 5.04 .71 
BIS 15.04 5.10 .71 
BAS 29.47 5.59 .70 
BAS DR 10.33 2.94 .71 
BAS FS 9.72 2.94 .72 
BAS RR 9.42 2.50 .73 
______________________________________________________________________ 
BCT=binary choice task, ER=Emotional Regulation TEI=trait emotional intelligence 
questionnaire, FI=functional impulsivity, DI=dysfunctional impulsivity, PA=positive 
affect, NA=negative affect, BIS=behavioral inhibition scale, BAS=behavioral acivation 





In the binary choice task (BCT), the total number of risky options chosen from 
the sixteen items for each set of the task was considered as a measure of participants’ 
risk-taking propensity in the decision making task (see also the task description in 
chapter 5). 
Female participants were found to be less risky choosing on average a lower 
number of risky options than males did (females’ risky choices M = 25.53, SD = 15.71; 
males’ risky choices M = 31.88, SD = 15.13). Here we see that although the risky 
option, which ranged in four different levels of risk, had a significantly larger expected 
utility (regarding the example of the decision making task shown above EUA<EUB, 
however, throughout the decision making task the trials were randomized) than the sure 
option. The participants of this study chose on average 28.01 times the risky option out 
of 64 possible trials over 35.99 times where they opted for the sure option. Therefore, 
43.75% of the times opted for the risky option versus 56.25% of the times where they 
opted for the safe option, thus exhibiting risk aversion. This result is in accord with 
research literature findings concerning descriptive models of decision making under risk 
such as prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman; 1992) 
which have systematically demonstrated that decision making behaviour in the domain 
of gains tends to be risk-aversive. However, although most research findings report 
between 50-50 split options in the form of “choose between A.) £5 OR B.) a 50% 
chance of winning £10” looking into preference reversals the difference in the present 
study was that the risky option always entailed a higher expected utility not a certainty 
equivalent option. The results obtained clearly highlight a violation of the assumptions 
of expected utility. 
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To explore gender differences in risk-taking behaviour, an independent-samples 
t-test was conducted to compare the BCT risky choices for male and female study 
participants. There was no significant difference in scores for males (M = 31.88, SD = 
15.13) and females (M = 25.53, SD = 15.71) t(64) = 1.598, p = .115 (two-tailed). The 
magnitude of the differences in the means (mean difference = 6.34, 95% CI: -1.59 to 
14.27) was very small (eta squared = 0.0028). This is clearly not the case in reported 
literature findings as females tend to be significantly less risky than men (Byrnes et. al. 
1999), however, due to the student sample utilized for our study the results obtained are 
not uncommon. 
Subsequently the total numbers of the BCT risky choice scores were correlated 
with individual scores of the individual differences measures. No significant 
relationship was found between the personality variables of emotional regulation (r = -
.213, p = .090), Trait EI (r = -.208, p = .099), functional impulsivity (r = -.209, p = 
.097), dysfunctional impulsivity (r = .018, p = .890), negative affect (r = -.107, p = 
.399), BAS reward responsiveness (r = .097, p = .445), and behavioural inhibition(r = -
.006, p = .960) and the scores of riskiness in the binary choice task. However, 
significant relationships between positive affect (r = .280, p = .025), bas drive (r = 
.251, p = .046), bas fun (r = .255, p = .042), total BAS (r = .309, p = .013) and the 
number of risky choices in the binary choice task were observed. These results indicate 
that individuals who are high in PA, BAS Drive, BAS Fun-Seeking, and total BAS tend 







Correlations between the binary choice task, personality and affect measures 
(Study A, N=64) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
  
 BCT ER TEI FI DI PA NA BIS BAS  DR FS 
 
ER -.21           
TEI -.21 .53**          
FI -.21 -.04 -.15         
DI .02 -.09 -.06 .14        
PA .28* .11 .08 -.04 .05       
NA -.11 .07 -.11 .03 -.04 .23      
BIS -.01 .43** .44** .05 -.06 -.05 -.09     
BAS .31* .09 -.11 .11 -.02 .10 .02 -.17    
 DR .25* -.01 -.08 .08 -.06 .06 -.08 -.11 .78**   
 FS .26* .01 -.07 -.15 -.06 .18 -.12 -.38** .79** .54**  
 RR .10 .19 -.08 .31* .09 -.06 -.01 -.19 .39** .06 -.05 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)           **.  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
BCT = binary choice task, ER = emotional regulation, TEI = trait emotional intelligence 
questionaire,  FI = functional impulsivity, DI = dysfunctional impulsivity, PA = positive 
affect, NA = negative affect, BIS = behavioural inhibition scale, BAS = behavioural 
inhibition scale, DR = BAS Drive, FS = BAS Fun Seeking, RR = BAS Reward 
Responsiveness 
 
Next, a sequential linear regression was conducted to assess whether individual 
differences variables could capture risk-taking behaviour variance on instance based 
decision making as measured by the binary choice task we employed in this study. More 
specifically, in order to investigate the relationship of individual differences measures to 
the binary choice task scores a sequential multiple regression was employed to assess 
the ability of three controlled measures, a) affect (PANAS), b) personality (BIS/BAS), 
and c) emotional intelligence (TEIQueSF) to predict levels of risk-taking behaviour in 
instance based decision making under risk (BCT), after controlling for the influence of 
age and sex. Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the 
assumptions of normality, linearity, multicolinearity and homoscedasticity. No outliers 
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among the cases have been identified and no cases had missing data. In the sequential 
regression age and sex were entered at Step 1, explaining 4.2%, F (2, 61) = 1.331, p = 
.272, of the variance in risk-taking behaviour. After entry of the positive affect and 
negative affect scales (PANAS) at Step 2 the total variance explained by the model was 
15.8%, F (4, 59) = 2.763, p = .036. Affect explained an additional 11.6% of the variance 
after controlling for age and sex. After entry of the behaviour inhibition and behaviour 
activation scales (BIS/BAS) at Step 3 the total variance explained by the model was 
26.4%, F (6, 57) = 3.401, p = .006. Personality explained an additional 10.6% of the 
variance after controlling for age, sex, and affect. At the final Step, 4, emotional 
intelligence was entered (TEIQueSF) and the total variance explained by the model was 
30.9%, F (7, 56) = 3.58, p = .003. R was significantly different from zero at the end of 
each step. After controlling for age and sex, affect, and personality, emotional 
intelligence accounted for an additional 4.5% of explained variance. The total variance 
explained by the model as a whole was 30.9%, F (7, 56) = 3.58, p = .003. Affect, 
personality, and emotional intelligence explained an additional 26.7% of the variance in 
risk-taking behaviour, after controlling for age and sex. R squared change in total was 
.268. The adjusted R squared value of .223 indicates that approximately a quarter of the 
variability in risk-taking behaviour on the instance based decision making task is 


















  M1   M2   M3   M4  
             
 B SEB β B SEB β B SEB β B SEB β 
             
Age -.22 .58 -.05 -.09 .56 -.02 -.07 .54 -.02 .16 .54 .03 
Sex 6.18 4.02 .19 6.92 3.84 .22 9.76 4.17 .31* 8.74 4.11 .27 
PA    .85 .31 .34** .81 .30 .32** .87 .30 .35 
NA    -.56 .38 -.18 -.60 .37 -.19 -.69 .36 -.22 
BAS       .82 .33 .29** .77 .32 .28 
BIS       -.40 .41 -.13 -.05 .44 -.02 
TEI          -.22 .11 -.25 
             
R.Sq  .04   .16   .26   .31  
A.R.Sq  .01   .10   .19   .22  




PA = positive affect, NA = negative affect, BIS = behavioural inhibition scale, BAS = 

































Model  Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig 
1 Regression 647.873 2 323.936 1.331 .272
a
 
 Residual 14845.112 61 243.362   
 Total 15492.984 63    
2 Regression 2444.531 4 611.133 2.763 .036
b
 
 Residual 13048.453 59 221.160   
 Total 15492.984 63    
3 Regression 4083.935 6 680.656 3.401 .006
c
 
 Residual 11409.050 57 200.159   
 Total 15492.984 63    
4 Regression 4789.702 7 684.243 3.580 .003
d
 
 Residual 10703.283 56 191.130   
 Total 15492.984 63    
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Sex, Age 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Sex, Age, PA, NA 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Sex, Age, PA, NA, BAS, BIS 
d. Predictors: (Constant), Sex, Age, PA, NA, BAS, BIS, TEI 
e. Dependent Variable: BCT 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
PA = positive affect, NA = negative affect, BIS = behavioural inhibition scale, BAS = 







To further analyze the data obtained we calculated the BAS to BIS absolute ratio 
and we divided the participants in three groups (higher, medium, lower) according to 
their BAS to BIS ratios. The ratios were grouped into upper, middle, and lower, 
indicating a greater BAS/BIS ratio, a balanced BAS/BIS ratio, and a greater BIS/BAS 
ratio, to account for the levels of approach/avoidance (expressed in ratios) behaviour in 
each individual. A one-way between groups analysis of covariance of the three 
BAS/BIS ratio groups on the BCT risk-taking behaviour, controlling for PA and NA 
scores. The particular statistic technique was chosen to compare the ability of two 
individual differences measures to predict risk-taking behaviour on the instance based 
decision making task (BCT). Preliminary checks were conducted to ensure that there 
was no violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity, homogeneity of variances, 
homogeneity of regression slopes, and reliable measure of the covariates. 
There was no significant difference between the three BAS to BIS ratio groups 
and risk-taking behaviour on the binary choice task, F (2, 59) = 2.505, p = .090, partial 
eta squared = .078. The results obtained indicate that the three BAS/BIS ratio groups 
did not differ significantly exhibiting no different risk-taking behaviour on the instance 


















Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent Variable: BCT(score) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source Type III SS Df Mean Square F Sig Partial η Sq 
Corrected Model 2777.103
a
 4 694.276 3.221 .019 .179 
Intercept 138.520 1 138.520 .643 .426 .011 
PA 1878.725 1 1878.725 8.717 .005 .129 
NA 601.428 1 601.428 2.791 .100 .045 
BBR112233 1079.723 2 539.861 2.505 .090 .078 
Error 12715.881 59 215.523    
Total 65725.000 64     
Corrected Total 15492.984 63     
______________________________________________________________________ 

















STUDY 1-B _ Individual Differences and Risk Taking Behaviour in an 
Instance Based Double Gamble Binary Choice Task 
 
The Task 
The double gamble binary choice task was, adopted from Everitt and colleagues 
(1999), a four versions short choice-task consisting of 16 binary choice double gambles 
of the form “choose between A.) 95% chance of winning £100 OR B.) 20% chance of 
winning £600”. 
 
Differences in the Risk-Taking measures 
The essential difference between the studies 1-A and 1-B was the risk-taking 
behaviour measure. The study 1-A task presented the individual with a certain win 
option and an option whose outcome was subject to probability in a forced choice task. 
The Study 1-B task presented the individual with two gambles, i.e. the outcome of both 
options was based on probability. One option in task 1-B was a relatively “safe” gamble 
with a high probability of occurrence and a low prospect whereas the alternative option 
was a risky gamble with a low probability of occurrence and a high prospect. The 




68 participants (N = 46 females, N = 22 males) volunteered in return for course 
credit and were recruited from the 1
st
 year undergraduate pool at the University of 
Edinburgh psychology department and volunteer postgraduate students from the 
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University of Edinburgh community. Participants’ age ranged from 18 to 31 years of 
age (M = 23.8 years, SD = 4.1). Participants were not prevented from taking part in 
both studies. therefore, since we recruited participants from the 1
st
 year undergraduate 
pool at the University of Edinburgh psychology department some participants may have 
participated in both studies 1-A and 1-B. 
 
Procedure 
Participants initially agreed to take part in the research and then provided their 
informed consent signing all the relevant forms. They then completed their assessments 
which were carried out individually in one session. Participants completed the 
personality scales and then the choice task, all on their own pace. Upon completing and 
returning all the study materials the participants were debriefed, had all their questions 
regarding the decision making task and the overall purpose of the study answered and 
were granted course credit for their participation. The research process did not take 
longer than an estimated 35-40 minutes. The participants were also given the 
researchers contact details in order to withdrew from the study so they wished in the 
near future (a time window of two weeks was allowed before the data were entered). 
 
Results 
The following self-report scales, scored according to guidelines, were employed 
to assess individual differences in personality, affective states, and emotional 
intelligence. The short form trait emotional intelligence (TEIQueSF) questionnaire 
(Mean=141.35, SD=15.56, α=.74). The emotional regulation (ER) questionnaire 
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(Mean=37.44, SD=7.72, α=.70). The Dickman’s Impulsivity Inventory (DII) designed 
to measure functional impulsivity (Mean=32.34, SD=5.81, α=.71) and dysfunctional 
impulsivity (Mean=31.85, SD=6.04, α=.70). The Positive Affect Negative affect Scales 
(PANAS), Positive affect (Mean=25.59, SD=6.32, α=.70), and Negative Affect 
(Mean=14.21, SD=3.77, α=.73). The Behavioural Inhibition and Behavioural Activation 
Scales (BIS/BAS), Behavioural Inhibition (Mean=15.16, SD=3.79, α=.69), and the BAS 
subscales Drive (Mean=10.40, SD=2.73, α=.73), Fun Seeking (Mean=9.18, SD=2.75, 
α=.72), Reward Responsiveness (Mean=9.22, SD=2.17, α=.70), and total Behavioural 
























Study 1-B    
Measure    
 Mean StD α 
pApB 28.60 15.36 .56 
ER 37.44 7.72 .74 
TEI 141.35 15.56 .79 
FI 32.34 5.81 .71 
DI 31.85 6.04 .70 
PA 25.60 6.32 .70 
NA 14.21 3.77 .74 
BIS 15.16 3.80 .69 
BAS 28.80 4.57 .63 
BAS DR 10.40 2.73 .73 
BAS FS 9.18 2.75 .72 
BAS RR 9.22 2.17 .70 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
pApB=double gamble binary choice task, ER=Emotional Regulation, TEI=trait 
emotional intelligence questionnaire, FI=functional impulsivity, DI=dysfunctional 
impulsivity, PA=positive affect, NA=negative affect, BIS=behavioral inhibition scale, 
BAS=behavioral acivation scale, BAS DR= BAS Drive, BAS FS= BAS Fun Seeking, 
BAS RR= BAS Reward Responsiveness 
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In the double gamble binary choice task (pApB), the total number of risky 
gamble options chosen from the sixteen items for each set of the task was considered as 
a measure of participants’ risk-taking propensity in the decision making task (see also 
the task description in chapter 5). 
Female participants were found to be less risky choosing on average less risky 
options than males did (females’ risky choices M = 27.17, STD = 14.27; males’ risky 
choices M = 31.59, STD = 17.38). From the results obtained in this study (1-B) a 
pattern, with regards to risky preferences, similar to that we encountered in study 1-A 
emerges. In this study as well, on average, opted for the less risky, i.e. “safer”, option. 
The risky option in study 1-B, like in study 1-A, ranged in four different levels of risk, 
and had a slightly larger expected utility (regarding the example of the decision making 
task shown above EUA<EUB, however, throughout the decision making task the trials 
were randomized) than the less risky, “safer”, option. 
The participants in study 1-B chose on average 28.60 times the risky option out 
of 64 possible trials over 35.40 times where the participants opted for the less risky, i.e. 
“safer”, option. Therefore, 44.69% of the times opted for the risky option versus 
55.31% of the times where the participants opted for the less risky option, thus 
exhibiting risk aversion. The results from both studies 1-A and 1-B are in accord with 
research literature findings concerning descriptive models of decision making under risk 
such as prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman; 1992) 
which have systematically demonstrated that risk-taking behaviour in the domain of 
gains tends to be aversive to risks. 
As we also mentioned in the results section of the previous study, although most 
research findings report between 50-50 split options in the form of “choose between A.) 
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£5 OR B.) a 50% chance of winning £10” looking into preference reversals the 
difference in studies 1-A and 1-B was that the risky option always entailed a higher 
expected utility not a certainty equivalent option. Intuitively, if people engage 
mathematic skills to calculate prospects as the literature reports most of the participants 
should have opted for the risky instead of the safe options. Therefore, the results 
obtained in both studies 1-A and 1-B clearly highlight violations of the assumptions of 
expected utility and b) indicate that people may not cognitively engage arithmetic skills 
when the take instance based decisions. We will further elaborate on the research 
implications with regards to the findings on the discussion section. 
To explore gender differences in risk-taking behaviour, an independent-samples 
t-test was conducted to compare the pApB risky choices for males and females. There 
was no significant difference in scores for males (M = 31.59, STD = 17.38) and females 
(M = 27.17, STD = 14.27) t(68) = -1.111, p = .270 (two-tailed). The magnitude of the 
differences in the means (mean difference = -4.41, 95% CI: -12.35 to 3.51) was very 
small (eta squared = 0.0015). Literature findings indicate that males are 
disproportionately riskier than females on a range on decision making tasks and 
contexts (Byrnes et. al. 1999). In this study we did not obtain significant differences in 
risk-taking behaviour among males and females and the result could be due to the 
student sample utilized. 
Subsequently the pApB risky choice scores were correlated with individual 
scores of the personality constructs. No significant relationship was found between the 
personality variables of emotional regulation (r = -.198, p = .105), Trait EI (r = -.222, p 
= .069), functional impulsivity (r = - .125, p = .311), dysfunctional impulsivity (r = - 
.135, p = .273), negative affect (r = .174, p = .155), BAS drive (r = .220, p = .071), 
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BAS reward responsiveness (r = .084, p = .497), behavioural inhibition (r = -.119, p = 
.335) and the overall scores of riskiness in the pApB double gamble task. However, 
significant relationships between positive affect (r = .243, p = .046.), bas fun (r = .251, 
p = .039), total BAS (r = .322, p = .007.) and the number of risky choices in the binary 
choice double gamble task were observed. These results indicate that individuals who 
are high in PA and BAS Fun-Seeking tend to be riskier in instance based decision 




Correlations between the binary choice double gamble task, personality and affective states  
measures (Study B, N=68) 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 pApB ER TEI FI DI PA NA BIS BAS  DR FS 
 
ER -.20           
TEI -.22 .33**          
FI -.13 -.01 .02         
DI -.14 .01 -.14 .22        
PA .24* .05 .08 -.01 -.07       
NA -.09 -.21 -.09 .13 .24* .15      
BIS -.12 .33** .31* -.04 -.01 .03 -.06     
BAS .32* -.03 -.13 -.01 -.11 .30* -.12 -.21    
 DR .22* -.03 -.05 .01 -.11 .34** -.03 -.20 .76**   
 FS .25* -.05 -.25* -.18 -.18 .15 -.18 -.21 .65** .28*  
 RR .08 .20 -.09 .19 .14 .02 .01 -.07 .32** -.01 .25* 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)           **.  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
pApB  = binary choice double gamble task (i.e. offering two risky prospects instead of 
one sure option and one risky option as was the case in study A), FI = functional 
impulsivity, DI = dysfunctional impulsivity, PA = positive affect, NA = negative affect, 
BIS = behavioural inhibition scale, BAS = behavioural inhibition scale, BAS Dr = BAS 
drive, BAS Fs = BAS fun seeking, BAS RR = BAS reward responsiveness 
 
Next, a sequential linear regression was employed to assess whether individual 
differences variables captured risk-taking behaviour variation on instance based 
decision making as measured by the binary choice double gamble task we employed in 
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this study. More specifically, a sequential multiple regression was employed to assessed 
the ability of three controlled measures, a) affect (PANAS), b) personality (BIS/BAS), 
and c) emotional intelligence (TEIQueSF) to predict levels of risk-taking behaviour in 
instance based decision making under risk (pApB), after controlling for the influence of 
age and sex. Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the 
assumptions of normality, linearity, multicolinearity and homoscedasticity. No outliers 
among the cases were identified and no cases had missing data. In the sequential 
regression age and sex were entered at Step 1, explaining 2.1%, F (2, 65) = .712, p = 
.495, of the variance in risk-taking behaviour. After entry of the positive affect and 
negative affect scales (PANAS) at Step 2 the total variance explained by the model was 
8.9%, F (4, 63) = 1.530, p = .204. Affect explained an additional 6.8% of the variance 
after controlling for age and sex. After entry of the behaviour inhibition and behaviour 
activation scales (BIS/BAS) at Step 3 the total variance explained by the model was 
16.5%, F (6, 61) = 2.012, p = .048. Personality explained an additional 7.6% of the 
variance after controlling for age, sex, and affect. At the final Step, 4, emotional 
intelligence was entered (TEIQueSF) and the total variance explained by the model was 
20.8%, F (7, 60) = 2.253, p = .042. R was not significantly different from zero at the end 
of the three first steps but was significantly different from zero at the fourth step. After 
controlling for age and sex, affect, and personality, emotional intelligence accounted for 
an additional 4.3% of explained variance. The total variance explained by the model as 
a whole was 20.8%, F (7, 60) = 2.253, p = .042. Affect, personality, and emotional 
intelligence explained an additional 18.7% of the variance in risk-taking behaviour, 
after controlling for age and sex. R squared change in total was .043. The adjusted R 
squared value of .116 indicates that approximately 12% of the variability in risk-taking 
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Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Risk-Taking Behaviour 
(N=68) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
  M1   M2   M3   M4  
             
 B SEB β B SEB β B SEB β B SEB β 
             
Age -.21 .47 -.06 -.05 .48 .01 -.08 .47 -.02 -.43 .50 -.12 
Sex 3.98 4.11 .12 3.94 4.04 .12 5.40 4.17 .17 4.61 4.12 .14 
PA    .63 .31 .26 .43 .32 .18* .41 .32 .17* 
NA    -.50 .50 -.12 -.36 .50 -.09 -.26 .49 -.06 
BAS       .78 .44 .23 .75 .43 .22 
BIS       -.56 .52 -.14 -.26 .54 -.06 
TEI          -.24 .13 -.24 
             
R.Sq  .02   .09   .17   .21  
A.R.Sq  -.01   .03   .08   .12  
F.ch.R.Sq  .71   1.53   2.01*   2.25*  
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 

























Model  Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig 
1 Regression 








   
2 Regression 








   
3 Regression 








   
4 Regression 








   
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Sex, Age 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Sex, Age, PA, NA 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Sex, Age, PA, NA, BAS, BIS 
d. Predictors: (Constant), Sex, Age, PA, NA, BAS, BIS, TEI 
e. Dependent Variable: BCT 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
PA = positive affect, NA = negative affect, BIS = behavioural inhibition scale, BAS = 
behavioural inhibition scale, TEI = trait emotional intelligence, pApB  = binary choice 




To further analyze the data obtained we calculated the BAS to BIS absolute ratio 
and we divided the participants in three groups (higher, medium, lower) according to 
their BAS to BIS ratios. The ratios were grouped into upper, middle, and lower, 
indicating a greater BAS/BIS ratio, a balanced BAS/BIS ratio, and a greater BIS/BAS 
ratio, to account for the levels of approach/avoidance (expressed in ratios) behaviour in 
each individual. A one-way between groups analysis of covariance of the three 
BAS/BIS ratio groups on the BCT risk-taking behaviour, controlling for PA and NA 
scores. The particular statistic technique was chosen to compare the ability of two 
individual differences measures to predict risk-taking behaviour on the instance based 
decision making task (pApB). 
Preliminary checks were conducted to ensure that there was no violation of the 
assumptions of normality, linearity, homogeneity of variances, homogeneity of 
regression slopes, and reliable measure of the covariate. There was no significant 
difference between the three BAS to BIS ratio groups and risk-taking behaviour on the 
binary choice task, F (2, 63) = .646, p = .528, partial eta squared = .020. The results 
obtained indicate that individuals who had a relative balance between the BAS and BIS, 
individuals with higher BIS to BAS ratio, and individuals with a higher BAS to BIS 
ratio did not exhibit any significantly different risk-taking behaviour on the instance 














Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent Variable: BCT(score) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source Type III SS Df Mean Square F Sig Partial η Sq 
Corrected Model 1471.797
a
 4 367.949 1.617 .181 .093 
Intercept 616.948 1 616.948 2.712 .105 .041 
PA 1024.558 1 1024.558 4.504 .038 .067 
NA 213.591 1 213.591 .939 .336 .015 
BBR112233 293.980 2 146.990 .646 .528 .020 
Error 14332.483 63 227.500    
Total 71437.000 68     
Corrected Total 15804.279 67     
______________________________________________________________________ 


















Risk-taking behaviour in modern society is apparent and such behavior 
manifests through engagement in everyday social activities such as gambling, extreme 
sports, smoking, alcohol drinking, substance abuse, engaging in unprotected sex, etc. 
and may be due to the complex interplay of a set of factors, among others, such as 
genetic endowment, individual personality traits, cognitive ability, and affective states. 
Traditional decision-making theories relying on the rationality assumption, i.e. every 
human being is a rational decision agent, do not provide adequate explanatory power 
and descriptive validity and have failed to predict risk taking behaviour. The present 
studies utilized simple instance based decision making tasks to assess individuals’ risk-
taking behaviour and the results obtained favoured the descriptive model of prospect 
theory. There are two major categories that were thought to be addressed by this study. 
Namely the aim of the present studies were as follows:  A) to provide experimental 
evidence regarding the influence of affect and personality traits on shifts of preference 
concerned with the consistency of risk-taking behaviour in instance based monetary 
decision making tasks and B) to identify personality correlates of financial decision 
making under risk and uncertainty. 
 
Part 1: Sex Differences & their Associations with Risky Decision Making 
Gender has been repeatedly shown to be associated with risk-taking behaviour. 
However, the literature on sex differences in risk-taking behaviour has unfolded in two 
major ways. First, a substantial body of research emphasizes the fact that there are 
significant sex differences in risk-taking behaviour (Byrnes et. al 1999). Second, an 
important number of studies emphasize underlying psychological factors that would 
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mediate or explain why female participants are more risk-averse than male participants 
(Pawloswski et. al. 2008; Hibbert et. al. 2008; Harris & Jenkins, 2006). 
A large body of research findings indicate a rather strong relationship between 
sex differences and risky behaviour, namely that males are significantly riskier than 
females (Byrnes et. al. 1999). In both studies no significant differences were observed 
in risk-taking behaviour between male and female participants. Although the literature 
is in favour of sex differences in risk-taking behaviour there is a growing number of 
research findings have failed to report any significant sex differences in risk taking 
behaviour (Riley & Chow, 1992). Meier and Masters (1988) report no significant 
differences in risk taking behaviour between male and female managers and 
entrepreneurs. A large scale study by Hibbert and colleagues (2008) that examined sex 
differences in risk-taking behaviour controlling for level of education and finance 
knowledge shows that women are no more risk averse, as they are usually portrayed in 
research findings, than men. These research findings explain that when research 
subjects have the same education level regardless their knowledge of finance, male 
participants were no more risk seeking than female participants (Hibbert et. al. 2008). 
Both of the studies presented here utilized 1
st
 year undergraduate psychology students. 
This means that virtually almost all of the students had the same level of education and 
this could, in part, explain why no significant sex differences were observed in risk-
taking behaviour. 
 
Part 2: Affective States & their Relationship with Risky Decision Making 
The present study offered additional support for a consistent relationship 
among natural variations in affective states and risk-taking behaviour on instance based 
172 
 
decision making tasks. Particularly in both studies risk-taking behaviour was positively 
correlated with positive affect: study 1-A positive affect was positively correlated with 
risk-taking behaviour on the binary choice task (r = .280, p = .025), and in study 1-B 
positive affect was positively correlated with risk-taking behaviour on the binary choice 
double gamble task (r = .243, p = .046.). 
 Previous studies have reported similar results, yet with highly complex 
interactions in controlled tasks, associating induced affective states with risk-taking 
behaviour and strategic decision making (Moore & Chater, 2003; Arkes et. al. 1988; 
Isen & Geva, 1987; Isen & Patrick, 1983; Isen et. al. 1988; Nygren & Ashby, 1988; 
Nygren et. al. 1996). According to Isen and colleagues there is not a clear cut 
relationship between affect and risk due to the fact that under some conditions positive 
affect promotes risk-taking behaviour whereas other research findings indicate that 
positive affect facilitates strategic decision making through avoiding exposure to risk. 
Although researchers have showed that individuals who score higher on positive affect 
tend to distinguish and evaluate more thoroughly the parameters upon which they will 
base their decisions in order to minimize loss (Isen & Geva 1987; Nygren et. al. 1996), 
there is sufficient evidence that indicate the presence of simpler patterns and 
associations between affect and risk taking behaviour (Isen & Patrick, 1983; Moore & 
Chater, 2003). 
In both studies presented here we chose to measure natural variations of 
individual’s affective states with the positive affect and negative affect scales (PANAS) 
and assess risk taking behaviour with simple binary choice tasks. Results from both 
studies indicate the individuals who scored higher on the positive affect scale were more 
likely to engage in risk-taking behaviour on the instance based decision making tasks. 
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Both studies involved hypothetical risk-taking behaviour in two diverse instance based 
risk-taking tasks, results showed that in general participants who were higher on 
positive affect were more willing to take a risk highlighting the influence of positive 
feelings in realistic risk-taking behaviour. 
 
Part 3: Associations between Dispositional Traits and Risky Decision Making 
 Both studies discussed here utilized Dickman’s theory of impulsivity and 
Gray’s reinforcement sensitivity theory as this is explained by the approach/avoidance 
(BAS/BIS) systems. We sought to offer additional support to the idea that there may be 
underlying personality traits associated with risky decision making in general and 
instance based decision making in particular. The results obtained from both studies 
support the hypothesis which states that there are associations and potential causal links 
between BAS and BIS predispositions and individual risk-taking behaviour on the 
instance based decision making tasks. 
In study 1-A there were significant positive correlations between bas drive (r = 
.251, p = .046), bas fun (r = .255, p = .042), total BAS (r = .309, p = .013) and the 
number of risky choices on the instance based binary choice task and in study 1-B there 
were significant positive correlations between bas drive (r = .251, p = .046), bas fun (r 
= .251, p = .039), total BAS (r = .322, p = .007.) and the number of risky choices on 
the instance based binary choice double gamble task. No significant associations were 
observed between the functional and dysfunctional impulsivity scales and risk-taking 
behaviour on the instance based decision making tasks. These results indicate that A) 
individuals who are high in BAS Drive, BAS Fun-Seeking, and total BAS tend to be 
riskier in instance based decision making involving monetary incentives, and B) 
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contrary to previous studies that have reported significant relationships between 
impulsivity and risk-taking behaviour, we did not observe any significant relationship 
between impulsivity and risk-taking behaviour. 
Impulsivity has been implicated in various forms of social risk taking 
behaviour (Fuentes et al. 2006; Clarke et al 2006; Derevensky et. al. 2004; MacDaniel 
& Zuckerman, 2003; Hollander & Rosen, 2000), however, research results on some 
occasions have been conflicting (e.g. Dannon et. al. 2010) and a general consensus has 
not yet been achieved as to whether impulsivity may be regarded as an accurate 
predictor of socially risk-taking behaviour. 
The research literature suggests that individuals who score high on impulsivity 
tend to have a preference for specific social context risk-taking behaviour, i.e. they are 
domain specific risk-takers. Domain specific risk taking behaviour, following 
Zuckerman’s rationale regarding impulsive sensation seeking that encompasses a 
“willingness to take risks” (Zuckerman, p. 62, 1994), could possibly drive preferences 
for external stimulation in the form of risk-taking in order to adjust for the perceived 
stimulation imbalance from a sensation seeker’s point of view—i.e. risk-taking acts as 
the stimulant. Regarding the present studies we have predicted a possible relationship 
between impulsivity and risk taking. More specifically we predicted that “functional 
impulsivity will predict advantageous risky decision making, i.e. an attempt to achieve 
or maximize personal gain depending on the choice set situation” whereas 
“dysfunctional impulsivity would predict risk aversive decision making that involves no 
“real” gain, i.e. in a risky choice set situation with a negative payoff”. We also expected 
that the absence of no “real” gain, i.e. with a negative payoff, options in a risky choice 
set we would expect the decision maker to opt for either low value risks, i.e. risks that 
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could be classified as risks not worth taking. Functional impulsivity has been associated 
with impulsive decision making in the balloon risk-taking task (Vigil-Colet, 2007) but 
has not been widely used. Therefore, our aim was to explore any possible relationships 
of functional and dysfunctional impulsivity with risk-taking behaviour on instance 
based decision making tasks. Although there is an important distinction between the 
instance based decision making tasks we used and the balloon risk-taking analog task 
that warrants further investigations with regards to whether functional and dysfunctional 
impulsivity are related to risk-taking behaviour. The distinction is that the tasks we 
employed were not performed under any time constraints and the participants were free 
to spend their time and weigh their decisions whereas in the risk taking balloon analog 
task there is a repetitive quasi compulsive behaviour involved (while the participant 
clicks a button on the pc the balloon on the screen inflates and with every click the 
participant wins some pennies but the balloon may explode without warning in an 
unpredictable fashion, the participant is free to claim the pennies before the balloon 
explodes but if it does the money zeros and the participant restarts blowing the next 
balloon by clicking the button from start) that leaves little room for decision assessment 
and the participant’s behaviour can be erratic—“heaven” from “hell” is just one click 
away. 
The results obtained in the present studies indicate that risk-taking behaviour 
on instance based decision making is associated with BAS tendencies but it is not 
possible to infer whether BAS tendencies cause risk-taking behaviour. However, the 
rationale for the present studies was to investigate whether aspects of “reward 
sensitivity” and “punishment sensitivity”, as reflected in core neuroanatomical brain 
circuits regulating approach/avoidance behaviour, could predict risk-taking behaviour 
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that has been shown to be directly related with specific brain mechanisms that explain 
behaviour related to incentives and rewards. It was a first attempt to establish some 
associations between the reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST) of personality and 
prospect theories. In RST omissions and terminations of expected rewards are coded as 
impending punishment whereas prospective rewards are coded as reinforcing stimuli 
(Corr, 2008). Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory (PT) and cumulative prospect 
theory (CPT) showed that losses loom significantly larger than gains and subsequent 
research illustrated that prospective losses differentiate from prospective wins by a 
factor of at least 2, i.e. a prospective loss will hurt twice as much as prospective wins 
will satisfy (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman; Novemsky & 
Kahneman, 2005; Ariely et. al 2005). This results in, both aggregate and within 
subjects, preference reversals in risky choice decision making, i.e. the decision maker 
will will express aversive behaviour to risks when choosing within a gains domain and 
risk seeking behaviour when choosing within a losses domain. Expected utility theory 
(EUT) postulates that the utilities of uncertain outcomes derive from their probabilities 
but utility itself is perceived as independent to probability (Varian, 2005). However, 
observations of economic behavior have systematically proven this axiomatic 
assumptions to be fundamentally incorrect in several experimental findings (Kahneman, 
2002; Rabin & Thaler, 2001; Rabin, 2000 a & b) because decision weights do not obey 
any formal rules deriving from subjective probability, but instead individual “decision 
weights are inferred from choices between prospects” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979. So 
we investigated whether individual decision weights with regards to risk-taking 
behavior on the instance based decision making tasks could be predicted by individual 
differences between the approach and avoidance tendencies underlying RST. Utilizing 
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Carver and White’s (1994) BAS/BIS measures we hypothesized that higher BAS will 
predict risk-seeking (approach behavior), i.e. reward sensitivity, and a higher BIS will 
predict risk-aversion (avoidant behavior), i.e. punishment sensitivity. The results 
revealed small but significant correlations between BAS tendencies and risk-seeking 
behavior but no significant associations between BIS and risk-aversive behavior. This 
means that individual differences between approach behaviour predicted individual 
preferences in risk-taking behaviour. 
The sequential regression analyses for both studies 1-A and 1-B yielded 
significant regression equations. We calculated these regression equations to evaluate 
how variance in our instance based decision making tasks was accounted for by by 
individual differences in affect, personality, and trait EI. In study 1-A results showed 
that affect, personality, and trait EI explained 22.3% (adjusted R squared) of the risk-
taking variance in a statistically significant equation (R=.556, R squared=.31, adjusted 
R squared .223, F(7,56)=3,58; P<0.01). In study 1-B results showed that affect, 
personality, and trait EI explained 11.6% (adjusted R squared) of the risk-taking 
variance in a statistically significant equation (R=.456, R squared= .208, adjusted R 
squared= .116, F(7,60)=3,58; P<0.05). We opted to also report the adjusted R square 
values due to the size of our samples. In both sequential regression analyses higher 
priority was given to demographics (step 1) and lower priority was given to affect (step 
2), followed by BAS/BIS tendencies (step 3), and finally by trait EI (step 4) to 
investigate whether affect, personality and trait EI add specific variance beyond what 
they share with demographics. Therefore, the linear combination of demographics, 
affect, personality, and trait EI explained a significant amount of variance in risk-taking 
behaviour when the goal is to maximize gains. As a whole, the sequential regression 
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equations from both studies support the hypothesis that a combination of individual 
differences, such as affect, BAS/BIS personality tendencies, and trait EI predict 
individual preferences in risk-taking behaviour, involving both prospective rewards and 
punishments, when the goal is to maximize gains. 
The BAS to BIS absolute ratios obtained divided the participants in three groups 
(higher, medium, lower) according to their BAS to BIS ratios. The ratios were grouped 
into upper, middle, and lower, indicating a greater BAS/BIS ratio, a balanced BAS/BIS 
ratio, and a greater BIS/BAS ratio, to account for the levels of approach/avoidance 
(expressed in ratios) behaviour in each individual. A one-way between groups analysis 
of covariance of the three BAS/BIS ratio groups on the BCT risk-taking behaviour, 
controlling for PA and NA scores. The particular statistic technique was chosen to 
compare the ability of two individual differences measures to predict risk-taking 
behaviour on the instance based decision making tasks (BCT & pApB). The results 
obtained indicate that individuals who had a relative balance between the BAS and BIS, 
individuals with higher BIS to BAS ratio, and individuals with a higher BAS to BIS 
ratio did not exhibit any significantly different risk-taking behaviour on the instance 
based binary choice double gamble task. Although due to our small samples the higher 
BIS to BAS ratio group was largely unrepresented accounting for less than 5% of the 
total cases. According to our hypothesis that higher BAS traits should predict risk-
taking behaviour when the goal is to maximize gains we would expect to see individuals 
who exhibit high BAS traits to experience high sensitivity to prospective rewards, i.e. 
significant risk-seeking. However, our results did not confirm the prediction that the 








The foundation of the cognitive heuristics approach is hard lined on the ER 
principle which postulates that heuristics should be conceptualized as simple and 
adaptive decision making strategies that exploit and benefit from their natural 
environment. From a Darwinian perspective, an evaluation of their universality is 
needed in order to consider them as potential and plausible candidates of decision 
making strategy optimization. Principles of evolution suggest that if simple heuristics or 
other equally simple rules of thumb were to be observed across species then their 
universal character would be difficult to challenge (Hutchinson & Gigerenzer, 2005). 
Hutchinson and Gigerenzer collected a number of simple heuristics observed in human 
behaviour and compared and contrasted them with simple rules of thumb observed in 
lower species and particularly social insects such as ants, bees, wasps, etc. showcasing 
in this way the ecological validity of the adoptive toolbox cognitive heuristics (2005). 
According to Hutchinson and Gigerenzer these observations do not warrant a universal 
acceptance of heuristics and rules of thumb across species, however, it is a strong 
indication that this is the case. 
Although, rules of thumb in social insects and other lower species is an 
established field of research the simple heuristics from an evolutionary approach is a 
rather new field of research lacking conclusive evidence regarding the internal and 
external validity of the cognitive heuristics paradigm. Gigerenzer and colleagues argue 
that adherence to these simple rules of thumb actually makes humans simply “smart”, 
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relying on fast and frugal strategies that “save” time and effort, and furthermore explain 
how human decision agents cope with their environment, process and evaluate 
asymmetric loads of information in limited time and with minimum computational 
capacity (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Gigerenzer & Todd, 2000). 
The recognition heuristic (RH) is an optimal statistical like procedure, like all 
simple heuristics, indicating that decisions rely on recognition in a non-compensatory 
manner which suggests that the first significant cue (recognition in this case) is 
sufficient to base a decision. According to the RH, the decision agent chooses “a 
recognized object more than an unrecognized one whenever recognition is related to the 
criterion” (Pohl 2006). The strongest claim of the RH model is that decisions are 
affected by recognition to such an extent that the decision agent ignores any further 
information, i.e. the decision assessment is non-compensatory, that he may possess 
regarding the choice dilemma. The RH is usually implicated in binary choice dilemmas 
where the decision agent is required to infer among the options available resorting to 
recognition, i.e. making inferences from memory, thus unavoidably, the decision 
agent’s recognition memory is involved in the decision making process. 
The relationship among RH and memory may be more straightforward in the 
following example illustrated by Goldstein and Gigerenzer “consider the task of 
inferring which of two objects has a higher value on some criterion (e.g., which is 
faster, higher, stronger). The recognition heuristic for such tasks is simply stated “if one 
of two objects is recognized and the other is not, then infer that the recognized object 
has the higher value” (1999). Based on this straightforward proposal the RH is basically 
an assertion that the “inference can be made merely on the basis of the presence or 
absence of information in memory” (Tomlinson et. al. 2011). Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 
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argue that the RH model is an optimization decision strategy that differentiates from 
other related decision concepts such as notions of “availability” and “fluency” (1996, 
2002). The distinguishing elements that differentiate the RH model from other related 
concepts are a) the processing and evaluation of the available information as a dual-
choice system, i.e. in a “binary” manner, and b) the “inconsequentiality” of any related 
knowledge, i.e. to ignore the knowledge, taking into account the decision making factor, 
which in this case is recognition, on which the inference will be based (Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer, 1996; 2002). 
The RH model, Goldstein and Gigerenzer argue, is beyond doubt the “most 
frugal of all heuristics” because it “makes inferences from patterns of missing 
knowledge” and “exploits a fundamental adaptation of many organisms: the vast, 
sensitive, and reliable capacity for recognition” (2002). The RH utilizes the notion of 
recognition, a core cognitive ability of the human brain, “in order to make inferences 
about unknown quantities in the world” (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011). Gigerenzer 
and Goldstein, recently reviewed and evaluated a decade’s worth of research regarding 
the RH model and concluded that up to present time there have been generated 
sufficient evidence which show that a) “the recognition heuristic predicts the inferences 
of a substantial proportion of individuals consistently, even in the presence of one or 
more contradicting cues”, b) “people are adapting decision makers in that accordance 
increases with larger recognition validity and decreases in situations where the validity 
is low or wholly indeterminable”, and c) “in the presence of contradicting cues, some 
individuals appear to select different strategies” implying that there is potential 
explanatory power that could be explained by individual differences (2011). 
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Although there has been an extensive debate (see chapter 3 for a discussion) 
with regards to the characteristics and the defining functionality of the RH as decision 
making optimization strategy, both advocates and “critiques of the RH have recently 
concluded that there are individual differences in adherence to the RH” (Hillbig, 2008a) 
use that must be investigated in order to be able to evaluate and conclude whether the 
RH is a) a non compensatory mechanism, and b) qualifies as an optimization decision 
making strategy (Pachur et. al 2008; Hillbig, 2008a). 
The RH has not been extensively studied to see if it allows for any individual 
differences to determine or predict peoples’ adherence to its use. Pachur and colleagues, 
Hillbig reports, argue that there is substantial individual differences variation that could 
potentially account for “adherence to RH” use that must be further examined in a 
systematic manner (Pachur et. al. 2008, Op. Cit. Hillbig et. al. 2008a). Hillbig in an 
attempt to follow up along these lines examined potential relationships of the big five 
personality constructs with peoples’ adherence to RH use. Neuroticism is reported to be 
negatively related with peoples’ adherence to RH use while the rest of the big five were 
not associated with adherence to RH use. In order to further test whether individual 
differences can determine RH use we examined relationships between RH use and 
individual differences variables of affect, impulsivity, trait EI, and the BAS/BIS scales. 
 
Hypotheses 
Ha: we hypothesized that “adherence to the RH use will be negatively correlated 
with BIS scores” and 
Hb: we hypothesized that “adherence to the RH use will be positively correlated 




The decision making task for this study was an ignorance based decision making 
task, i.e. the classic city size task, that has been designed to evaluate between users and 
non users of a fast and frugal decision making strategy, i.e. the recognition heuristic (see 
chapter 5 for full description). 
Participants 
73 participants (N = 44 females, N = 29 males) volunteered in return for course 
credit and were recruited from the 1
st
 year undergraduate pool at the University of 
Edinburgh psychology department. Participants’ age ranged from 18 to 30 years of age 
(M = 19.6 years, SD = 2.1). Again it should be noted here that an overlap in the sample 
may have happened due to the fact that paticipants were not prevented from taking part 
in more than one study. Therefore since we recruited from the 1
st
 year undergraduate 
pool at the University of Edinburgh psychology department some undergraduate 
participants may have participated in more than one studies. 
Procedure 
Participants initially agreed to take part in the research and then provided their 
informed consent signing all the relevant forms. They then completed their assessments 
that were presented to them individually in one session. They were first presented with 
the 1st part of the classical city size task; on a two page questionnaire including all 55 
pairs of cities presented in randomly (following Hillbig’s instructions, Hillbig, 2008a). 
Each participant was requested to indicate for each binary trial what city had the 
greatest number of residents. Subsequently the participants were requested to complete 
the personality scales on their own pace. At the end the participants in an additional 
form were requested to choose between the 11 cities, which were presented in 
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alphabetical order if they had heard of it or identified the city’s name and, if this was the 
case, substantially identified (had visited the city), had heard of it (TV or other mass 
media source in general) or had any relevant information about it through friends, 
associates, media, etc. (Pohl, 2006). Upon completing and returning all the study 
materials the participants were debriefed, had all their questions regarding the instance 
based decision making task and the overall purpose of the study answered and were 
granted course credit for their participation. The research process did not take longer 
than an estimated 35-40 minutes. The participants were also given the researchers 
contact details in order to withdrew from the study so they wished in the near future (a 
time window of two weeks was allowed before the data were entered). 
Results 
The following self-report scales, scored according to guidelines, were employed 
to assess individual differences in personality, affective states, and emotional 
intelligence. The short form trait emotional intelligence (TEIQueSF) questionnaire 
(Mean=130.31, SD=16.70, α=.75). The emotional regulation (ER) questionnaire 
(Mean=42.86, SD=7.31, α=.63). The Dickman’s Impulsivity Inventory (DII) designed 
to measure functional impulsivity (Mean=31.78, SD=7.42, α=.74) and dysfunctional 
impulsivity (Mean=32.67, SD=7.28, α=.71). The Positive Affect Negative affect Scales 
(PANAS), Positive affect (Mean=27.38, SD=8.14, α=.77), and Negative Affect 
(Mean=15.61, SD=5.37, α=.73). The Behavioural Inhibition and Behavioural Activation 
Scales (BIS/BAS), Behavioural Inhibition (Mean=17.85, SD=6.61, α=.80), and the BAS 
subscales Drive (Mean=12.33, SD=3.24, α=.74), Fun Seeking (Mean=11.78, SD=3.96, 
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α=.74), Reward Responsiveness (Mean=14.03, SD=4.13, α=.75), and total Behavioural 





   
Measure    
 Mean StD α 
ER 42.86 7.31 .63 
TEI 130.31 16.70 .75 
FI 31.78 7.42 .74 
DI 32.67 7.28 .71 
PA 27.38 8.14 .77 
NA 15.61 5.37 .73 
BIS 17.85 6.61 .80 
BAS 36.30 11.06 .84 
BAS DR 12.33 3.24 .74 
BAS FS 11.78 3.96 .74 
BAS RR 14.03 4.13 .75 
______________________________________________________________________ 
ER=Emotional Regulation TEI=trait emotional intelligence questionnaire, FI=functional 
impulsivity, DI=dysfunctional impulsivity, PA=positive affect, NA=negative affect, 
BIS=behavioral inhibition scale, BAS=behavioral acivation scale, BAS DR= BAS 




Participants recognized M = 5.19 (SD = 1.48) of the 11 cities presented in our 
questionnaire.  Four (4) participants recognized all 11 cities and three (3) participants 
did not recognize any of the cities presented and thus were excluded from the study 
because the discrimination index (DI) could not be calculated. With regards to the 
discrimination index “a score of zero is necessary for being a true RH user” (Hillbig & 
Pohl, 2008), nonetheless a zero score as Hillbig and Pohl (2008) explain is not sufficient 
to determine with certainty exclusive reliance on the RH as the criterion upon which the 
decision is based. In addition, it follows that the greater the deviation from a score of 
zero for the discrimination index (ranges from -1 to +1), the greater the possibility for 
the participant to have incorporated some additional information in the decision making 
process. The mean "recognition validity" was significantly above guessing level (M 
=.69, SD = .21). 
To assess whether individual differences may be determinants of RH use, 
individual absolute scores the discrimination index  (DI) were correlated with individual 
scores of Functional Impulsivity, Dysfunctional Impulsivity, Positive Affect, Negative 
Affect, and the BIS/BAS scales. No significant relationship was found between 
dysfunctional impulsivity (r = -.10, p = .42), positive affect (r = .15, p = .22), 
behavioural activation (r = -.15, p = .21) behavioural inhibition (r = -.21, p = .07) and 
absolute scores of the Discrimination Index. However, significant relationships between 
functional impulsivity (r = .26, p = .02), negative affect (r = .33, p = .01) and absolute 






Table 7.2: Correlations between the discrimination index, personality and 




 DIndex FI DI PA NA BAS 
FI .26*      
DI -.10 -.07     
PA .15 .20 -.17    
NA .33** .12 -.11 .08   
BAS -.12 .07 .19 .19 -.10  
BIS -.21 .01 .16 -.01 .02 .21 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*.     Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  **.  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
DIndex = discrimination index, FI = functional impulsivity, DI = dysfunctional 
impulsivity, PA = positive affect, NA = negative affect, BIS = behavioural inhibition 
scale, BAS = behavioural inhibition scale 
 
These results indicate that individuals who are high in functional impulsivity and 
negative affect were more likely to rely on RH use for deciding between the two options 
presented in each trial. 
The following step in our analysis was a multiple regression model to assess 
possible associations between absolute DI scores and scores on the variables of affective 
states and impulsivity. Affective states (PA, NA) and impulsivity (FImp, DImp) 
predicted people’s adherence to the RH with an explained variance of 17 %, R squared 
= .17, F (4, 68) = 3.46, p = .01, and the standardized regression coefficients were: for 
FImp beta was = .21, for DImp beta was = -.04, for PA beta was = .08, and for NA beta 







Table 7.3: Regression analysis for variables predicting adherence to the RH 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
  B SEB β 
FI  .01 .01 .21 
DI  -.01 .01 -.04 
PA  .01 .01 .08 
NA  .02 .01 .30** 
     
 R Squared  .17  
 Adj. R Sq  .12  
 F change in R Sq  3.46**  
_________________________________________________________________ 
Multiple regression analysis was used to test if the personality traits and affective states 
significantly predicted participants' adherence to RH use. The results of the regression 
indicated the four predictors explained 17 %, R squared = .17, F (4, 68) = 3.46, p = .01. 
It was found that negative affect significantly predicted adherence to RH use (beta = 
.30, p=.01). 
 
Next, we  examined whether the individual decision agent’s knowledge validity 
was related to affective states and impulsivity and if any of them offered a more 
accurate description with regards to people’s reliance on the RH to make an inference 
between two options. Further bivariate correlations were obtained to examine the 







Table 7.4: Correlations between the discrimination index, personality, affective 
states, and measures of people's accesibility to further knowledge (N=73) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
  RV KA FI DI PA 
KA -.19     
FI -.03 -.07    
DI .01 -.22 -.07   
PA .09 .09 .20 -.17  
NA .15 .05 .12 -.11 .08 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
*.     Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  **.  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
RV = recognition validity, KA = knowledge availability, FImp = functional impulsivity, 
DImp = dysfunctional impulsivity, PA = positive affect, NA = negative affect 
 
The correlations between affective states, impulsivity and the amount of items 
that individual participants confirmed further knowledge was involved in the decision 
making process was not significant. The data show that affective states and impulsivity 
were not associated with the amount of accurate decisions in cases where further 
knowledge was involved in the decision making process. Thus affective states and 
impulsivity were not directly related to people’s recognition validity and the proportion 
of peoples’ knowledge used in the decision making process. 
Next, both recognition validity and knowledge availability were inputted into the 









Table 5: Regression analysis for variables predicting adherence to the RH 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
  B SEB β 
FI  .01 .01 .22 
DI  -.01 .01 -.05 
PA  .01 .01 .06 
NA  .02 .01 .27* 
RV  .32 .21 .17 
KA  -.01 .01 -.05 
     
 R Squared  .20  
 Adj. R Sq  .13  
 F change in R Sq  2.81*  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Multiple regression analysis was used to test if the effects of negative affect and 
functional impulsivity is mediated by peoples’ accessibility to knowledge. As a result, R 
squared increased by .03 and the equation model remained significant, R squared = .20, 
adjusted R squared = .13, F(6,66) = 2.81, p = .02. Thus, the new regression equation 
after having added both measures of knowledge explained 20% of variance in our 
model. It was found that negative affect significantly predicted adherence to RH use 
(beta = .27, p=.02). We conclude that the results obtained from the regression equation 
rule out the possibility that the effects of negative affect and functional impulsivity are 
mediated by peoples’ accessibility to knowledge--RV & KA 
 
R squared increased by .03 and the equation model remained significant, R 
squared = .20, F(6,66) = 2.81, p = .02. Thus, the new regression equation after having 
added both measures of knowledge explained 20% of variance in our model. The results 
obtained from the regression equation rule out the possibility that the effect of affective 




In the present study a number of individual differences’ variables were 
investigated as potential determinants of adhering to an optimization decision making 
strategy, i.e. the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). A study by 
Hillbig (2008) showed that RH use was negatively correlated with neuroticism. More 
specifically Hillbig showed that neuroticism predicted individual decision maker’s use 
of the RH “while the other Big 5 factors and intelligence yielded no additional 
explanatory power” (2008a). Hillbig also showed that neuroticism effects regarding the 
use of the RH were not directly influenced by the proportion of knowledge availability 
“thus lending preliminary support for the notion that this effect may, in fact, be 
genuinely motivational in nature” (Hillbig, 2008a). 
Neuroticism has also been examined from Gray’s biopsychological theory of 
personality perspective, using Carver and White’s (1994) BAS/BIS measures which 
assess two core dimensions of personality, i.e. the behaviour activation and behaviour 
inhibition systems (Gray, p. 246-276, 1981).
 
The behaviour activation system is thought 
to be associated with approach behaviour and sensitivity to reward whereas the 
behaviour inhibition system is thought to be related to avoidant behaviour and 
sensitivity to punishment (Corr, 2008). Neuroticism scores have been reported to be 
positively correlated with behaviour inhibition scores at the P< 0.01 level (Boksema et. 
al. 2006). Therefore, one of our predictions was that behaviour inhibition scores will be 
negatively correlated with the recognition heuristic use. 
The RH as a fast and frugal cognitive heuristic favours quick assessment of the 
information and rapid decision making relying solely on recognition exploiting the 
human brain’s “vast, sensitive, and reliable capacity for recognition” (Goldstein & 
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Gigerenzer, 2002). Our second prediction was that peoples’ adherence to use of the 
recognition heuristic will be positively correlated with functional impulsivity that 
translates as a propensity for rapid decision making. Dickman (1990) proposed that 
there are two major manifestations of impulsive behaviour a) dysfunctional impulsivity, 
which is associated with the traditionally negative view of impulsive behaviour and b) 
functional impulsivity, which is associated with rapid decision making and is 
understood to be a positive dispositional construct enabling people to remain 
operational under stress and anxiety. The RH city size task was presented to the 
participants as a performance based task but with no time constraints. Functional 
impulsivity was expected to predict RH use because the effects of the descriptive 
construct, i.e. rapid decision making, resembles strong similarities to the underlying 
evolutionary processes that have been used as a framework explanation upon which the 
fast and frugal heuristics model of adaptive decision making strategies was based. 
The results we obtained in the present study support our hypothesis that 
functional impulsivity will determine people’s adherence to RH use but did not support 
our hypothesis that people’s adherence to further knowledge beyond recognition will be 
negatively correlated with BIS scores. Specifically, the behaviour inhibition measure 
(BIS) was negatively correlated with adherence to RH use as was predicted but did not 
reach significance 
However, although not among our initial predictions negative affect was 
associated with people’s adherence to RH use. Particularly, functional impulsivity and 
negative affect were positively correlated with the amount of further knowledge beyond 
recognition being involved in the decision making process. In addition, both variables 
functional impulsivity and negative affect were not related to recognition validity of 
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participant’s further use of knowledge and both variables, i.e. recognition validity and 
knowledge availability, did not predict whether the individual decision agents employed 
the RH strategy or not. Finally, a regression model additionally incorporating 
dysfunctional impulsivity, positive affect, and trait EI performed slightly better than the 
initial model that included functional impulsivity, negative affect and behaviour 
inhibition. 
In light of result’s interpretation attempted here, we should clarify that the 
discrimination index (for a review of the measure see Hilbig & Pohl, 2008) that was 
employed in the present study as a further knowledge use assessment does not entail a 
straightforward dichotomous distinction between subjects that make use of additional 
knowledge and subjects that do not make use of additional knowledge. With regards to 
the discrimination index “a score of zero is necessary for being a true RH user” (Hillbig 
& Pohl, 2008), nonetheless a zero score as Hillbig and Pohl (2008) explain is not 
sufficient to determine with certainty exclusive reliance on the RH as the criterion upon 
which the decision is based. In addition, it follows that the greater the deviation from a 
score of zero for the discrimination index (ranges from -1 to +1), the greater the 
possibility for the participant to have incorporated some additional information in the 
decision making process. Based on these premises, we may conclude that the higher the 
participants’ scores of functional impulsivity and scores of negative affect were, since 
both variables were positively correlated with RH use, the more likely the individuals 
were employing the RH strategy (further knowledge beyond recognition was not related 
to functional impulsivity and negative affect). These findings could be interpreted in the 
following way: supposing that human decision agents scoring high in functional 
impulsivity and negative affect were affected from knowingly participating in a test—
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the classical city size task had been presented as a performance test. In search of a 
plausible explanation for the results obtained we may assume that individuals high on 
functional impulsivity and negative affect refrained from basing their decisions on their 
knowledge thus relying more on the recognition criterion as a fast and reliable strategy 
mechanism that would allow rapid departure from the cognitively laden and effortful 
decision making process. 
 Hillbig (2008) suggests that the application of fast and frugal heuristics in the 
decision making process as an optimization strategy to regulate negative emotions is 
thus an open question. In the present study we report some preliminary findings that 
lend additional support, further to that presented by Hillbig (2008), to the hypothesis 




















In this chapter we will offer a brief overview of the thesis outlining the key 
research breakthroughs that influenced and inspired the present project. We will also 
provide some general discussion points and remarks that will prepare the ground for a 
more in depth evaluation of the research field and will make some predictions regarding 
its future. Then we will attempt to draw some concrete conclusions from the present 
studies that comprise the core of this thesis. We will also present strengths and 
limitations of the present studies. And finally we will attempt a representative synthesis 
of the major ideas behind this thesis addressing some key areas offering explicit 
research recommendations to address limitations and future research directions. 
 
Summary of the Thesis, Albeit a Brief One 
The traditional classical economic view of man as a rational actor has been 
constantly challenged the past five decades with increasing intensity as the bridging 
between psychology and economics intensifies. Economic behaviour, like everyday 
human behaviour, varies greatly and cannot be captured in mathematical formulations 
and a priori axiomatic principles. Psychologists that developed an interest in studying 
economic behaviour and decision making have laid solid foundations for an empirical 
understanding of decision making processes, economic behaviour and risk taking 
activity on aggregate levels. 
In this thesis we attempted first to discuss a) the behavioural decision making 
approach to the study of decision making under risk and uncertainty that was pioneered 
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by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, and b) the cognitive evolutionary approach of 
fast and frugal heuristics, namely the adaptive toolbox approach, which was pioneered 
by Gerd Gigerenzer. Both of them are vigorous research lines that have produced 
maximum input for furthering the research cause of understanding essential judgement 
and human decision making processes. Although, both research lines at first seem to be 
diametrically different in their respective understanding of human judgement and 
decision making process they both have a single common denominator that makes them 
in a sense “blood brothers”. They both recognize the same forefather in the name of 
Herbert Simon as the sole inspiration for sparking their birth. 
Herbert Simon was among the first that realized and later conceptualized that 
human rationality was not perfect, as economists deliberately assumed, laying the 
foundations for the empirical investigation of human reasoning and cognitive decision 
making strategies pointing a finger to the limited descriptive validity of utility 
maximization (Simon, 1955). Herbert Simon, a true revolutionary in the fields of 
economics, cognitive psychology, and computer science, based his assumptions of 
imperfect rationality on the well known critical physiological limits the human brain. 
Human decision agents, Simon suggested, intend under circumstances to be fully 
rational but ultimately they are only “boundedly rational” due to information processing 
limitations (Qin & Simon, 1990; Simon, 1990; 1957). 
Simon introduced the concept of “bounded rationality”, a cognitive model of 
dynamic adaptation to account for the information processing limitations, and which 
represented the first attempt to incorporate cognitive limitations into normative models 
of human reasoning, judgement and decision making (Simon, 1957). His pioneering 
analysis of bounded rationality introduced an information processing and problem 
197 
 
solving approach to human decision making (Simon, 1957). Although, Simon initiated 
the single most important and undoubtedly most influential attempt to fill the gap in 
understanding human decision behaviour and improve the descriptive validity of 
normative models he merely reduced the problem of rationality to the human brain’s 
computational power stating that “boundedly rational agents experience limits in 
formulating and solving complex problems and in processing (receiving, storing, 
retrieving, transmitting) information” (op. cit. in Williamson, 1981). Herbert Simon’s 
assumption that human decision agents are “procedurally rational” was a weak, i.e. in 
terms of descriptive accuracy, and strong, i.e. it greatly improved the neoclassical 
economic assumption regarding human rationality, point at the same time because it 
furthered the cause of understanding human judgement and decision making processes 
and proved to be a significant “feeding” point for future research. 
Herbert Simon’s most influential successors were Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman
12
 and Gerd Gigerenzer who nonetheless developed diverse yet invigorating 
research frameworks for the study of judgement and decision making. Tversky and 
Kahneman set the field in motion with two papers that identified and tried to explain 
heuristics and biases (the list has expanded since then and still keeps getting enriched) 
of, i.e. cognitive reproducible errors in judgement and decision making, which form the 
core foundations that challenged the traditional economic view of man as a rational 
actor. The first paper showed how cognitive heuristics, i.e. cognitive “shortcuts”, 
produce personal decision weights based on one’s own reference point, which largely 
deviate from statistical principles that had dominated normative theories up to that point 
                                                           
12
 The late Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman worked together in unusual collaboration that spanned 4 
decades and the research cited that won Daniel Kahneman the Nobel prize in economics was produced in 
collaboration with Amos Tversky. 
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(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Later their second paper titled “Prospect theory” 
formulated an alternative descriptive model to the traditional expected utility model. It 
appeared in Econometrica documenting a significant number of violations of “a priory” 
assumptions of classical economic modelling suggesting a descriptive framework, 
which was inspired by fundamental models of psychophysics, to account for the 
observed discrepancies in aggregate decision making behaviour (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). 
Gigerenzer, espousing the cognitive evolutionary approach, argued that 
heuristics cannot be cognitive errors otherwise evolution would have eliminated them, 
i.e. a cognitive error that systematically leads to biased decisions would put at risk the 
species existence. Therefore, according to Gigerenzer’s understanding of human 
rationality heuristics had to be there for a reason and this reason comes in the form of 
the appealing definition framework (it is not crystallized yet) that postulates that fast 
and frugal heuristics are simple cognitive mechanisms that by pass the limited 
computational limitations of the human brain and manifest in the form of cognitive 
“shortcuts” whose sole purpose is to make humans smarter by enabling them to act 
faster (Gigerenzer, Todd & the ABC Research Group, 1999). In other words, simple 
heuristics are adaptive cognitive mechanisms, i.e. essential parts of the “adaptive 
toolbox” framework that offers a wide range of decision strategies to be selected 
according to the context and problem they encounter and operate as optimizing decision 
making strategies that “safeguard” the single most important evolutionary rule, i.e. 
survival of the species (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999). 
Both frameworks aim to shed light in the problem of human rationality and the 
quest for understanding human judgement and decision making processes focus 
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primarily on aggregate models. However, there are still significant discrepancies among 
aggregate models that aspire to solve the human rationality problem and explain human 
judgement and decision making processes. Therefore, the most significant part of this 
thesis was to discuss contributions of individual differences to the study of human 
judgement and decision making processes in order to add a small piece of work towards 
this direction in the form of three small scale studies. 
As we mentioned above the leading research programs regarding the problem of 
human rationality focus on aggregate models with, however, only a small number of 
studies carried out in recent years on individual differences and decision making. In 
recent risk taking studies a number of researchers have pointed out that decision agents 
on the individual level largely differ in risk taking behaviour while others have showed 
that human decision agents, depending on the decision making context and task, largely 
exhibit inconsistent risk taking behaviour (Lauriola et. al. 2005; Levin et. al. 2007; 
Zuckerman, 1994). Therefore, contrary to the established utilitarian decision making 
theory approach to the study of risk taking behaviour that has been focused on the 
characteristics of the situations, ignoring interpersonal differences and studying 
aggregate  behaviour Nicholson and colleagues claim that risk propensity, i.e. a risk 
loving tendency, is rooted within personality (2005). 
Common sense comes to the rescue for individual differences through the 
intuitive assumption that any individual may be risk loving in one domain, i.e. extreme 
sports, but risk averse in another domain, i.e. personal finances. Furthermore, we 
discussed how replicated research findings show that an individual’s attitude towards 
diverse decision making domains is not stable and may be subject to change depending 
on a multitude of factors (Camerer & Lowenstein, 2005; Frederick 2005; Tversky & 
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Kahneman, 1992; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Rabin, 1998; Mullainathan and Thaler, 
2000; Rabin & Thaler, 2002). Although not all research is directed at a common goal, it 
is becoming evident that individual differences have the potential for explaining the 
apparent inconsistencies that derive from the study of aggregate decision making 
behaviour, offering support to a well-received argument which postulates that decision 
making researchers should consider a multi-domain approach to measuring people’s 
decision making behaviour. 
Every human decision making agent is faced with numerous choice dilemmas 
that involve highly uncertain outcomes on a daily basis and the propensity to take 
and/or avoid risks is highly influenced by a number of individual differences that act 
either as direct predictors or mediators of decision making behaviour. Therefore, the 
scope of this thesis was to investigate the influence of affect, emotional intelligence, and 
personality on risk taking behaviour and more specifically instance based decision 
making in laboratory based experiments. The general objective of the project was to 
strengthen the relationship between individual differences and decision theoretical 
frameworks and provide some additional groundwork that would contribute a small 
piece of knowledge helping in this way to establish individual differences research as a 
key component in understanding human judgment and decision making processes. The 
specific objective of the project was to examine the predictive validity of specific 
individual differences such as emotional intelligence, affect, and personality in instance 
based decision making under risk and uncertainty and ignorance based decision making. 
In order to achieve these objectives we designed three exploratory studies aiming to 
examine the predictive validity of emotional intelligence, affect, and personality in 
instance based decision making under risk and uncertainty and ignorance based decision 
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making. The assumptions upon which the studies were based are in line with previous 
experimental work and have been formulated on strong hypotheses deriving from 
existing literature in accord with high academic standards. 
 
Strengths and Limitations of the Present Studies 
There are a few important limitations in the present studies. First the total 
samples for all the studies were somewhat small, i.e. 64, 68, and 78 respectively, and 
although this is no problem for exploring associations between variables it possibly has 
influenced the power of the regression equations. As a rule of thumb we should aim for 
at least 15 participants per variable included in a regression equation and if there are 6 
variables included in a given regression equation then a minimum of 90 participants are 
needed to have sufficient statistical power. Unfortunately, in none of the studies 
presented here the number of participants was in accord with this simplistic yet practical 
rule of thumb. Second, all of the research participants were most undergraduate and 
some graduate students in psychology. This should be considered as a major caveat 
because in the Western world general population there is less than 0.001% of people 
that actually studies psychology. So, whenever decision making behaviour is the focus 
of the study it is very important to carry out the studies in well representative samples of 
the general population. 
Among the strengths in the present studies are some first indications regarding 
individual differences influences in fast and frugal decision strategies (study 2), 
examining risk taking behaviour under different levels of risk (study 1-A) and 
replicating, in part, the findings in a similar task where both options were probabilistic, 




Studies 1-A and 1-B had multiple aims covering two broad categories. 
Specifically to  A) provide evidence regarding the influence of affect and dispositional 
traits on shifts of preference concerned with the consistency of risk-taking behaviour in 
instance based monetary decision making tasks and B) to identify personality correlates 
of financial decision making under risk and uncertainty. The results obtained from these 
studies lend preliminary support to the following hypotheses a) positive affect is a risky 
behaviour determinant on instance based decision making tasks, b) approach behaviour 
measures such as total BAS and BAS tendencies such as Fun Seeking and Drive are 
risky behaviour determinants on instance based decision making tasks. Studies 1-a and 
1-B failed to provide support to the following hypotheses which state that a) functional 
impulsivity will predict advantageous risky decision making, i.e. an attempt to achieve 
or maximize personal gain depending on the choice set situation, b) dysfunctional 
impulsivity will predict risk aversive decision making that involves no “real” gain, i.e. 
in a risky choice set situation with a negative payoff, c) behaviour inhibition is a risk 
aversive behaviour determinant in instance based decision making tasks. The results 
obtained in studies 1-A and 1-B is a promise for further investigations that would seek 
to investigate these relationships, specifically in populations whose lifestyle is affected 
and/or determined by risk-taking behaviours. Results obtained from the studies 1-A and 
1-B, as well as findings from several other studies reviewed in this thesis, indicate that 
instance based decision making tasks are promising tools for measuring risk-taking 
behaviour and studying the complex interaction between variables involved in human 
judgement and decision making processes along diverse tasks. 
203 
 
Study 2 followed a call to investigate “individual differences in fast and frugal” 
heuristic strategies (Hillbig, 2008), and aimed to provide some first indications 
regarding possible directions and future research concerned with individual differences 
effects on fast and frugal decision making. The results obtained from this study lend 
preliminary support to the following hypotheses a) functional impulsivity will 
determine people’s adherence to RH use and b) negative affect will determine people’s 
adherence to RH use. The results obtained in this study did not support our hypothesis 
that people’s adherence to further knowledge beyond recognition will be negatively 
correlated with BIS scores. However, we should mention that the behaviour inhibition 
measure (BIS) was negatively correlated with adherence to RH use as was predicted but 
did not reach significance at the P<0.05 level. In addition we can rule out that functional 
impulsivity and negative affect are associated with the use of the RH strategy. In 
addition, both variables functional impulsivity and negative affect were not related to 
recognition validity and knowledge availability and they failed to predict the 
individual’s employment of the RH strategy. 
 
General Remarks, Recommendations and Future Research Directions 
It has been suggested that individual differences maybe among the top 
candidates to contribute to the understanding of human judgement and decision making 
processes and most importantly help us explain the apparent inconsistency in results of 
aggregate economic behaviour, offering support to the argument that economists should 




In order for this scenario, i.e. individual differences explaining discrepancies 
observed in aggregate models of decision making behaviour, to come true three distinct 
research aims that need to be pursued within the field of individual differences:  A) to 
provide experimental evidence regarding the influence of affect and dispositional traits 
on shifts of preference concerned with the consistency of risk-taking behaviour, B) to 
identify dispositional traits and cognitive ability constructs that determine risky decision 
making behaviour in diverse risk-taking domains, and C) to identify genetic factors that 
account for a predisposition for advantageous decision making in the long run on 
controlled decision making tasks.  
The exploration of framing effects—first identified by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979)—could be a first systematic attempt to identify dispositional traits and cognitive 
abilities that make individuals more or less susceptible to framing effects and 
particularly to what is known as risky choice framing effects that may be studied in 
diverse decision making domains. Stanovich and West (1998, 2000, 20008) have 
provided a systematic account of proxies of cognitive ability and a number of heuristics 
and biases that affect the decision making process. Following a parallel line of research 
it would be very interesting to explore individual differences determinants of both gain 
and loss risky choice frames in decision making tasks. Framing effects are cognitive 
reproducible errors in a sense and demonstrate irrational decision making behaviour in a 
predictable manner because they illustrate preference reversals regarding prospects in 
between and within group designs. When the researcher is presenting the same option in 
deferent frames (e.g. positive frame, negative frame) by changing the wording alone this 
heavily affects the decision making process and alters the participant’s final decisions 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Risky choice framing effects have been implicated in 
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lotteries and gambles, simple risky choice tasks and hypothetical investment scenarios. 
In particular, individuals tend to employ very inconsistent choice strategies, primarily 
depending on whether the problem is framed positively or negatively. Tversky and 
Kahneman argued that the differences in the framing made the participants to see the 
problems from a different angle (1981) but there are additional things to take into 
account with regards to framing: A) it has been shown that not all decision agent’s 
exhibit framing effects (Levin et. al. 2002) and B) there have been identified numerous 
influential moderators that shape decision outcomes such as self-esteem (McElroy et. al. 
2003), affect (Moore & Chater, 2003) and gender (Fagley & Miler, 1997; Wang et. al. 
2001). In addition there have been observed wide discrepancies regarding people’s 
choices under framing in the literature that potentially account for trait individual 
differences (Lauriola & Levin, 2001; Bernstein et. al. 1999). 
Another significant dimension in decision making is loss aversion in both 
choices involving risk and uncertainty, i.e. lotteries and binary choice gambles 
(Birnbaum, 2004b), and riskless choices, i.e. manifestations of the endowment effect 
(Kahneman et. al. 1990) which essentially reflects monetary differences between what a 
decision agent is “willing to pay” to acquire something of value how much he/she is 
willing to sell it for (Thaler, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Loss aversion 
manifests as a propensity to favour avoiding losses than acquiring gains of equal value, 
i.e. a tractable and measurable difference between loss aversive behaviour compared to 
the decision agent’s own status quo and a lower aspiration towards gains of equal value. 
The loss aversive decision making behaviour effect was first demonstrated by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in a set of experiments and was presented as a 
competitive and realistic counterexample to the axiomatic assumptions of the expected 
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utility model. To a considerable extent, loss aversion as it is commonly observed and 
utilized in experimental paradigms directly causes risk aversion—that is, simply put, an 
inherent fear of loss prevents people from taking risks. In most of the experiments 
regarding loss aversion, individuals participating in a real experimental auction (the 
same applies in auctions with hypothetical payoffs) demand significantly more for an 
item they possess than they are willing to pay for the same item that is not in their 
possession (Thaler, 1980; Benartzi & Thaler, 1995). 
Loss aversive decision making behaviour does not distinguish between domains 
and contexts, it takes place in both riskless and risky choices and is valuable in 
illustrating where the normative assumptions of decision making models are not able to 
provide realistic explanations. However, there is rather little “evidence whether people 
who are loss averse in riskless choices are also loss aversive in risky choices” because 
behaviour decision researchers tend to focus on between subjects designs and aggregate 
behaviour (Herrmann et. al. 2009). Concerning loss aversion it would be very 
interesting to I) investigate “whether people who are loss averse in riskless choices are 
also loss averse in risky choices” (Herrmann et. al. 2009) by designing within subjects 
designs and II) by exploring the contribution of some key dispositional traits such as 
impulsivity and neuroticism to risky preferences and loss aversion in both riskless and 
risky choices. At the same time it would be very interesting to explore whether the 
behavioural inhibition and behavioural activation systems could potentially predict A) 
the human tendency of being averse in domains of loss in hypothetical financial 
investment and savings scenarios and B) particular shifts in preferences for risky 
decision making under optimal and sub-optimal scenarios of individual behaviour under 
bonus, penalty, and combined (i.e. mixed) risky choice frames presented as real 
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financial problems. Additionally, of great interest is the predictive power of the 
behavioural inhibition and activation systems in explaining, at least in part, why certain 
individuals appear consistently loss aversive in their decision making style both in 
riskless and risky situations concerning monetary investment decisions.  
A recent focus on human genetic endowment aspires to provide insights with 
regards to how this affects human judgement and decision making processes. Regarding 
the contribution of individual differences in helping solve the puzzle of human 
rationality the identification of genetic factors that account for advantageous decision 
making predispositions could be the single most important contributions from the field. 
Some preliminary studies have showed that an individual’s genetic endowment can 
affect behaviour with regards to risky decision making (Frydman et. al. 2011, Cesarini 
et. al. 2010; Cesarini et. al. 2009). Frydman et. al suggest that genes could possibly 
“affect the value assigned to different risky options, or they may affect the way in which 
the brain adjudicates between options based on their value” (2011). Frydman and 
colleagues explain that “combined methods from neuroeconomics and behavioural 
genetics” have initiated systematic investigations regarding ”the impact that the genes 
encoding for monoamine oxidase-A (MAOA), the serotonin transporter (5-HTT) and 
the dopamine D4 receptor (DRD4)” may have on decision making under risk and 
uncertainty. Consistent with the emerging literature on genetic determinants of decision 
making behaviour, it would be very interesting to investigate whether genetic factors are 
able to influence and/or predict advantageous decision making under risk and 
uncertainty, as Frydman and colleagues showed in a preliminary study (2011), in 
diverse and more realistic decision making domains involving more than a binary 




Some really important research questions to be examined from an individual 
differences point of view to address the problem of human rationality are the following: 
• How do established dispositional traits influence people’s financial 
investment and savings’ activities? 
• Can dispositional traits predict in a systematic manner risky decision 
making behaviour? Are personality traits contributing factors to impaired and irrational 
decision making behaviour? 
• What is the individual differences position and contribution in addressing 
human rationality and explaining predictably irrational behaviour and decision making 
anomalies? 
• There are some indications that genetic endowment explains 
advantageous monetary decision making in simple gambles, does this hold true in real 
life environments and financial investment and savings behaviour? 
• How can we create plausible descriptive models of human decision 
making behaviour stemming directly from their judgment and decision making 
activities, combining cognitive, emotional and social dimensions? 
• How can we use plausible descriptive models that account for human 
decision making to formulate a delivery framework upon which investment propositions 
that support better financial outcomes for lay people can be based? 
• Descriptive decision making models heavily focus on aggregate 
behaviour and aim to gradually replace normative decision making models aspiring to 
be more tractable and practical approaches in describing decision making anomalies 
(see Camerer & Lowenstein, 2003). How can individual differences help to incorporate 
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naturalistic risk-taking behaviour and real world risky choice scenario outcomes in 
descriptive decision making models? 
The proposed lines of research concerning the contribution of individual 
differences in furthering the cause of understanding human rationality that have been 
discussed here and the research questions outlined above fall under a wider umbrella 
that seeks to understand human behaviour and decision making performance both in the 
lab and real world settings. In particular, the research proposals discussed in this chapter 
focus on the psychological and contextual factors that influence financial decision-
making using behavioural economic paradigms. Besides attempting to “get the 
psychology right in choosing assumptions” that would help us explain and model 
economic behaviour on a descriptive framework, we should keep an eye not only in 
optimizing decision making in the lab but also help lay the foundations for improving 
real life decision making skills (Camerer, 2005). To achieve this broad goal there is a 
need to develop simple descriptive models and tractable economic behaviour themes 
and concepts which a) have practical applications across diverse decision making 
domains, b) make accurate forecasts about risk-taking behaviour in realistic decision 
making problems—i.e. investment, savings, and consumer behaviour, and c) remain 
invariant across time—i.e. the predictive ability of the model remains stable across time 
(for a more in depth discussion of the relevant framework see Camerer, 2005). 
Understanding the contribution of individual differences in explaining and 
formalizing descriptive models of economic behaviour has decision making 
implications both at the individual and consumer financial levels, and so relates with 
greater collective forces that seek to shape and reform global economic performance, 
policy and management strategic priorities. This line of research would also help to 
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understand decision making behaviour and strategic preferences at the individual level 
because it focuses both on dispositional traits and state determinants of individual 
perceptions of risk, human judgement and decision making. 
Therefore, the collective goal of being engaged in such a line of research is to 
assist in developing new descriptive decision making models that would gradually 
replace normative decision making models allowing the possibility of tractability to be a 
key factor and thus improve the governance and regulation of complex public policy 
and financial systems that are bound to suffer the most from irrational human 
behaviour. 
Closing, we should stretch the importance of considering individual differences 
as a top candidate in helping to explain, in part, human rationality and assisting to 
model a descriptive framework that would account with equal success human economic 
behaviour both in the lab and in real life scenarios. In an attempt to provide plausible 
descriptive models of decision making in general and economic behaviour in particular 
individual differences may help us to find new ways to address resulting social changes 
and enhance decision making performance and growth at the micro level of our society. 
It seems imperative that individual differences would certainly contribute to our 
understanding of human judgement, decision making processes, and general economic 
behaviour from a multi-domain perspective, taking into account both the limitations of 
the human computational power and the severe limitations usually, if not always, 
associated with complex financial instruments, which often seek to manipulate financial 
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